



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
COMMANDER MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND  
471 EAST C STREET  
NORFOLK VA 23511-2419

5800  
N00  
3 Sep 15

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6) ltr 5830 of 10 Jul 15

From: Commander, Military Sealift Command  
To: Investigation File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE USNS MERCY (T-AH 19)  
ALLISION AND DAMAGE WITH THE USS ARIZONA MEMORIAL IN  
PEARL HARBOR, HI THAT OCCURRED ON 27 MAY 2015

Encl: (53) Lab Results (July 13, 2015)  
(54) Evaluations of (b)(6) (2012-2014)

1. The Findings of Fact, Opinions, and Recommendations are approved except as stated below.
2. Finding of Fact 73 is modified to include information discovered after the investigation report was signed. Finding of Fact 73 is modified to state:

Required reports of Chemical Drug and Alcohol Testing Following a Serious Marine Incident (CG 2692B) were submitted. All test results, but one, were negative. Enclosure 53.

3. Opinion 19 is added:

The single positive test result did not contribute to causing the USNS MERCY allision. FoF 61.e.

4. Finding of Fact 83 is modified to state:

(b)(6) was promoted to his position 3 July 2011. He had filled the position of Administrative Chief Mate (the senior position below the Master) onboard three ordnance-laden ships. Enclosure (54).

5. Recommendation 10 is disapproved. The Findings of Fact and Opinions do not warrant a bottom-up review of manning requirements and procedures for all government-operated ships.
6. Recommendations 1 through 9 and 11 through 15 shall be carried out by Director, Government Operations, NFAF and Service



Support Ships (P01) within 60 days. All programs and N-codes shall support P01 in carrying them out and P01 shall report completion.

7. This investigation is final.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. K. Shannon', with a stylized, cursive script.

T. K. SHANNON

Copy to:

P01

PM4

N12

N00L

MSCPAC



10 July 2015

From: Captain (b)(6) USN  
To: Commander, Military Sealift Command

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Ref: (a) Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN)  
(b) USNS MERCY OPREP 5 DTG 272000Z MAY 15 (C)  
(c) Article 0847, U.S. Navy Regs (1990)  
(d) OPNAVINST 5440.75B  
(e) COMPACFLTINST/COMUSFLTFORCOMINST  
3530.1A  
(f) COMSCINST 3121.9C (SOM)  
(g) USNS MERCY LOGREQ DTG 171715 APR 15 (C)  
(h) MSCREP PEARL HARBOR HI LOGREQ REPLY DTG 132131Z  
MAY 15 (C)  
(i) USNS MERCY OPREP-3 DTG 272200Z MAY 15  
(j) USNS MERCY OPREP-3 DTG 172200Z JUN 15  
(k) MSFSCINST 3502.3A (AFLOAT TRAINING)  
(l) International Convention on Standards of  
Training, Certifications, and Watchkeeping for  
Seafarers, 1978, as amended 2011 (STCW)  
(m) 46 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter B, Part 11

Encl: (1) COMSC ltr Ser N02 of 28 May 2015  
(2) Google Overhead View of ARIZONA Memorial  
(3) USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) ship characteristics and  
overview brief  
(4) Excerpt from Tech Manual T9241-AG-MMC-010-0-0  
Main Propulsion Turbine and Gear entitled 'MERCY  
SHAFT RPM TO HORSEPOWER'  
(5) USNS MERCY U.S. Coast Guard Temporary  
Certificate of Inspection issued 30 Apr 2015  
(6) Safety Management System (SMS) Duty Statements  
(7) Master's Standing Orders of 13 April 2015  
(8) USNS MERCY Navigational Brief Checklist  
27 May 2015  
(9) USNS MERCY Crew List dtd 17 May 2015  
(10) USNS MERCY Crew Experience Summary  
(11) Declarations and Merchant Mariner Credentials  
(MMC) of Captain Thomas Giudice  
(12) Declarations and MMC of Chief Mate  
(C/M) (b)(6)



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- (13) Declarations and MMC of Second Officer (2/O)  
[REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (14) Declarations and MMC of 2/O [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (15) Declarations and MMC of 3/O [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (16) Declarations and MMC of 3/O [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (17) Declarations and MMC of 3/O [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (18) Declarations and MMC of 3/O [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (19) Declarations and MMC of Chief Radio Electric  
Technician (CRET) [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (20) Declarations and MMC of QM1 (AW/SW)  
[REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (21) Declarations and MMC of Chief Engineer (CHENG)  
[REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (22) Declarations and MMC of Second Assistant  
Engineer (2A/E) [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (23) Declaration and MMC of AB(W) [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (24) USNS MERCY 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet
- (25) Pilot [REDACTED] (b)(6) initial statement
- (26) Investigating Officer (IO) statement re:  
[REDACTED] (b)(6) interview (dtd 02 JUN 2015)
- (27) Declarations of Captain [REDACTED] (b)(6) and Tiger  
4 Report of Marine Accident, Injury, or  
Death (CG-2692) dtd 27 MAY 2015
- (28) Declarations of Captain [REDACTED] (b)(6)  
and Tiger 5 Report of Marine Accident, Injury,  
or Death (CG-2692) dtd 27 MAY 2015 (Tiger 5)
- (29) IO statement (Subj: Tug Contract, Damage  
Photos, and Thrust Calculations)
- (30) USNS MERCY Daily Log dtd 27 May 2015
- (31) USNS MERCY Departure Checklist dtd 27 May 2015
- (32) USNS MERCY Bell Log Wednesday, May 27, 2015
- (33) USNS MERCY Engineering Log dtd 27 May 2015
- (34) USNS MERCY Pilot Boarding Card 27 May 2015
- (35) Simplified Voyage Data Recorder (S-VDR)  
transcript (edited)
- (36) Screen shots of Engineering display for RPM
- (37) Electronic Chart Display and Information System  
(ECDIS) sequence per minute
- (38) Event Photos taken from pier
- (39) Declaration and MMC of 3/O [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (40) Declaration of Supply Utilityman (SU)  
[REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (41) Video taken by SU [REDACTED] (b)(6)
- (42) Video provided by Navy Region Hawaii
- (43) USNS MERCY Report of Marine Accident, Injury,  
or Death (CG-2692) dtd 27 May 2015



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- (44) Reports of Chemical Drug and Alcohol  
Testing Following a Serious Marine Incident  
(CG-2692B) for USNS MERCY, Pilot, and tug  
Captains
- (45) USNS MERCY American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)  
Class Survey Report (CSR) dtd 01 Jun 2015
- (46) USNS MERCY ABS CSR dtd 08 Jun 2015
- (47) CAPT (b)(6) MSC N3/5 / Port Captain (b)(6)  
(b)(6) memo (Subj: USNS MERCY  
NAVIGATION ASSESSMENT) w/enclosures
- (48) (b)(6) (MSC N122) e-mail of 30 Jun 2015  
(Subj: C/M (b)(6) experience)
- (49) USNS MERCY Deck Log Weather Data Sheet  
27 May 2015
- (50) C/M manning shortage
- (51) (b)(6) (MSC N122) e-mail of 9 Jul 2015  
(Subj: 2/O (b)(6) experience)
- (52) USNS MERCY (T-AH19) 12 Month Slider Capture  
(past 12 month schedule)

#### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As directed by enclosure (1) and in accordance with reference (a), an investigation was conducted to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allision between USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) and the USS ARIZONA Memorial that occurred in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 27 May 2015.
2. At the time of this report, a detailed damage assessment with final cost estimates and length of time to repair the ARIZONA Memorial landing dock was not available.
3. The Master, Officers and Crew members of the MERCY who were involved or witnessed the incident, the Federal Harbor Pilot, and the two Harbor Tug Captains were interviewed. All personnel cooperated fully and complied with all requests for information.
4. All times are stated in local time unless otherwise indicated. Local time in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, is Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) minus ten hours. All courses noted in the report are per the gyro compass and ship and wind speeds are reported in knots. Rudder positions are based on orders and not degrees.



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5. All documentary evidence included in this investigation is hereby certified to be original or a copy that is a true and accurate representation of the original. Some original documents are retained aboard MERCY. Personally identifiable information in the enclosures subject to protection under the Privacy Act has been redacted.

6. Recordings made by the vessel's Simplified Voyage Data Recorder (S-VDR) were used to reconstruct the events. However, rudder and engine order information was not available during S-VDR playback and a significant portion of the bridge voice recording was inaudible.

7. Prior to this investigation, Captain Thomas Giudice, MERCY's Master, had the officers and crew members who had participated in the evolution that resulted in the allision prepare statements recording their recollections of the incident. Captain Giudice also made a statement which was attached to a U.S Coast Guard (USCG) Form 2692. These statements, referred to as declarations, are included in the report as enclosures. Statements from the same individuals taken by the Investigating Officer (IO) are identified as "supplemental declarations" to distinguish them from the earlier statements. (b)(6) the Federal Pilot, was interviewed by the USCG as part of its investigation into the incident. The Navy, represented by the IO, was permitted to attend as an interested party. Notes taken by the IO during the USCG's interview of the pilot were used to prepare an IO statement summarizing the pilot's testimony. This IO statement, a copy of which has been provided to the USCG, is included in the report as an enclosure. Finally, (b)(6) and (b)(6) (b)(6) the captains of Tugs Tiger 4 and Tiger 5, respectively, were interviewed by the IO and their statements are included in the report.

8. With two exceptions, no significant disagreements between witness statements or between witness statements and the available documentary evidence (e.g., S-VDR, ECDIS, and the Engineering Automation log) were noted. Where witness statements were inconsistent with the documentary evidence, for example minor discrepancies were noted with respect to timing and the reporting of closing distances between MERCY and the memorial, changes in ordered bell, and rudder positions were relied upon as documentary evidence to craft the findings of fact.



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9. The two exceptions noted pertain to the angle at which the two tugs were working on MERCY. Tiger 4 on the bow was pushing the MERCY during the evolution. When interviewed, the Captain of Tiger 4 maintained that from the time MERCY cleared the K10 pier until (b)(6) was directed to stop pushing, Tiger 4 was pushing at an angle approximately 90 degrees (°) to the keel of MERCY (~270° relative to MERCY). This is contradicted by the statements given by other witnesses and by the photographic evidence which indicate that Tiger 4 was pushing at an angle closer to 60° to the MERCY's keel (~300° relative to MERCY), and not at a 90° angle. In the absence of other evidence to explain the ship's sternway, the evidence that Tiger 4 was pushing at less than a 90° angle to the keel is persuasive. Similarly, Tiger 5 was pulling from the stern chock. The Captain of Tiger 5 stated that (b)(6) was pulling at an angle of 90°. However, several statements from MERCY crewmembers stated that Tiger 5 was pulling at an angle more than 90° to the keel (~250° relative to MERCY), adding sternway to the ship. In the case of Tiger 5, photographic evidence was less persuasive due to the perspective of the photographer.

10. Minor discrepancies occurred in the times recorded by systems that were not synchronized (for example, Engineering display time is not synchronized with ECDIS) and because different systems use different methodologies for recording time (for example, the Deck Log records time to the nearest minute). Attempts to reconcile these discrepancies result in the timeline set forth in the Findings of Fact. This timeline draws from various sources, including ECDIS, S-VDR, engineering console display, the Ship's Log, the Bell Log, and the Engineering Log.

11. As part of the investigative effort, a Navigation Assessment was conducted which included, operational and material assessments, and an engineering assessments. Findings of fact (FoF) based on these assessments are included in the report and the findings of the assessments are reflected in the opinions and recommendations made.

12. While the investigation was ongoing, the Chief Mate was reassigned based on the recommendation of the Navigation Assessment team.



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13. An eleven day extension was requested and approved.

14. Several individuals supported this investigation. Captain (b)(6) (West Coast Port Captain), Chief Engineer (b)(6), and Captain (b)(6) (International Safety Management auditor), served as subject matter experts and technical advisors and supported the Navigation Assessment. (b)(6) Associate Counsel, Military Sealift Command, and (b)(6) (b)(6) Operations and Plans directorate, respectively, provided legal and administrative support.

#### FINDINGS OF FACT

##### Background - The Memorial and the MERCY

1. The USS ARIZONA Memorial marks the resting place of 1,102 of the 1,177 sailors and marines killed on the USS ARIZONA (BB 39) during the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941. The memorial, operated by the National Park Service, straddles the sunken hull of the battleship without touching it and is accessible only by boat. The remains of the battleship were declared a National Historic Landmark on 5 May 1989. See [https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=USS\\_Arizona\\_Memorial](https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=USS_Arizona_Memorial). [Encl. (2)]

2. USNS MERCY (T-AH-19) (hereinafter "MERCY") is the lead ship of her class of hospital ships. The ship, built in 1976 as a supertanker, was converted to a hospital ship beginning in July 1984, and commissioned on 8 November 1986. When deployed, the MERCY carries up to 1,215 medical personnel and 72 civil service mariners (CIVMARs) and provides full hospital capabilities and services. MERCY's primary mission is to provide rapid, flexible and mobile acute medical and surgical services to support Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force units deployed ashore, and naval amphibious task forces and battle forces afloat. See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MERCY-class\\_hospital\\_ship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MERCY-class_hospital_ship); [www.mercy.navy.mil](http://www.mercy.navy.mil); and [www.msc.navy.mil](http://www.msc.navy.mil). [Encl. (3)].

3. MERCY is 894 feet in length and has a beam of 105' 7". She displaces 69,360 tons and has a top speed of 17 knots. The ship's propulsion system consists of two 900 psig boilers and two GE turbines capable of 24,500 shaft horse power (shp). The ship has a single shaft and propeller. Shaft horse power of force varies based on the ordered



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bell: Ahead Dead Slow (10 Revolutions Per Minute [RPM]) =  
1200 shp; Ahead Slow (20 RPM) = 2000 shp; Ahead Half (40  
RPM) = 4000 shp; Ahead Full (60 RPM) = 8000 shp. [Encls.  
(3) and (4)].

4. On 27 May 2015 MERCY had a United States Coast Guard  
(USCG) Temporary Certificate of Inspection with no USCG  
835s. [Encl. (5)].

5. On 27 May 2015 MERCY had no category 3 or 4 Casualty  
Reports concerning propulsion, steering, or navigation  
equipment. [Ref. (b)].

#### Duties and Responsibilities of Master and Officers

6. The duties and responsibilities of the Master are set  
forth in agency regulations and guidance documents.

a. Article 0847 of the U.S. Navy Regulations (1990)  
sets forth the responsibilities of the Master of an In-  
service Ship of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). In  
relevant part, it provides as follows:

In an in-service ship of the (MSC), the master's  
responsibility is absolute, except when, and to  
the extent, relieved therefrom by competent  
authority. The authority of the master is com-  
mensurate with the master's responsibility. The  
master is responsible for the safety of the ship  
and all persons on board. He or she is  
responsible for the safe navigation and technical  
operation of the ship and has paramount authority  
over all persons on board. ... The master may,  
using discretion, and when not contrary to law or  
regulations, delegate authority for operation of  
shipboard functions to competent subordinates.  
However such delegation of authority shall in no  
way relieve the master of continued  
responsibility for the safety, well-being, and  
efficiency of the ship.

[Ref. (c)].

b. Paragraph 6c(1)(1) of OPNAVINST 5440.75B which  
provides, in relevant part, as follows:



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The ship's master is the civilian officer commanding the ship and is charged with ultimate command authority, under Federal and International Admiralty law .... The master is responsible for the safe navigation of the ship and the safety of all personnel embarked, including adherence to force protection requirements prescribed by the supporting COCOM.

[Ref. (d)].

c. COMPACFLTINST/COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 3530.1A (Fleet Navigation Policy and Standards), Paragraph 8c provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Commanding Officers and Masters shall:

- 1) Execute navigation responsibilities as directed herein and in concert with Type Commander guidance, and in accordance with the principles of good seamanship and operational risk management.

[Ref. (e)].

d. COMSCINST 3121.9C (Standard Operating Manual or SOM), at Section 2-2 (Standards for Ship Operations) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

**2-2-1 General**

a. MSC Ship Masters are experienced mariners licensed in their profession by the USCG. The limited guidance provided in this section does not attempt to encompass the broad field of knowledge that must be mastered to safely operate ships at sea. In all cases, MSC Masters are expected to operate their ships according to U.S. Navy Regulations, and COMDTINST M16672 (series) Navigation Rules, International - Inland. They are also expected to operate MSC vessels efficiently and professionally, in keeping with the standards of the commercial U.S. Merchant Marine and in compliance with both the customer and program management business policies.



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#### **2-2-2 Master's Presence on the Bridge**

a. Unless the safety of the ship requires otherwise, the Master shall be on the bridge when docking, undocking and shifting berths, when entering and leaving restricted waters; when maneuvering in restricted waters or near other ships; when maneuvering in ice or in reduced visibility, or at any other time when conditions are such that the possibility of danger warrants the Master's presence.

b. Restricted waters are defined as any waters less than the ship's Navigation Draft/Safety Depth, and any position within two nautical miles (2nm) of these waters.

#### **2-2-3 Master's Responsibility with a Pilot Onboard**

a. U.S. Navy Regulations and the 72 COLREGS specifically charge Masters with responsibility for the safe navigation of their ships. Masters may employ licensed pilots. Employment of pilots might be deemed necessary at any port when required by applicable laws or regulations. Pilots so employed act as a (sic) technical advisors or assistants to the Master. Pilots' presence does not relieve Masters or their subordinates of responsibility for the safe navigation of their ships. Though not obliged, Masters may allow pilots to maneuver their ships.

[Ref. (f)].

7. The T-AH Safety Management System provides additional information about the roles and responsibilities of the Master and crew.

a. The Master is in overall command of the vessel and has full responsibility for all matters. Through training and supervision of deck watchstanding personnel as well as the development of a bridge team management plan, the Master is to ensure the vessel is operated within the guidelines of the Rules of the Road, safe navigation and prudent seamanship. [Encl. (6), Statement 101].



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b. The First Officer (Administration) or Chief Mate serves as the ship's safety officer, training officer, damage control officer, vessel security officer, and oil spill coordinator. As training officer, he or she is responsible for training of all personnel in their duties during replenishment/mission operations and for the compilation and submission of all required departmental training reports. He or she ensures deck officers maintain their proficiency in safe navigation practices and ensures crewmembers are properly trained to respond to all emergencies. [Encl. (6), Statement 104].

c. The Second Officer is designated as the Navigation Officer (NAVOPS) and serves as a member of the Deck Department under the supervision of the First Officer. NAVOPS performs such duties as docking/undocking, anchoring, and underway steaming and maintains a continuous plot of the ship's position using all available means of navigation including visual bearing and radar fixes when navigating harbors or other restricted waters. [Encl. (6), Statements 106/105].

d. Third Officer (Watch) is a member of Deck Department and works under the supervision of the Second Officer (Navigator) and First Officer. The Third Officer ensures that the Watch is properly trained in standard helm commands and lookout duties. He or she also ensures the watch is trained to respond to a steering casualty scenario, a man overboard incident, emergency maneuvering situation, and ship's security procedures. [Encl. (6), Statements 107/108].

8. The Master of MERCY promulgated standing orders on 13 April 2015. All of the officers on duty on the morning of 27 May 2015 had signed the Master's Standing Orders acknowledging them prior to 27 May 2015. The Master's Standing Orders set the minimum standards for acceptable performance (Section 1, General). Among the provisions of the orders relevant to the events of 27 May 2015 are the following:

While on duty, all deck officers are expected to keep abreast of what is going on within and around the ship. This is known as 'maintaining situational awareness.' You should know at all times where the



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ship is, where we are going, what the traffic situation is; what is next on our schedule of events; and so on. Section 1 (Attention to Duty and Maintaining Situational Awareness).

The development of ECDIS is perhaps one of the most significant technological developments in navigation since the advent of radar and even the chronometer. No other navigation device, system, or procedure provides the immediate situational awareness of a properly functioning ECDIS. Section 2 - NAVIGATION, ECDIS.

To a large degree, it is through you that I maintain my situational awareness. It is through you that I keep up with movements of other ships around us, weather conditions, etc. If you are doping off or inattentive to what is going on around us, we all suffer for it. Section 8 (SUMMARY) SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

[Encl. (7)].

MERCY Manning Structure, Participants, and Tug Services  
Contract

9. Manning for MERCY's departure from port on 27 May was divided into three ship control stations - Bridge (Deck), Engine Room, and Aft Steering. Bridge personnel consisted of the Master, Chief Mate, Navigator, Helm Safety Officer, Helmsman, and one Quartermaster with a Second Officer (Cargo Mate) and Third Officer on the bow, and a Third Officer on the stern. Aft steering was manned by the Deck Machinist (DMAC) and an AB(W). [Encl. (8)].

10. Personnel who witnessed and/or participated in the MERCY's departure are as follows:

Ship's Company

Name	Position	Time w/MS	Current Position	Time Onboard
Thomas J Giudice	Master	15 years	4 years	19 months
(b)(6)	Chief Mate	10 years	4 years	2 months



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(b)(6)	Second Mate (Navigator)	4 years	1 year	4 months
(b)(6)	Second Mate (Bow Watch)	9 years	8 years	14 months
(b)(6)	Third Mate (Helm Safety)	22 months	7 months	1 month
(b)(6)	Third Mate (Bow Watch)	21 months	19 months	3 months
(b)(6)	Third Mate (Off Watch)	2 years	2 years	1 month
(b)(6)	Third Mate (Stern Watch)	4 years	1 year	1 month
(b)(6)	Chief Radio Elec Tech	10 years	5 years	36 months
(b)(6)	QM1 (SW/AW) (ECDIS)	16 years USN	N/A	2 months
(b)(6)	Chief Engineer	12 years	7 years	13 months
(b)(6)	Second Asst Engineer	2 years	2 months	2 months
(b)(6)	AB (W) (Aft Steering)	10 years	3 years	1 month

[Encl. (9) - (23)]. On 27 May 2015, the licenses of all MERCY personnel on duty were current, [Encls. (11 - (23))], and all crew members had met 96 hour work/rest history requirements. [Encl. (24)].

Other

Name	Position	Time as a Mariner	Current Position
(b)(6)	Pilot	33 years	19 years
(b)(6)	Tug Tiger 4 Captain	14 years	14 years
(b)(6)	Tug Tiger 5 Captain	12 years	12 years

[Encls. (25)-(28)].

11. The tug services provided to assist MERCY in her departure (tugs Tiger 4 and 5) were provided by P&R Water Taxi, Ltd., under the terms of Navy Contract N00033-12-C-2101 for Pearl Harbor Tug Support. [Encl. (29)].



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Events Prior to 27 May 2015

12. On 17 APR 2015, MERCY requested three tugs to assist in departure from Pearl Harbor scheduled for 27 May 2015. [Encls. (11) and (13); Ref. (g)].

13. On 13 MAY 2015, MSCREP PEARL HARBOR HI advised MERCY that two tugs would be available to assist with MERCY's departure from Pearl Harbor. [Encls. (11) and (13); Ref. (h)]. MERCY's departure, originally planned for 0900 on 27 May 2015 was rescheduled to 0730 to ensure that MERCY and the servicing tugs were out of the harbor before the commencement of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Change of Command (COC) ceremony, scheduled for 0900. [Encls. (11) and (26)].

27 May 2015 Timeline

14. 0001. The day begins with MERCY moored port-side-to at pier Hotel 2 (H2). [Encl. (30), Ref. (h)].

15. 0448 (0-3h)<sup>1</sup>. Steering checks in all modes and engine order telegraph checks are complete. [Encls. (30) and (31)].

16. 0450 (0-2h58m). The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) check is complete. [Encl. (30)].

17. 0452 (0-2h56m). Internal communications systems checks are complete. [Encls. (30) and (31)].

18. 0500 (0-2h48m). Ahead and astern propulsion checks are complete. [Encls. (30) and (31)].

19. 0630 (0-1h18m). The Navigator completes the pre-departure navigation brief. [Encl. (30)].

20. 0700 (0-48m). Sea, Anchor and Maneuvering detail is set. The Master, Captain Giudice, and Chief Mate (b)(6) are on the bridge. Also on the bridge are 2/O (b)(6)

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<sup>1</sup> Note: All times set forth in parentheses are approximate to the nearest half minute before or after the allision, with "0" as the reference allision time of 0748.



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the Navigator, and 3/O (b)(6) the Helm Safety Officer.  
AB (b)(6) and DMAC (b)(6) are in after steering.  
[Encls. (30), (32), and (33)].

21. 0707 (0-41m). The bow is manned and anchors are ready  
to let go. [Encls. (30) and (32)].

22. 0710 (0-38m). Captain (b)(6), a licensed  
federal pilot, comes aboard MERCY. Captain (b)(6) rode out  
to MERCY aboard Tug Tiger 5 ("Tiger 5"). During the ride  
out to MERCY, Captain (b)(6) discussed how (b)(6) planned to  
maneuver the MERCY with (b)(6) the Tiger 5  
Captain. The plan Captain (b)(6) described was simple: one  
line to Tiger 5 on the stern and one line to Tiger 4  
("Tiger 4") on the bow to pull the ship off the pier into  
the basin and then twist to starboard. [Encls. (26), (28),  
and (30)].

23. 0713 (0-35m). At 0713 (0-35m), Tiger 4 is made fast  
forward to starboard bow at Dutch bollard and Tiger 5 is  
made fast aft via centerline stern chock. [Encl. (26),  
(30), and (32)].

24. 0716 (0-32m). Captain Giudice (Master) and Captain  
(b)(6) (Pilot) discuss the Pilot's plan for maneuvering the  
ship, and review and sign the Pilot Boarding Card. The  
Departure Checklist was completed. Captain Giudice  
recalled that Captain (b)(6) said (b)(6) would "take us out,  
clear the pier, and pivot in place." The log entry for  
0716 reads **"Master/Pilot Exchange completed IAW 33 CFR  
157.455(b). Pilot Capt. (b)(6) has the conn."** (bold in  
original). [Encls. (11), (26), (30)-(32), and (34)].

25. 0730 (0-18m). The last line is taken in. MERCY's  
rudder is amidships. [Encls. (30), (32), and (35)].

26. 0731:30 (0-17m). Captain (b)(6) orders the stern tug  
(Tiger 5) to pull MERCY out from the pier "a bit" and  
orders MERCY to go to slow astern bell. MERCY proceeds to  
clear H2 pier. [Encls. (11), (26), (32), (33), and (36)].

27. 0735 (0-13m). The Master and the Pilot discuss letting  
the Pilot disembark at Hospital Point. [Encl. (11), (26),  
and (35)].



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28. 0736 (0-12m). MERCY is making 1.5 knots of sternway.  
[Encls. (37)].

29. 0737 (0-11m). MERCY has 1.8 knots of sternway. [Encl.  
(37)].

30. 0738 (0-10m). MERCY has 2.1 knots of sternway. [Encl.  
(37)].

31. 0738:30 (0-9m30s). The bridge lines up with Kilo 10  
(K10) pier and Captain (b)(6) orders engines all stop.  
[Encls. (11), (26), (32), (33), (35), and (36)].

32. 0739 (0-9m). MERCY has 2.3 knots of sternway. [Encl.  
(37)].

33. 0740:00 (0-8m). The bow of MERCY clears K10 pier and  
Captain (b)(6) after verifying that the bow of MERCY would  
not swing into K10, directs Tiger 4 to take in her line and  
shift from the starboard to port bow to support the  
twisting of MERCY. MERCY has 2.5 knots of sternway.  
[Encls. (11), (26), (37), and (38)].

34. 0741:00 (0-7m). Tiger 4 takes up a position on the  
port bow between the port anchor and the bulbous. Captain  
(b)(6) directs Tiger 4 to push ahead full throttle on the  
port bow to start the starboard twist. Tiger 5 repositions  
to port quarter and at an angle estimated to be 90° to the  
keel (~270° relative to MERCY), answers half astern. MERCY  
has 2.6 knots of sternway. [Encls. (26)-(28), (37), and  
(38)].

35. 0742:00 (0-6m). MERCY is twisting at a speed over  
ground (SOG) of 2.6 knots with 2.6 knots of sternway.  
[Encl. (37)].

36. 0742:30 (0-6m). The Pilot orders a slow ahead (20 rpm)  
bell to slow the ship down and to check the responsiveness  
of the propulsion plant. The ship slows but maintains  
sternway. Captain (b)(6) considers this desirable to  
continue backing out of the slip and to clear K8 during the  
twist to starboard. The rudder remains at amidships.  
[Encls. (11), (26), (30), (32), (33), (35), and (36)].

37. 0743:00 (0-5m). 3/0 (b)(6) ("Stern Watch"), reports  
to the Bridge that (b)(6) estimates 250 yards to the USS



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ARIZONA Memorial. MERCY's SOG is 2.9 knots and the ship is making 2.6 knots of sternway. [Encls. (18) and (37)].

38. 0744:00 (0-4m). The Pilot orders hard right rudder to assist in the twist after MERCY clears K8. MERCY's SOG is 3.0 knots and her sternway is 2.4 knots. Actual distance to shoal water directly astern is 741 ft. Actual distance to memorial is 523 ft. [Encls. (11), (26), (35), and (37)].

39. 0744:30 (0-3m30s). Pilot orders Engines all stop. The ship maintains slight sternway to support clearing K8 pier during twist to starboard. [Encls. (11), (26), (32), (33), and (35)].

40. 0745:00 (0-3m). Pilot orders slow ahead bell (20 rpm). Stern Watch reports distance between the stern and the USS ARIZONA Memorial landing dock is approximately 100 yards (300 feet). Tiger 5 reports distance as 250 feet with no visible prop wash from MERCY. Actual distance to shoal water directly astern is 436 feet. Actual distance to memorial is 305 ft. MERCY's SOG is 2.7 knots with 2.0 knots of sternway and the ship is perpendicular to the channel. [Encls. (11), (18), (26), (28), (32), (33), and (35)-(37)].

41. 0746:00 (0-2m). MERCY's SOG is 2.5 knots, with 1.7 knots of sternway; the ship is perpendicular to the channel. Actual distance to shoal water directly astern is 131 feet. Actual distance to sunken ARIZONA is 44 feet, approximately 130 feet from the memorial. [Encl. (37)]

42. 0746:30 (0-1m30s). The Pilot orders half ahead bell (40 rpm). Rudder remains hard right. The Stern Watch reports 200-100 foot distance to the landing dock. [Encls. (11), (18), (26), (32), (33), (35), and (36)].

43. 0747:00 (0-1m). Tiger 5 reports observing prop wash from MERCY. Tiger 5 repositions to an angle to slow sternway. The Pilot orders Tiger 4 to stop pushing ahead on the bow. The Cargo Mate and Bow Watch recall observing Tiger 4 immediately after she stopped pushing ahead full and noted that the Tiger 4's angle was 45° to the keel. The **Master assumes the conn** and orders a full ahead bell (60 rpm). Rudder remains hard right. MERCY's SOG is 2.2 knots and sternway is 1.3 knots. MERCY's stern is even



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with the sunken ARIZONA hull and 65 feet from the memorial's landing dock. [Encls. (11), (12), (14), (16), (26), (27), (32), (33), and (35)-(38)].

44. 0748:00 (0-0m). MERCY strikes the landing dock and the Stern Watch reports "we hit the pier, opening at this time". SOG at the time of allision is 1.3 knots and sternway is 0.2 knots. Tiger 5 reports the ship's rudder has rubbed against the USS ARIZONA Memorial landing dock fender and that prop wash from the full bell has caused significant motion to the landing dock and damage. [Encls. (11), (18), (26), (29), and (37)].

45. 0748:30. (0+30s) A slow ahead bell (20 RPM) is ordered and Third Assistant Engineer (3 A/E) (b)(6) heads to aft steering to inspect space for damage. [Encls. (32), (33), (35), (36), and (39)].

46. 0749:00 (0+1m) MERCY's SOG is 1.9 knots and headway is 1.6 knots. [Encl. (37)].

47. 0749:30 (0+1m30s). Rudder amidships is ordered. [Encl. (35)].

48. 0750:00 (0+2m). MERCY's SOG is 1.9 knots and the ship is making 1.8 knots headway. [Encl. (37)].

49. 0751:00 (0+3m). MERCY's SOG is 1.9 knots and the ship is making 1.9 knots of headway. [Encl. (37)].

50. 0801 (0+13m). 3 A/E (b)(6) reports all conditions normal for aft steering, no leaks found and hydraulic units working properly. [Encl. (39)].

51. 0804 (0+16m). 3 A/E (b)(6) inspects engine room and AMR. [Encl. (39)].

52. 0808 (0+20m). Tiger 4 and Tiger 5 are released. [Encl. (30), and (32)].

53. 0814 (0+26m). Pilot debarks MERCY in vicinity of Hospital Point. [Encls. (30) and (32)].

54. 0825 (0+37m). 3 A/E (b)(6) reports all conditions normal. All salt water strainers are clean and all pumps are operating at correct pressures. [Encl. (39)].



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55. 0838 (0+50m). MERCY secures from Sea & Anchor detail. Steering is tested at sea after the restricted maneuvering detail is secured. All systems test normal. [Encls. (30), (32), and (33)].

56. 0918 (0+1h30m). Captain Giudice makes a voice report to USCG after MERCY clears the harbor. [Encl. (11)].

57. 1114 (0+3h26m). AB (b)(6) completes rounds throughout the vessel with no negative results. [Encl. (30)].

58. 1130 (0+3h42m). 2/O (b)(6) reports the S-VDR is secured from reporting and that the memory card has been placed in the Captain's safe IAW SMS 8.22-001-ALL. [Encl. (30)].

59. 1200 (0+4h22m). MERCY releases OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE DTG 272200Z MAY 15. [Ref. (i)]

#### Relevant Witness Recollections

60. Captain (b)(6) (Pilot)

a. In the statement the pilot filed after the incident, Captain (b)(6) wrote -

... I had concern about getting headway too soon while the bow was passing K8. This is a normal concern when making this maneuver however I should have been more concerned with the failure to totally check up the stern way. I also was concerned with the time or I would have considered backing the ship further into the basin and spinning to port as we do with the carriers.

b. When later interviewed by the USCG, Captain (b)(6) expanded on the impact that the change in schedule caused by the need to clear the harbor before the PACFLT COC had, Captain (b)(6) said it was (b)(6) understanding that Port Operations had been "pressured" to get the ships out of the harbor before 0900. Pilot (b)(6) said (b)(6) was directed to get the ships underway before the ceremony and that Port Operations wanted the tugs back in their berths prior to the COC. (b)(6) said the schedule was shifted to get a previous ship underway earlier and that there was a navy



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cruiser underway at the same time as MERCY. This left two tugs available for the MERCY move.

c. The deck log indicates that from 0716 until 0747 Captain (b)(6) had the conn. Captain (b)(6) stated that (b)(6) role was to coordinate ship orders through the Master and tug orders through (b)(6) hand-held radio. (b)(6) considered (b)(6) role to be that of an advisor to the Master and was "basically directing the operation." (b)(6) did not recall there being a "hard designation" of the pilot having the conn.

[Encls. (25) and (26)].

61. Captain Thomas Giudice (Master)

a. Captain Giudice knew (b)(6) had years of experience with large ships and was known as the "Carrier Pilot." Captain Giudice recalled that "winds were light and current was negligible." He had known about the change in the ship's underway time from 0900 to 0730 "days ahead of time." He didn't like the change, but, with the exception of not getting breakfast, he did not feel rushed. He "had the best pilot and it was a beautiful day." With Captain (b)(6) piloting the vessel and good weather, Captain Giudice was confident that the plan could be executed with minimal risk using two tugs.

b. Captain Giudice recalls that after MERCY cleared the Hotel pier;

As we started to pivot, my focus was on the stern tug to ascertain our swing in relation to the New Jersey (Missouri) and Arizona Memorial. The rudder was still over to starboard and the Pilot ordered a slow ahead bell which I was happy to hear (as) I'm hearing distances closing. As is my habit I check(ed) the RPM indicator to confirm that bell was answered. Although I checked GPS speed indication, I know that the GPS does not distinguish between forward, stern and lateral movement. Things appeared to be in order and I did not think we were in any danger. I was operating under the belief that the Pilot had both tugs positioned at a 90° angle.



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I'm hearing distances closing a little more rapidly that I felt should have been during a twist with the Ahead Bell. The Pilot ordered a Half Ahead Bell, which I concurred with and felt this was the proper call. I distinctly remember thinking that a Half Bell seemed a bit extreme for the inner harbor and I would need to be prepared to take it off before we developed significant headway. After confirming that we reached RPM, I felt this was adequate to move us away from the Memorial... I don't recall any reports from the pilot regarding lack of prop wash and although distances were still closing all indications and reports had us clearing. Then I heard the Stern Watch say "We're gonna hit" and almost simultaneously overheard the Tug indicate the same. I took the conn (and) ordered Full Ahead. I remember worrying about the prop wash and was concerned about proceeding at full speed in the inner harbor. It seemed almost instantaneously we gained some separation from the memorial and I ordered a slow bell.

c. Captain Giudice recalled that the navigator (2/0

(b)(6)

... never reported to me on the position of the ship as (b)(6) was charting with respect to distances to obstructions, etc. Everything throughout the evolution was routine until the distance to the Memorial started decreasing rapidly and the ahead half was ordered. I did not get reports on whether we were standing into danger.

d. Captain Giudice stated, "in hindsight, if I had more information on the bridge wing, say an ECDIS monitor or lateral and astern motion indicators, it is quite possible I would have known I needed to take action sooner."

e. There were no delays answering bells from the propulsion plant or distractions contributing to this event.

f. There were no distractions on the Bridge other than perhaps "Pilot complacency syndrome" which refers to



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the tendency of the watch team to stand easy when the Pilot is embarked and tugs are assisting ship movements.

g. Once clearing the harbor, I decided to continue on because of vessel traffic and because MILLINOCKET was waiting for me for a photo exercise (PHOTOEX). About an hour and a half after the incident, I called the U.S. Coast Guard, (b)(6) to make the initial report that we "rubbed" the memorial. The USCG acknowledged and didn't ask me to remain in the vicinity. I didn't learn of the extent of the damage to the memorial until a day later. My assessment of the ship was that it was still safe to operate. So I continued on mission.

h. Captain Giudice stated that he offered his C/M every opportunity to conn during previous maneuvering details but (b)(6) declined. Additionally he stated;

"On the morning of the 27 May I told (b)(6) I wanted (b)(6) to drive the ship into and out of Pearl Harbor, but (b)(6) reaction was very telling and I didn't feel comfortable with a reluctant driver. In retrospect, had (b)(6) been driving, I feel I would have had better situational awareness."

[Encl. (11)].

62. Chief Mate (C/M) (b)(6)

a. Chief Mate (b)(6) states that (b)(6) could not see ("had no visual") on the tugs because (b)(6) was on the bridge and couldn't recall if the Bow or Stern Watches reported when the tugs repositioned. (b)(6) recalled the Bow Watch reporting when the bow cleared Kilo pier and the Stern Watch reporting that the MERCY had cleared the MISSOURI but was closing on the ARIZONA Memorial.

b. Chief Mate (b)(6) states that the distances being reported by the Stern Watch over the ship's radios and the distances reported by Tiger 5 to the Pilot via bridge-to-bridge working channel remain consistent during the timeframe leading up to allision.



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c. When interviewed, Chief Mate (b)(6) thought it was normal for the pilot to order a half ahead bell for the maneuver, but "sensed trouble when we had the half ahead bell and we were still closing astern."

d. Chief Mate (b)(6) states Captains Giudice (Master) and (b)(6) (Pilot) were side-by-side during the entire evolution, and that (b)(6) was "in close proximity". Captain Giudice handled the communications with the Helm Safety Officer.

[Encl. (12)].

63. 2/O (b)(6) (Navigator)

a. During the departure, 2/O (b)(6) took visual fixes every three minutes with the help of two deck cadets. (b)(6) was working on getting the fixes for 0745 when (b)(6) heard 3/O (b)(6) reporting closing distances to the ARIZONA Memorial. 2/O (b)(6) was on the port bridge wing and could see Tiger 5. (b)(6) "noticed that the AFT tug was pulling more astern than at 90 degrees" (~250° relative to MERCY). (b)(6) noticed that Tiger 5 was pulling more on the port quarter than at a 90° angle. "I was seeing more of Tiger 5's bow than its beam, which lead me to believe it was pulling more on the quarter." (supplemental statement) 2/O (b)(6) stayed on the bridge wing as the tug was pulling hard. When the stern reported the MERCY was at 15 yards and closing, (b)(6) heard the full ahead bell order from Captain Giudice. 2/O (b)(6) did not perceive that "things weren't going well" until (b)(6) heard the report that the ship was at 15 yards and still closing. (Supplemental statement). After the report of opening from the stern, 2/O (b)(6) went back inside the bridge. (b)(6) continued to get 3 minute fixes until (b)(6) was tasked with getting the weather.

b. When asked about the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), 2/O (b)(6) said that "I usually refer to (ECDIS) for position, but don't include ECDIS information in my verbal reports. I don't typically include the distance to the nearest hazard to navigation. I did not adjust any ship parameters in ECDIS prior to departure."



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c. 2/O (b)(6) "did not notice at any point that we were sliding astern."

[Encl. (13)].

64. 2/O (b)(6) (Cargo Mate). Cargo Mate (b)(6) recalled being on the bow turning over with 3/O (b)(6) and having to speak up because Tiger 4 pushing at the bow was very loud. (b)(6) could hear the UHF radio conversation between C/M (b)(6) and 3/O (b)(6) on the stern. (b)(6) heard 3/O (b)(6) report "30 yards" and then "20 yards, closing" to which (b)(6) heard Chief Mate (b)(6) reply "Bridge copy." (b)(6) then heard the "half ahead" order. The Stern Watch continued to report with closing yardage and each time, Chief Mate (b)(6) acknowledged the report. When the ship was reported at "5 yards," 3/O (b)(6) said words to effect of "I bet there will be a full bell coming soon."<sup>2</sup> Cargo Mate (b)(6) heard Captain Giudice order full ahead and noticed that the tug engines had "become very quiet like they had finally stopped pushing." Cargo Mate (b)(6) looked towards Tiger 4 and saw stack smoke coming from "approximately one point (15°) port of the bull nose." 3/O (b)(6) reported that the MERCY had hit, and after a moment of shock, Cargo Mate (b)(6) ran to the stern. When (b)(6) got to the stern, (b)(6) saw the wash pushing the ARIZONA landing dock around and the gray rubber fender partially knocked off.

[Encl. (14)].

65. 3/O (b)(6) (Bow Watch)

a. 3/O (b)(6) recalled belaying (b)(6) reports when it became apparent the Stern Watch was reporting closing distances. (b)(6) recalled hearing the following reports in sequence: "100 yards closing," "25 yards closing," "15 yards closing," "5 yards closing," "we're going to hit, and we hit." 3/O (b)(6) recalled that when (b)(6) heard "15 yards closing" (b)(6) looked at Cargo Mate (b)(6) and said "I think they're going to call full ahead." Immediately thereafter,

<sup>2</sup> 3/O (b)(6) says (b)(6) made (b)(6) comment when 3/O (b)(6) reported "15 yards" vice "5 yards". This is consistent with the statement given by 2/O (b)(6). See FoF 65 *infra*.



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(b)(6) heard the engine room answer the bridge on the IJV speaker "Full Ahead Aye."

b. When 3/O (b)(6) heard that the ship was still closing 5 yards off the memorial and about to hit, 3/O (b)(6) noticed-

"the tug engines stop (cut off) and I looked over the rail. The forward tug was at an angle of about 45 degrees, laying too on the port bow (see attached bow tug position drawing)."

[Encl. (16)].

66. 3/O (b)(6) (Stern Watch) recalled the following. (b)(6) first report of distance to the ARIZONA was that the ARIZONA was 300 yards astern. This report was acknowledged by C/M (b)(6). Once MERCY was clear of Kilo pier, Tiger 5 repositioned itself to port and "took a heavy strain". After about a minute, (b)(6) reported that the stern of MERCY had started to rotate slightly. C/M (b)(6) requested distance and how the stern was doing and 3/O (b)(6) reported "The stern appears to be rotating nicely and ARIZONA is 200 yards off the port quarter." After about another minute, (b)(6) reported that the distance to the ARIZONA was 150 yards. C/M (b)(6) asked (b)(6) to add "opening" or "closing" to (b)(6) distance reports, and (b)(6) responded "100 yards and closing to ARIZONA". (b)(6) then started providing continuous distances: 80 yards to ARIZONA and 150 yards to MISSOURI to starboard; 50 yards closing, 30 yards closing. 3/O (b)(6) perception was that the rotation had slowed and sternway was continuing. (b)(6) reported 20 yards to the ARIZONA dock, then 10 yards. At 10 yards from the dock, 3/O (b)(6) reported seeing considerable propwash from the MERCY. The ship continued to close and 3/O (b)(6) reported 7 yards, 5 yards. (b)(6) then saw the outboard western corner of the dock beneath MERCY's stern overhang, and (b)(6) reported "We hit." (b)(6) continued to see a lot of propwash. The ARIZONA boat dock appeared to (b)(6) to be pushed 5-7 yards out of position, the brow connecting the dock to the Memorial started separating, and hand railing sections from the dock broke away. 3/O (b)(6) reported "distance opening". [Encl. (18)].



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67. 3/O (b)(6) (Helm Safety Officer) states that at approximately 0746, (b)(6) heard 3/O (b)(6) tell the bridge via radio that the stern was 30 yards from the USS ARIZONA landing dock. Captain Giudice, the master, assumed the conn at 0747. 3/O (b)(6) received the full ahead bell order and "immediately relayed it to the engine room." 3/O (b)(6) recalled that at that time, the rudder had been at hard right for several minutes. About a minute after (b)(6) relayed the "Full ahead bell", 3/O (b)(6) overheard 3/O (b)(6) report over the radio that the MERCY was going to hit the pier, and then several seconds later, that the MERCY had hit the landing dock. [Encl. (15)].

68. CRET (b)(6) (Off Duty Observer)

a. CRET (b)(6) was not assigned to any watch during the MERCY's departure. (b)(6) was smoking and watching the evolution from the smoking level (02 level aft). A CIVMAR with 10 years of MSC experience (three on MERCY), CRET (b)(6) is a credentialed AB seaman and a retired Navy Operations Specialist. (b)(6) retired in 1994 and has considerable experience with line handling and has watched evolutions similar to MERCY's departure from Pearl Harbor multiple times.

b. Around 0735, (b)(6) was about 65 feet from Tiger 5 and had a clear view of Tiger 5. Tiger 5 was not at a normal 90° position to assist the swing of the ship. CRET (b)(6) continued to watch as MERCY started to twist. CRET (b)(6) thought everything looked good and then, all of a sudden, "we were sliding back." When MERCY was about 250 yards from the ARIZONA Memorial, the tug line to Tiger 5 went slack as Tiger 5 repositioned to the aft quarter. CRET (b)(6) thinks it was about 0740 when (b)(6) saw Tiger 5 back off, loosen its line, and then tighten it back up. The line from Tiger 5 became taut and Tiger 5 slid around to a 90° (beam) position as MERCY closed to 200-150 yards from the Memorial. CRET (b)(6) estimated that Tiger 5 was at "maybe (a) 25-30 degree angle abaft the beam." CRET (b)(6) thought that angle "created some sternway for the ship, rather than just twisting." It was after 3/O (b)(6) reported that MERCY was at 200 yards that Tiger 5 went to a 90° position.



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c. CRET (b)(6) could hear 3/0 (b)(6) reporting distances. (b)(6) "noticed anxiety in (3/0 (b)(6) voice over the radio after (b)(6) reported 200 yards." From where (b)(6) was, CRET (b)(6) thought the distances 3/0 (b)(6) was reporting were accurate. When MERCY was -

... somewhere at 30 yards or less from the Memorial, I could see prop wash. I could look down and see the turrets of the sunken ARIZONA. I could tell our "ahead bell" had been ordered based on the shaking of the ship and prop wash. If the ahead bell hadn't been ordered when it was, we would have wiped out the memorial."

[Encl. (19)].

69. Supply Utilityman (SU) (b)(6) (Observer) was watching and filming (video) the departure from the same location as CRET (b)(6) (b)(6) then moved to the other side of the ship. [Encl. (40)]. The (b)(6) video starts with a port quarter perspective of the event and then shifts to the starboard quarter perspective. Significant wash is visible on the starboard side and absent from the port side. [Encl. (41)]. Video of the event provided by Navy Region Hawaii shows significant prop wash on the starboard side. [Encl. (42)].

70. Captain (b)(6) (Tiger 4 Captain), recounted the following sequence of events:

When MERCY (sic) cleared the K10 pier, Tiger 4 was directed by the Pilot to push ahead full throttle on the port bow to start the starboard twist. Tiger 4 proceeded to push at a 90° angle to MERCY's keel. While in the vicinity of the K8 pier and in the channel, I heard the Pilot tell Tiger 5 "ok, watch for wash, gonna kick it ahead." My perception is that MERCY was still moving astern pretty fast at that point. I heard, via Channel 14, the Tiger 5 Captain report "still don't see any wash, getting close to ARIZONA Memorial." Then I heard Tiger 5 start calling distances when MERCY's stern was approximately 250 feet from the ARIZONA Memorial. Tiger 5 kept calling distances in feet, to which the Pilot acknowledged. Tiger 4 continued



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pushing full at the bow, at a 90 degree angle to MERCY's keel while Tiger 5 was pulling ½ astern at a 90 degree angle to MERCY's keel. After the allision occurred, the Pilot ordered both tugs to "stop" at which point MERCY gained headway.

[Encl. (27)].

71. Captain (b)(6) (Captain Tiger 5) recounted the following sequence of events:

... After MERCY's bow cleared Kilo 10, Tiger 5 was ordered by the Pilot to stop pulling aft, let out some line and get to 90 degrees port side of MERCY (perpendicular to MERCY's keel). Once in position I informed the Pilot that I was at 90 degrees and ready to work. I was then directed by the Pilot to come ½ astern at 90 degrees. Shortly after I began pulling at 90 degrees the Pilot indicated (b)(6) was coming ahead and directed Tiger 5 to watch for prop wash. I did not see any prop wash and reported this to the Pilot. I continued to look for wash as MERCY continued sternway. When MERCY was approximately 300 feet away from the Memorial, I realized something was out of the ordinary. At this point, Tiger 5 was still at 90 degrees to the keel of MERCY. I started calling distances (seaman's eye) at 275 feet. I also reported to the Pilot that there was still no prop wash. At 200 feet, I tried to check sternway by increasing my angle to 135 degrees. However, still no prop wash was visible and I reported this again to the Pilot. I saw some prop wash when the Memorial landing dock was 30 feet astern and 20 feet off the port quarter of MERCY. I then reported seeing prop wash to the Pilot. This was still much less wash than what I expected to see at that point. I witnessed heavy prop wash when there was 5-10 feet between MERCY's aft, port quarter and the Memorial landing dock, then MERCY's rudder contacted the Memorial landing dock, causing the dock to shift astern of MERCY. The rudder continued approximately 20 feet along the face of the landing. At that point MERCY slowly began headway away from the landing. [Encl. (28)].



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Post-Event and Other Facts

72. Required Reports of Marine Casualty (CG 2692) were submitted. [Encls. (27), and (43)].

(b)(5)

74. ABS Class Survey Report issued directing survey of vessel's bottom plating, rudder, propeller, steering gear, and shell plating to be performed at next port of call. [Encl. (45)].

75. An ABS Surveyor inspected MERCY in Suva, Fiji and observed no deficiencies. As part of the survey, divers inspected the MERCY and found no visible structural damage. Examination of the underwater portion of the rudder's trailing edge (beginning from the bottom of the rudder extending upwards to a point approximately halfway the full height) revealed scrape marks approximately 6 inches in length, but no structural damage. The surveyor recommended the vessel be retained as classed. [Encl. (46)].

76. The landing dock was displaced approximately 12 feet. The gangway attachment and fasteners to the Memorial, the landing dock railing, and the rubber fendering material (bumper) were damaged. The cost to repair the damages is not known. [Encl. (29)].

77. The Operational Navigation assessment conducted after the allision described the Chief Mate as (b)(6). It found that the Navigator's reporting (b)(6).

Finally, the assessment recommended the Ship Management Team address Bridge Resource Management (BRM) deficiencies. [Encl. (1) of Encl. (47)].

78. The post event engineering assessment identified no material deficiencies to engineering systems or equipment relevant to the allision. The assessment found the engineering plant to be operating as designed. [Encl. (2) of Encl. (47)].



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79. A Navigation material assessment conducted after the allision found all of the bridge equipment was in good working order. The minor findings identified were consistent with previous findings on other vessel, but none create a concern for the crew to safely operate the vessel. [Encl. (3) of Encl. (47)].

80. The Navigation Assessment team conducted debriefs with the senior Deck officers and the Master made the appropriate BRM adjustments prior to getting underway from Suva, Fiji (next port of call). Corrective actions were validated by the Navigation Assessment team during the next two maneuvering details. [Encl. (47)].

81. The Military Sealift Command Afloat Training instruction does not required training or assessments pertaining to BRM or Safe Navigation. As such, the Afloat Training Team does not provide training or evaluation of BRM procedures and safe navigation practices. [Ref. (k)].

82. BRM training is a requirement for deck officer licensing. BRM is a four day, shore based course and provides instruction in the effective use of available resources to enhance navigation safety, with emphasis on teamwork to minimize human error. In addition, as part of the licensing process under both International Maritime Organization (IMO), Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW), U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and US Coast Guard Licensing requirements, all licensed deck officers are required to satisfactorily complete USCG approved training in subject areas regarding radar and navigation courses that include use of radar, including Radar Observer; Advanced Shiphhandling (for Chief Mate and Master); Terrestrial and Celestial Navigation, and Electronic Navigation Systems; Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) to be valid on a vessel with this equipment; and Electronic Chart Display Information Systems (ECDIS), to be valid on a vessel with this equipment. MSC does not re-examine licensed deck officers regarding their qualifications since they have already passed a deck license exam and satisfied the above regulatory requirements applicable to the commercial maritime industry. [Refs. (l) and (m)].



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(b)(5)



84. MERCY's ECDIS recorded the departure. A print-out for each minute of the ECDIS recorder shows the ship maneuvering. Notes and arrows added to the series of prints show the distance relative to shoal water astern of the MERCY and the distance to the memorial. Additionally, based on the ECDIS speed vector, a calculated sternway value is provided. [Encl. (37)].

85. A series of time stamped photos taken by an MSC employee and bystander to the incident show the aspect of the tugs in relation to MERCY. Notes and arrows were added to the original photos to bring the viewer's attention to specific items relevant to this investigation. [Encl. (38)].

86. When operating under a slow ahead bell (20 RPM) with a hard right rudder on, MERCY generates 1600 horsepower (HP) ahead. Tiger 4 pushed ahead full (4400 shaft horse power [shp]) against MERCY at a position 90° to the bow between the ship's anchor and bulbous (i.e. 60° to the keel or ~300° relative to MERCY), generating 2200 shp astern. If both happened simultaneously, the net result (2200 HP astern - 1600 HP ahead) would be 560 shp astern, causing thrust in the stern direction. [Encl. (29)].

87. Captain Giudice's Standing Orders do not cover maneuvering detail requirements or required reports (hazards to navigation, tug maneuvering reports, etc.) during the maneuvering detail when a pilot is onboard. [Encl. (7)].

88. Weather at the time of the allision included winds at a Force 1, Seas at 0 feet, Sea State 1, with water temperature 77°F. [Encl. (49)].

89. With 98 Chief Mates required and 74 available to support 55 ships, MSC has a shortage of 24 Chief Mates. [Encl. (50)].



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90. The verbal communications recorded by the S-VDR were garbled and at times inaudible. Other data such as rudder position, RPMs, and SOG, were not recorded. [Encl. 35].

91. 2/O (b)(6) was promoted to (b)(6) position 06 June 2014 and has been assigned NAVOPS aboard MERCY since 10 December 2014. (b)(6) had completed no more than six maneuvering details prior to the allision. [Encls. (51) and (52)].

### OPINIONS

1. The allision was avoidable and the result of human errors. Poor tug control by the pilot resulted in unexpected sternway and the loss of situational awareness with respect to the ship's movement by the Pilot and Master for approximately 3 minutes (0744 - 0747) resulted in the allision. FoF 25-44, 60-71, and 85.

2. Poor control of Tiger 4 by the Pilot directly resulted in sustained sternway and placed the ship in a hazardous situation, requiring effective and timely action by the Pilot and Master to avoid the allision. Tiger 4 operations directly contributed to the allision. While pushing ahead full on the bow starting at 0742, Tiger 4 provided a stern thrust component for at least 4 minutes (0744 - 0748) prior to the allision by pushing at an angle of approximately 60° to the keel (~300° relative to MERCY). Tiger 4 Captain's statement of pushing 90° to the keel conflicts with the statements of the Cargo Mate and Bow Watch. However, photos taken from 0744 to 0748 show Tiger 4 wash and push angle to the bow at approximately 60° to the keel (~300° relative to MERCY), contributing to MERCY's sternway for at least 4 minutes prior to the allision. FoF 11, 25-44, 60-71, and 85-86.

3. Tiger 5 may have contributed to the allision. Conflicting statements exist between several MERCY crew members who stated that Tiger 5 contributed to MERCY's sternway by pulling the stern at more than 90° to the keel (at an angle abaft of the beam), and Tiger 5 Captain who stated that (b)(6) pulled at 90°. Photos are less definitive based on the angle the photos were taken. Therefore, Tiger 5's contribution to the sternway is undetermined. However, compared to Tiger 4 at ahead full and at an angle of 60° to the keel (~300° relative to MERCY), Tiger 5 at a half astern bell at an angle near 90° to the keel (~250° relative to



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MERCY) would have had less of a sternway contribution. FoF 43, 63, 66, 68(b), and 71.

4. Placed in a hazardous situation by Tiger 4, the Pilot and Master loss of situational awareness as a result of poor BRM which hindered them from taking the effective and timely action necessary to avoid the allision. Stationed on the starboard bridge wing with both tugs on the port side and unaware of Tiger 4's actual position on the angled portion of the bow between the anchor and the bulbous, the Pilot and Master were unaware of the sternway contribution caused by Tiger 4 pushing ahead full at an angle on the bow, and potentially to a lesser degree Tiger 5 on the stern. Believing that they only needed to check the momentum of the ship in the stern direction, they ordered ahead slow (20 RPM) for a total of 3 ½ minutes (from 0742:30 to 0744:30 and from 0745 to 0746:30) to counter the sternway. Only 1 ½ minutes of this time (from 0745 to 0746:30) was with the rudder amidships. The remainder of the time (plus the intervening 30 seconds when the ship was at "all stop" [from 0744:30 to 0745]) the ship was at hard right rudder. Calculations show that Tiger 4's contribution to sternway over-powered MERCY's slow ahead bell with rudder hard right by 560 shp and produced a higher sternway than the Master and Pilot expected or realized. At approximately 150 feet distance to the ARIZONA memorial with sternway remaining, corrective action was taken by the Pilot and Master to stop the sternway by ordering ahead half (40 RPM) bell with the rudder still hard right. FoF 34-44, 61- 71, and 86.

5. After realizing the hazardous situation the ship was in, the corrective actions taken by the Pilot and Master were effective in significantly reducing the severity of the allision. Increasing the ahead bell from ahead slow to half ahead and then to full ahead, and directing Tiger 4 to stop pushing ahead full were appropriate actions. However, the effectiveness of the ahead bell orders in countering the sternway was reduced by the rudder remaining at hard right. The hard right rudder also caused the stern to swing faster towards the landing dock than it would have otherwise. A half ahead bell with rudder amidships would have more quickly stopped the sternway and slowed the swing of the ship, and likely prevented the allision from occurring. Even if this additional action would not have avoided the allision, it would have minimized the damage



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that was caused to the landing dock by the prop wash associated with the full ahead bell. FoF 41-47, and 61-71.

6. The C/M did not effectively facilitate communications with the Bow and Stern Watches pertaining to the movement of the ship or the position and status of the tugs or make necessary reports to the Master (e.g., forward tug is shifting from starboard to port bow, tug pulling at 90° - medium strain, etc.). This contributed to the Pilot's and the Master's loss of situational awareness which decreased the time available to take action to avoid the allision. FoF 7-8 and 62.

7. The navigation reports by the NAVOPS to the Master and Pilot on the bridge wing were ineffective and contributed to the inadequate BRM. Although not required by Captain Giudice in his standing orders or by required licensing standards, a report of distance and time based on sternway speed to the nearest navigation hazard would have potentially allowed the Pilot and Master to take action to stop the sternway prior to the allision and without answering a full bell. This lack of reporting contributed to the Pilot's and the Master's loss of situational awareness. FoF 7-8 and 63.

8. ECDIS accurately displayed the ship's position during the evolution, but was not effectively used by the Master or Pilot. Additionally, NAVOPS and C/M did not effectively communicate information from ECDIS to the Master and Pilot. The Master's decision to remain with the Pilot on the starboard bridge wing and relay conning orders to the bridge hindered his ability to use ECDIS. Understanding that the bridge wing speed indicators includes the twist speed, the Master and Pilot relied solely on seaman's eye to gage sternway. The failure to utilize ECDIS contributed to the Master's loss of situational awareness. FoF 7-8, 61-63, 82, and 84.

9. The lack of experience of the C/M contributed to this event in several ways. First, the C/M was reluctant to conn the ship, resulting in the Master relaying orders to the pilot house for the Pilot who had the conn. This hindered the Master's situational awareness. Second, the C/M did not manage the maneuvering detail effectively in that (b)(6) did not require effective reports from the watchteam. Specifically, the tug positions and loading as



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well as hazards to navigation were not provided to the Master on the bridge wing. Finally, with the Master and Pilot on the starboard bride wing, the C/M did not use ECDIS to evaluate the ship's maneuvering parameters and distances to navigation hazards and thus was unaware that the ship was steering into danger. One of the C/M's primary functions was to relay information the Master needed to maintain situational awareness. As a result of (b)(6) lack of experience, this function was poorly accomplished, and directly contributed to the loss of situational awareness of the Master and Pilot which led to the allision. FoF 7-8, 61-62, and 82-84.

10. The lack of experience and effectiveness of the Navigator contributed to the allision. The Navigator's statement that (b)(6) "did not notice at any point that we were sliding astern" is telling. FoF 63. Although within the prescribed guidelines of licensing requirements and the Captain Giudice's Standing Orders, NAVOPS was focused exclusively on ship's position fixes and provided no reports to enhance the situational awareness of the Master or watchteam until after the allision which occurred 18 minutes after getting underway. Although specific guidelines are not delineated, the T-AH SMS discusses NAVOPS as "performing such duties as docking/undocking, anchoring..." FoF 7-8, 61(c), 63, and 82.

11. The Master's maneuvering detail experience level was lacking and contributed to inadequate BRM, and by extension the allision. Both the 1/O and 2/O directly supporting the Master during the maneuvering detail lacked experience. C/M (b)(6) had coordinated a total of two maneuvering details, both aboard MERCY. 2/O (b)(6) acted as navigator for 6 details, all aboard MERCY. Detailing inexperienced personnel into these key positions added risk during the maneuvering detail. A shortage of C/M exist within Military Sealift Command which limits the options for detailing more experienced C/M to demanding position of C/M aboard a deployed T-AH. FoF 7, 9, 83, 89, and 91.

12. The Master's responsibility for his ship is absolute. The master is responsible for the safe navigation of the ship. Pilots, when employed, serve as technical advisors or assistants to the Master and the presence of a pilot does not relieve the Master and his subordinates of



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responsibility for the safe navigation of the ship.  
FoF 6-8.

13. The Pilot and Master accepted the risk inherent in getting MERCY underway with two tugs instead of the originally requested three tugs. Quiet hours were designated to start at 0900 for the Change of Command event. This meant the ship had to be clear of the channel and the tugs back to their normal berth prior to 0900. With other movements driven by the same restrictions ongoing, only two tugs were available at 0730. The Master accepted this risk based on his 30+ year professional relationship with the Pilot, combined with light airs, minimal current and seas. A third tug made fast to the starboard quarter could have provided immediate forward thrust to counter any unexpected sternway. This decision indirectly contributed to the allision by hindering the Pilot's ability to maneuver the ship *in extremis*. FoF 12-13, 60-61, and 88.

14. The Master's Standing Orders were not as effective as they might otherwise have been. In promulgating his orders, the Master could have required the reporting of specific information during maneuvering to include navigation reports reporting on time and distance to closest hazards to navigation and tug reports reporting tug shifts and perceived power (i. e. tug shifted to starboard bow and is working ahead full). Although the Master's Standing Orders include sections for "THE WATCH - AT SEA" (Section 2) and "THE WATCH - AT ANCHOR" (Section 3), a section specifically addressing reporting requirements during maneuvering detail was not promulgated. FoF 8 and 87.

15. Weather conditions, including winds, current, and sea state, were not a contributing factor in the allision. FoF 60-61 and 88.

16. MERCY's engineering equipment and systems functioned properly and did not contribute to the allision. FoF 15-17, 61(e), and 78.

17. MERCY's navigation equipment and communication systems were operating correctly and did not contribute to the allision. FoF 17, 61(e), 67, 78, and 79.



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18. The S-VDR was of limited assistance in reconstructing the events after the incident because voice recordings were garbled and other indications, such as rudder position, RPMs, and SOG, were not recorded. FoF 58 and 90.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommend PO1 review the ROI and, in consultation with Total Force Management (N1) and Counsel (N00L), take such administrative or corrective action concerning the Master, the Chief Mate, and the Navigator as it deems appropriate. Opinions 1-14.

2. Recommend MSC develop and promulgate navigation guidance, to include appropriate checklists and standing orders requirements, to enhance navigation proficiency and Bridge Resource Management throughout the MSC fleet. Opinions 4, 6-10, and 14.

3. Pending the development and issuance of such navigation guidance, recommend that all ship masters be directed to review and revise as deemed appropriate their standing orders to require time and distance from hazard(s) reports and tug operation reports be made to the Bridge during maneuvering. Opinions 4, 6-10, and 14.

4. Recommend the development of a BRM team training process to observe, assess, and debrief MSC ship watchteams during maneuvering details while underway to validate compliance with proposed command navigation directives and guidance. Options could include contracted BRM experts to validate Contracted Mariners adherence and/or a Master licensed Civilian Mariner associated with MSC Afloat Training Team for Government Operated vessels. Opinions 4, 6-10.

5. Recommend using existing skills assessments programs in navigation and shiphandling for newly promoted Masters prior to their first assignment as ship's Master (available maritime industry) as a template to smooth the transition from administrative and cargo management duties as Chief Mate to that of a ship's primary ship handler and navigator as Master. Opinions 1, 4, 5, 6-12, 14.

6. Recommend MSC enhance knowledge and proficiency of shiphandling theory and its practical application through



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development of shore based training for licensed deck officers. Training for Masters and Chief Mates would serve as a refresher for the Advanced Shiphhandling course required for licensing. Similarly, introducing advanced shiphhandling concepts and procedures to 2nd and 3rd officers would enable enhanced situational awareness by the entire bridge team during maneuvering conditions. Recommend the training leverages the latest technological developments in the use of ship simulation and focuses upon the intangibles of maneuvering a ship in a restricted environment, knowing and understanding controllable and uncontrollable forces affecting a ship, understanding a ship's maneuvering capabilities and limitations, and accurately assessing the physical environment and its effects on the maneuvering situation. Opinions 1-13.

7. Recommend the development and implementation of an exportable BRM training program designed for use aboard ship to refresh and reinforce the knowledge gained through individual BRM training received ashore. Opinions 1-10, 13, and 14.

8. Recommend MSC Port Captain West revisit MERCY during deployment to assess and provide corrective BRM actions as appropriate. Opinions 6-10.

9. Recommend upgrading situational awareness tools on MSC ships by installing weatherproof ECDIS display repeaters and/or ship motion indicators that provide astern, lateral, and ahead movement vectors in the pilot house and on each bridge wing. Opinions 7-9.

(b)(5)





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11. Recommend authorizing appropriate incentives to retain Chief Mates to enhance the experience base in the fleet. Opinions 9, and 11.

12. Recommend validating proper operations of S-VDR for each class of ship to ensure required data is being accurately captured. Opinion 18.

13. Recommend the responsible Program Office (PO1) review the report of investigation (ROI) and develop and promulgate lessons learned to the MSC fleet. Opinions 1-18.

14. Recommend a copy of the ROI be forwarded to Commander, Navy Region Hawaii for its situational awareness and for such administrative and or corrective action as it deems appropriate concerning the Pilot. Opinions 1-5 and 12-13.

15. Recommend the ROI be provided to the contracting officer responsible for the administration of the P&R Tug contract for his/her consideration and such actions as she/he considers necessary to protect the Government's rights under the contract. Opinions 2 and 3.

(b)(6)



CAPT USN /





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
COMMANDER MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND  
471 EAST C STREET  
NORFOLK VA 23511-2419

5830  
N02  
28 May 15

From: Commander, Military Sealift Command

To: CAPT (b)(6), USN

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Ref: (a) Manual for the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN),  
Chapter II

1. This appoints you, per chapter II of reference (a), to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allision and damage between USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) and the USS ARIZONA Memorial that occurred on 27 May 2015.

2. Investigate the cause of the incident, any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore, and recommend appropriate corrective or administrative action. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form and via electronic format by 29 June 2015, unless an extension of time is granted. To the extent that it is necessary in the course of your inquiry to obtain personal information from the witnesses, you are required to comply with the Privacy Act as detailed in 0207(e) of reference (a). If you have not previously done so, read chapter II of reference (a) in its entirety before beginning your investigation.

3. During your investigation, you may seek legal advice from MSC Counsel, (b)(6) COMM: (b)(6) or at (b)(6)

4. During your investigation, you may seek additional support in the course of the investigation from the following: Captain (b)(6) Port Capt West; CDR (b)(6), Coast Guard Support; (b)(6) Action Officer; (b)(6) MSC CIVMAR Training Manager; technical advice from (b)(6) (b)(6) CHENG, USS FRANK CABLE (AS 40).

P. A. STADER  
Chief of Staff

Enclosure(1)



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Copy to:

MSC N00L

Captain (b)(6)

CDR (b)(6)


Mr. (b)(6)

Mr. (b)(6)

Mr. (b)(6)

Mr. (b)(6)







### SHIP CHARACTERISTICS

The ships are converted San Clemente Class supertankers that were designed to commercial shipbuilding standards in accordance with United States Coast Guard (USCG) and American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) requirements. The current life expectancy of the ships is 2020.

Length Overall .....	894 feet
Beam .....	105 feet, 9 inches
Design Draft .....	32 feet, 9 inches
Scantling Draft .....	38 feet
Displacement .....	59,360 long tons
Diesel Fuel Capacity (DFM/F76) .....	42,000 barrels
.....	1,779,624 gallons
Fuel Consumption (At Anchor/Inport) .....	260 barrels/day
Fuel Consumption (Underway - 13 kts) .....	450 barrels/day
.....	1.5 barrels/mile
Fuel Consumption (Underway - 17.5 kts) .....	975 barrels/day
.....	2.4 barrels/mile
Fuel Endurance - Economical .....	95 days
Fuel Endurance - Maximum .....	44 days
Range .....	13,420 nautical miles
JP5 Tankage (JP5/F44) .....	760 barrels
.....	31,080 gallons
Main Propulsion - Single Screw .....	Steam Turbine
Boilers(2) - Steam Pressure .....	900 psi
Shaft Horsepower .....	24,500
Sustained Speed .....	17.5 knots
Generators (Diesel) - For MTF (3) .....	2000 KW each
Generators - For Ship Service	
Turbo (1) .....	1000 KW
Auxiliary Diesel (1) .....	750 KW
Emergency Diesel (1) .....	1600 KW
Distilling Plants (4) .....	75,000 GPD each
Fresh Water Storage Capacity .....	460,000 gallons
Air Conditioning Plant (3) .....	400 tons each
Liquid Oxygen/Nitrogen Plant (2) .....	18 gallons/hr each
Flight Deck .....	One Spot

### PIER REQUIREMENTS

ITEM	SPECIFICATIONS
Water Depth .....	32 feet @ MLLW
Vertical Clearance .....	138 feet at MHHW—based upon expected draft of 25 feet
Pier Apron .....	700 feet long and 40 feet wide (minimum)
NOTE: Pier should extend a minimum of 700 feet aft from Frame 33	
Fendering .....	Absorb 336,000 foot pounds/unit; 25 psi max hull pressure
Shore Power .....	3200 amps @ Frame 84, 450 volts, 60HZ, 3 phase
.....	800 amps @ Frame 110, 450 volts, 60 HZ, 3 phase
Potable Water .....	90 psi w/flow rate of 185 gal/minute; 2.5 inch hose @ Frame 95
Steam .....	145 PSIG 24 hrs/day; 2.5 inch hose @ Frame 119
Sewage .....	300 gallons/minute and 140 feet of head; 3 inch hose @ Frames 44 and 84
NOTE: During ROS: 1500 gal of waste/day	
During dock trials: 23,000 gal of waste/day	
Fire Main .....	90 psi @ at flow rates 0 to 185 gal/min; 2.5 inch hose @ Frames 62 and 83
Phone Lines .....	12 lines connected to Dimension 2000 PBX System

### MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS



## COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

### Commerical Radio System

INMARSAT STD A, Magnavox MX-2400 HSD (High Speed Data) – in Radiology .....	1
INMARSAT STD A, Magnavox MX-2400 HSD (High Speed Data) – in MTF CO's Stateroom .....	1
INMARSAT STD A, Magnavox MX-2400 with STU-III capability .....	1
INMARSAT STD C, MDT-6000 .....	1
VHF Bridge-to-bridge Transceiver (Ross DSC-500) .....	2
HF SITOP, Harris RF-193 (Simplex Telex Over Radio) .....	1
HF/MF SSB Voice capability, SunAir GSP-900 .....	1
Mackay Console with auto alarm (incl. 2021 Transmitter and 3020/3041 Receiver) .....	1

### Navy Communication System

#### UHF SATCOM

AN/WSC-3(V)3A / 15 Transceiver .....	2
OE-82/WSC-1(V) SATCOM Antenna System .....	1
OK-454/WSC DAMA System .....	1
AN/SSR-1A SATCOM Antenna Receive System .....	1

#### UHF Line of Sight (LOS)

AN/WSC-3(V)7 LOS Transceiver .....	4
OA-9123/SRC LOS Antenna Coupler .....	1
Battle Group Cellular System .....	1

#### VHF

AN/GRC-211 VHF Transceiver .....	1
AN/URC-94(V) VHF/HF Transceiver .....	4
AN/PRC-96 Transceiver (MERCY) .....	6

#### MF/HF

AN/URT-23D(V) HF Transmitter .....	2
R-2368/URR LF/MF/HF Receiver .....	4
MSR-5050 LF/MF/HF Receiver .....	4
RF-5254C HF Modem .....	1
CU-2007/U Coupler .....	1
AM-4823/U RF Amplifier .....	4
AN/URA-17F .....	2

#### Teletype Processing System

AN/SYQ-7(V)2 NAVMACS W/MPD .....	1
AN/UGC-143(V) NST Teletypewriter .....	2
NOW Teletype System .....	2

#### Special Communications

AFLOAT GATEGUARD System .....	1
PC BASED MTF EDITOR .....	1
Lotus CC-Mail electronic mail systems (1 for ship/hull; 1 for MTF) .....	2
VVFD (Voice, Video, Fax, Data Terminal) (Partial) .....	1
Manual Single Audio System (MSAS) (incl. (4)C-10315/U, (Qty)TA-970/U, and (3) C-10316/U) .....	1
AN/SSQ-88 QMCS .....	1
AN/URQ-23 Frequency Standard .....	1

#### Secure Communications

TSEC/KGA4A COMSEC Equipment .....	1
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per diem operating costs for other exercises or assigned mission support are dependent upon the anticipated concept of operations and length of deployment, and can be provided by contacting the ships' Program Manager located at HQ, Military Sealift Command. Phone numbers are: DSN: 325-5908/9 or COMM: (202) 685-5908/9.

#### MTF AUGMENT STAFFING

The costs to provide medical and non-medical personnel to staff the Medical Treatment Facility for exercises or assigned mission support can be provided by BUMED/MED 27 at DSN: 762-3420/5 or COMM: (202) 762-3420/5.

#### PERSONNEL STAFFING PROFILE

The sourcing command/activity for all CIVMARs is the Military Sealift Command. The BUMED commands responsible for sourcing augmentees for the MTFs are as follows:

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USNS MERCY: Naval Medical Center, San Diego CA  
USNS COMFORT: National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda MD

	ROS-5	250 BEDS/4ORs	500 BEDS/6ORs	1000 BEDS/12 ORs
CIVMARs	13	68	68	68
Line Officers	0	6	6	6
Medical Corps	0	40	54	66
Dental Corps	0	2	4	4
Med. Svc. Corps	3	17	20	20
JAG Corps	0	1	1	1
Nurse Corps	2	87	130	168
Supply Corps	1	5	5	5
Chaplain Corps	0	2	2	2
Non-Med Enlisted	25	238	242	244
Medical Enlisted	27	339	485	698
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>805</b>	<b>1017</b>	<b>1282</b>

NOTE: Detailed information on the MTF active duty staffing requirements can be obtained from the Activity Manpower Document (AMD) contained in the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS).

#### LOGISTICS SUPPORT

**INFORMATION SYSTEMS** - Both ships have Micro-SNAP and SAMS resident onboard their fiber optic LANs to manage and order items contained in the Authorized Medical Allowance Lists (AMAL). SAMS is used primarily for AMAL management in the MTF work centers, while Micro-SNAP is used to order supplies/equipment and manage the MTF OPTAR. SALTS is also available to send and receive supply information and is tested routinely during dock and sea trial periods.

**ROS LOGISTICS STATUS** - Each ship's MTF maintains a minimum of 5 days of medical supplies and general use consumables onboard during ROS—with the exception of short shelflife items such as pharmaceuticals and reagents. A limited quantity of ship's store stock and provisions are also maintained during ROS.



All AMAL-authorized medical equipment is installed onboard and maintained in a 100% ready-for-sea status by a cadre of biomedical equipment repair technicians assigned to the MTF ROS crew.

**FOS LOGISTICS** - Depending upon the assigned mission and the number of MTF beds and ORs to be operated, the ship can













## **Background**

Converted San Clemente Class Oil Tankers, designed and built to commercial standards (USCG-passenger ship, and ABS).

USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) was built as SS WORTH, by NASSCO Shipbuilding Co., in 1976. In 1984 NASSCO began conversion to a hospital ship and was commissioned 8 November 1986. First deployment was 27 FEB 1987 thru 13 JUL 1987 to the Phillippines and South Pacific.

USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) was built as SS ROSE CITY, by NASSCO Shipbuilding Co., in 1976. In 1984 NASSCO began conversion to a hospital ship and was commissioned 1987. First deployment was 11 AUG 1990 thru 15 APR 1991 for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

COMSC is TYCOM of the hull and the Medical Treatment Facility.



## **Mission**

To provide a safe, stable, mobile platform for carrying out the assigned missions.


### **Primary: Floating Theater Hospital**

Support forward deployed Navy elements of the fleet and fleet activities, amphibious task forces, Marine Corps, Army and Air Force elements.

### **Secondary: Disaster or Humanitarian Relief**

Support U.S. Government agencies involved in disaster or humanitarian relief or limited humanitarian care incident to these missions in peacetime military operations.





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## T-AH Command & Control




**Two COMMANDS: Master and MTF CO**

- Military Sealift Command (MSC)** has ADCON of civilian crew for ship/hull operations.  
**MASTER:** Civilian Officer, Command of Ship  
 Responsible for all matters relating to the safe operation and navigation of the ship including the safety of the crew, all embarked personnel, cargo and the ship's operating equipment.
- Military Sealift Command (MSC)** has ADCON of embarked Medical Treatment Facility (MEDTREFAC/MTF) for medical requirements.  
**CO USN:** Medical Corp, Command of Medical Treatment Facility (MTF)  
 Responsible for equipment and personnel assigned to the MTF.
- During FOS the Fleet may embark a Mission Commander.

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<div>   <div>Operating Status</div>  </div>	
<p><b>Reduced Operating Status (ROS):</b></p> <p>MSC maintains vessel, 72 hour emergent sortie, 120 hour mission activation for unplanned missions, 30 days notice for planned missions.</p> <p>ADCON of ship and MTF is with COMSC.</p> <p><b>Full Operating Status (FOS):</b></p> <p>OPCON is with COCOM/Fleet.</p> <p>ADCON of ship and MTF remains with COMSC.</p>	
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<div>   <div>T-AH Characteristics/Capabilities</div>  </div>															
<p>T-AH 19 USNS MERCY T-AH 20 USNS COMFORT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Length: 894 feet</li> <li>Beam: 106 feet</li> <li>Draft: 33 feet</li> <li>Displacement (full): 69,360 long tons</li> <li>Speed: 17 knots (12 knots cruise)</li> <li>Endurance: 13,420 nm</li> <li>Ship's Fuel: DFM/F76 42,000 Barrels</li> <li>Helo Fuel: JP-5/F44 90,000 Gallons</li> <li>Shafts: 1</li> <li>Main Engines: 2 GE turbines, 2 GE boilers</li> <li>Patient Transfer: Helo, Small Boat, and Pier side.</li> <li>Potable Water: 300,000 gal/day</li> <li>Chapel</li> <li>Elevators: 9</li> <li>Galley – aft CIVMAR galley &amp; forward Hospital galley.</li> <li>Laundry – hospital laundry, &amp; self-serve laundries.</li> <li>Incineration – 2. Ship waste &amp; medical waste.</li> <li>VERTREP (Helo replenishment) &amp; Landing</li> <li>CONREP (Connected Replenishment &amp; Fueling) RAS- replenishment at sea. FAS- fueling at sea.</li> <li>INREP (Inport Replenishment)</li> <li>Patient Transfer Boats: 2 Tenders/Lifeboats</li> <li>Mission gear transport boats: 2 10M Navy Utility</li> </ul>	<p><b>Crew Size (Reduced &amp; Full Operating Status)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Civilian Mariners: ROS 20 FOS: 72</li> <li>❖ MTF Personnel: ROS 59 FOS: 1,215</li> </ul> <table> <tr> <td>Total Hospital Beds:</td> <td>1,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intensive Care Beds:</td> <td>80</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Recovery Beds:</td> <td>20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intermediate Care Beds:</td> <td>400</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Minimal Care Beds:</td> <td>500</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Casualty Receiving Stations:</td> <td>50</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Operating Rooms:</td> <td>12</td> </tr> </table> <p>Services: Laboratory, Blood Bank, Radiological, Optical &amp; Dental, Pharmacy, Portable x-ray machines, Mission and Medical Communications, O2N2 Plant, Patient Litter Hoist, Morgue, Patient Care Services, Medical Waste Handling, Fitness, Recreation, Cyber Café, Post Office, Ship's Store, Medical Planners Center, Mission Operations Center</p>	Total Hospital Beds:	1,000	Intensive Care Beds:	80	Recovery Beds:	20	Intermediate Care Beds:	400	Minimal Care Beds:	500	Casualty Receiving Stations:	50	Operating Rooms:	12
Total Hospital Beds:	1,000														
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Casualty Receiving Stations:	50														
Operating Rooms:	12														
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## Medical Treatment Facility





<b>Total Beds:</b>	<b>1,000</b>
Intensive Care Beds:	80
Recovery Beds:	20
Intermediate Care Beds:	400
Minimal Care Beds:	500
Casualty Receiving Stations:	50
Operating Rooms:	12

**Surgical Capabilities**

General	Orthopedic
Cardiac and Thoracic	Dental
Ear/Nose/Throat	Plastic
Neurosurgery	Maxillofacial
Ophthalmic	Urology
Obstetric and Gynecology	


**Non-Surgical Medical Capabilities**

Internal Medicine	Dermatology
Dialysis	Psychiatry
Respiratory Therapy	Angiography

**Ancillary and Support Services Capabilities**


Dental Prosthetics	Lens Fabrication
Laboratory	Radiology
Pharmacy	Blood Bank
Medical Equipment Repair	Dietary
Burn Treatment	Physical Therapy
Medical Supply	Laundry

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## Medical Treatment Facility



*The Medical Treatment Facility aboard the MERCY Class Hospital Ship is one of the largest trauma facilities in the United States and offers a full spectrum of surgical and medical services.*

*Patients arrive aboard by helicopter and occasionally by small boat, especially if operating near shore.*





- Four X-ray rooms
- CAT Scan unit
- Cardio-thoracic angiography suite
- Dental surgical suite
- Optometry and lens laboratory
- Physical Therapy and Burn Care Center
- Pharmacy and medical supply center
- Maintains up to 5,000 units of blood and also produces oxygen and nitrogen

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## Ship Challenges



### SMALL BOAT

- Access by small boat is not always reliable as patient transfers and deployment of med teams can be unsafe in rough seas.
- Distance from shore and travel time can restrict patient access.
- Pierside is the most efficient means for accomplishing safe and numerous patient encounters.



### HELO

- 90K gallon JP5 resource aboard will support a modest air effort. Advance resupply points are key to mission rhythm.
- HCA missions utilize a temporary helo shelter to support limited maintenance of Fleet embarked H-60 helo det. The shelter imposes AVCERT restrictions and limitations on the flight deck.





## T-AH Maneuvering Considerations

### Maneuvering the Hospital Ship

- Large Sail Area and deep draft
- Steam Plant: Slow in getting up to RPM's
- Maneuvering ability designed for long transit point to point operation.
- No bow or stern thrusters. Single radically skewed screw for efficient, quiet point to point transit.
- Need for high horsepower tug assists. Some countries lack adequate tugs.






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## HCA Equipment



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**Aviation Facility - HELLO Shelter:**

- Interim AVCERT: Temporary Shelter (plastic) H-60 limited maintenance.*
- Pending V-22 deck mods and Permanent NAVAIR Hangar for H-60 & Super Puma, (design done, awaiting install funds)*
- Two Utility Boats- NAVY 10M (transport mission gear & backup patient transfer)**
- Two Patient Transfer Boats/Tenders & Davit System (new 2014)**
- Tenders capacity: 50 persons plus 4 wheel chair patients and 6 litter patients = 60.*
- Length: 11 meters*
- Speed: 12 knots*
- Draft: 1 meter*
- Mission Operations Center:**
- COMF = 03 level, adjacent to flight deck,*
- MERCY= 2<sup>nd</sup> deck, adjacent to MTF ADMIN & MTF Planning Center*
- Force Protection 7M Picket Boats (FLEET provide)**
- NECC embarked security dets no longer operate 7M picket boats.*
- Force Protection 7M Picket Boat Davit*
- Starboard Side-port waterborne Embarkation Platform**

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## Ship to Shore Movements



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**SMALL BOAT Tenders**



**SMALL BOAT 10M Utility**



**FLIGHT DECK**




**PIER SIDE**

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# BACKUP



## Comms

### **Radio/Navy communications suite:**

UHF SATCOM -CBSP

UHF Line of Sight

VHF

MF/HF

NAVMACS

DMDS

NGO Suite

### **Mission:**

BGAN

IRIDIUM

### **MSC:**

NGW



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<b>Propulsion Plant</b>	
<i>Two Foster Wheeler D Type Marine Boilers</i>	
Design Pressure:	1100 psig
Operating Pressure:	900 psig
Normal Capacity:	91,420 lbs./hr
Max Capacity:	137,170 lbs./hr
Superheater:	875 psig, 930 deg F.
Fuel:	MGO/DFM
<i>GE Cross Compound (HP, LP and Astern) Propulsion Turbines</i>	
<i>GE Double Reduction and Double Helical Marine Reduction Gear</i>	
Power:	24,500 SHP @ 95 shaft rpm.
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <span>United States Fleet Forces</span> <span>Ready Fleet ... Global Reach</span> </div>	

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<b>Deck Machinery</b>	
<i>Two Anchor Windlasses:</i>	<i>30,000 lbs.</i>
<i>Six Mooring Winches</i>	
<i>Nine Patient Elevators:</i>	<i>7,500 lbs.</i>
<i>Stores Handling Cranes:</i>	
<i>One at Frame 41 (port):</i>	<i>6,000 lbs.</i>
<i>One at Frame 41 (stbd):</i>	<i>30,000 lbs.</i>
<i>Two at Frame 98 (port/stbd):</i>	<i>4,000 lbs.</i>
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <span>United States Fleet Forces</span> <span>Ready Fleet ... Global Reach</span> </div>	



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<b>Auxiliary Machinery</b>	
<b>Auxiliary Diesel Generators</b>	
Three MAN B&W V12 25/30:	2000 kW x 3
<b>Emergency Diesel Generator</b>	
One MAN B&W V18 20/27:	1500 kW x 1
<b>Ship's Service Turbo Generator</b>	
One GE Steam Turbine:	1000 kW x 1
<b>Ship's Service Diesel Generator</b>	
One Caterpillar 3508B DI-TA SCAC:	715 kW x 1
<b>Air Conditioning Plants</b>	
Forward: Three Carrier Centrifugal	500 ton R134a
Eng Rm: One York Reciprocating	70 ton R12
<b>Refrigeration Plants</b>	
Forward: Two York Reciprocating	
Eng Rm: One York Reciprocating	
<b>Distilling Plants</b>	
Four AquaChem Flash:	75,000 gals/day x 4
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<b>Safety Equipment</b>	
<b>Lifeboats, Liferafts, Rescue Boats</b>	
<b>Fire detection and protection systems</b>	
<b>Topside chemical washdown, limited</b>	
<b>Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)</b>	
<b>Global Maritime Distress Signal System (GMDSS)</b>	
<b>Hull Perimeter Lighting (HPL)</b>	
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


<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div>Pre-Decisional – Draft Working Papers</div> </div> <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; margin-top: 5px;">Layberth Pier Requirements</div>	
Minimum Water Depth:	32' MLLW
Vertical Clearance:	138' MHHW and 25' ship draft
Pier Apron:	700' long, 40' wide (minimum)
Mooring Plan Winds:	70 mph
Potable Water (2 connections):	90 psi at 185 gpm, 1.5" hose.
Telephone Service:	local and long distance, 16 connections for Nortel 61C system, 2 each T-1 service connections.
Pier Steam service:	145 psig    17,500 lbs./hr at 0 deg F. 500 lbs./hr at 65 deg F & above.
Make-up feed water purity:	less than 3 ppm chlorides.
Sewage service:	Two connections, 300 gpm & 140 ft head.
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div>United States Fleet Forces</div> <div>Ready Fleet ... Global Reach</div> </div>	

<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div>Pre-Decisional – Draft Working Papers</div> </div> <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; margin-top: 5px;">Layberth Pier Requirements (continued)</div>	
Firefighting Service within 15 minutes of alarm.	
Pier Fire Hydrant services:	
Two ship connections (Frames 01-62-2 & 01-83-2), 90 psi & 185 gpm each.	
Shore Power:	
3 phase, 60 Hertz, 460 Volts, delta connected with capacity of 4000 Amps (3200 amps at Frame 84, and 800 amps at frame 110).	
Moored port side to pier.	
Parking capacity: 100 automobiles & 2 passenger buses.	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div>United States Fleet Forces</div> <div>Ready Fleet ... Global Reach</div> </div>	



# MERCY SHAFT RPM TO HORSEPOWER







United States of America  
Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard

Certification Date: 30 Apr 2015  
Expiration Date: 30 Apr 2016  
IMO Number: 7390454

## Temporary Certificate of Inspection

For ships on international voyages this certificate fulfills the requirements of SOLAS 74 as amended, regulation V/14, for a SAFE MANNING DOCUMENT

This Temporary Certificate of Inspection is issued under the provision of Title 46 United States Code, Section 399, in lieu of the regular certificate of inspection, and shall be in force only until the receipt on board said vessel of the original certificate of inspection, this certificate in no case to be valid after one year from the date of inspection.

Vessel Name <b>USNS MERCY</b>	Official Number <b>570876</b>	Call Sign <b>NMER</b>	Service <b>Public Vessel, Unclassified</b>			
Hailing Port <b>SAN DIEGO CA, US</b>	Hull Material <b>Steel</b>	Horsepower <b>24500</b>	Propulsion <b>Steam Turbine</b>			
Place Built <b>SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA</b>	Delivery Date <b>19Dec1986</b>	Date Keel Laid <b>12Jun1974</b>	Gross Tons <b>R-54367 I-63527</b>	Net Tons <b>R-35958 I-19058</b>	DWT <b>45481</b>	Length <b>R-881.8 I-</b>
Owner <b>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, BLDG 210 WASHINGTON DC 20398-5100 UNITED STATES</b>	Operator <b>MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND PACIFIC 140 SYLVESTER ROAD SAN DIEGO CA 92106</b>					

This vessel must be manned with the following licensed and unlicensed personnel. Included in which there must be 0 certified lifeboatmen, 0 certified tankermen, 0 HSC type rating, and 4 GMDSS Operators.

1 Master	0 Master & 1st Class pilot	0 Radio Officer(s)	1 Chief Engineer	3 QMED/Rating
1 Chief Mate	0 Mate & 1st Class Pilot	6 Able Seamen/ROANW	1 1st Asst. Engr/2nd Engr	6 Oilers
1 2nd Mate/OICNW	0 Lic. Mate/OICNW	3 Ordinary Seamen	1 2nd Asst. Engr/3rd Engr	
1 3rd Mate/OICNW	0 1st Class Pilot	0 Deckhands	1 3rd Asst. Engr	
			0 Lic. Engr.	

In addition, this vessel may carry 0 passengers, 49 other persons in crew, 0 persons in addition to crew, and 1365 Medical Personal/Support Staff and 1000 Patients. Total persons allowed: 2440

Route Permitted and Conditions of Operation:

---Oceans---

NAVAL VESSEL, IN SERVICE, CIVILIAN MANNED. INSPECTED AND CERTIFICATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MSC VESSELS.

REQUIRED CERTIFIED LIFEBOATMEN:

(1) FULL OPERATIONAL SERVICE WITH FULL MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY ABOVE 1000 PERSONNEL (MEDICAL AND PATIENTS): 106 LIFEBOATMEN

\*\*\*SEE NEXT PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL CERTIFICATE INFORMATION\*\*\*

With this Inspection for Certification having been completed at Portland, OR, the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, Sector Columbia River certified the vessel, in all respects, is in conformity with the applicable vessel inspection laws and the rules and regulations prescribed thereunder.

Annual/Periodic/Quarterly Reinspections				This certificate issued  <b>(b)(6)</b>  Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection  Sector Columbia River  Inspection Zone
Date	Zone	A/P/Q	Signature	
-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	





Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard

## Temporary Certificate of Inspection

Certification Date:  
30Apr2015

USNS MERCY

(2) FULL OPERATIONAL SERVICE WITH FULL MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY NOT EXCEEDING 1000 PERSONS ONBOARD: 64 LIFEBOATMEN.

(3) FULL OPERATIONAL SERVICE WITH PARTIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY NOT EXCEEDING 500 PERSONS ONBOARD: 24 LIFEBOATMEN.

NAVY PERSONNEL TRAINED IAW U.S. COAST GUARD APPROVED MSC LIFERAFT TRAINING PROGRAM MAY BE SUBSTITUTED FOR REQUIRED CERTIFIED LIFEBOATMEN ON DAVIT LAUNCHED LIFERAFTS AND FLOAT-FREE LIFERAFTS ONLY.

JUNIOR ENGINEERS, ENGINEMEN, OR DECK ENGINE MECHANICS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED FOR ONE OR MORE OF THE REQUIRED OILERS.

FLAMMABLE MATERIAL IS NOT TO BE STORED IN THE MEDICAL STORES OR HELICOPTER SHELTER SPACES.

VESSEL IS CONSTRUCTED OF HIGH TENSILE STEEL, SPECIAL WELDING PROCEDURES ARE REQUIRED. (SEE APPROVED PLANS)

IMMERSION SUITS ARE NOT REQUIRED WHEN OPERATING BETWEEN 32 DEGREES NORTH AND 32 DEGREES SOUTH LATITUDE.

THE MASTER SHALL ENSURE THAT FOUR (04) PERSONS ON BOARD THE VESSEL ARE ASSIGNED AND ENDORSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STCW CODE, SECTION A-VI/2 TO OPERATE THE FAST RESCUE BOAT. THE MASTER SHALL ENSURE THAT THE FAST RESCUE BOAT IS OPERATED WITH A MINIMUM OF TWO (02) QUALIFIED PERSONS.

LIFEBOATS #1 & #2 ARE AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE AS SMALL PASSENGER VESSELS/TENDERS. THESE TENDERS MAY BE USED TO FERRY PASSENGERS TO AND FROM USNS MERCY AND SHALL NOT BE OPERATED MORE THAN TWENTY (20) MILES FROM A HARBOR OF SAFE REFUGE. THESE TENDERS AS CURRENTLY BUILT AND OUTFITTED ARE CONSIDERED TO MEET EQUIVALENT REQUIREMENTS TO THOSE LISTED IN 46 CFR PARTS 175 THROUGH 185 WITH EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS, WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED PURSUANT TO 46 CFR 175.550:

(1) TENDERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MEET SUBDIVISION OR COLLISION BULKHEAD STANDARDS REQUIRED BY 46 CFR PART 179 AS THE VESSELS MEET AN EQUIVALENT STANDARD UNDER THE LIFESAVING APPLIANCES CODE.

(2) SEATING ARRANGEMENTS CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BASED UPON REDUCING THE PASSENGER CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE LIFEBOAT FROM 150 PERSONS AS A LIFEBOAT TO 64 PERSONS AS A TENDER, OF WHICH 60 MAY BE PASSENGERS WITH NO MORE THAN 06 STRETCHERS AND 04 WHEEL CHAIRS.

(3) PRIMARY LIFESAVING REQUIRED BY 46 CFR PART 180 IS NOT REQUIRED DUE TO TENDERS BEING FULLY FOAMED AND DESIGNED AS SURVIVAL CRAFT.

WHEN THE TENDERS ARE BEING OPERATED WITH PASSENGERS ONBOARD, UNLESS OPERATED IN THE CAPACITY OF A LIFEBOAT, THEY MUST BE MANNED WITH TWO (02) DECKHANDS, ONE (01) ENGINEER AND ONE (01) MASTER HOLDING A LICENSE AS A MATE OF OVER 200 GROSS TONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 46 CFR 15.901(a).

UPON ACTIVATION, FIRE AND BOAT DRILLS WITH FULL CREW COMPLEMENT SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE PRESENCE OF A COAST GUARD MARINE INSPECTOR.





Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard

# Temporary Certificate of Inspection

USNS MERCY

Certification Date:  
30Apr2015

MAIN STEAM PIPING HYDROSTATICALLY PRESSURE TESTED TO 1375 PSI ON 30APR2015.

## ---Hull Exams---

Exam Type	Next Exam	Last Exam	Prior Exam
Drydock	30Apr2020	30Apr2015	31Mar2010
Internal Structure	30Apr2020	30Apr2015	31Mar2010

## ---Stability---

Letter	Approval Date /	Office/
Book	17Jan2014	CG MSC
	22Apr2010	NONCG

## ---Inspection Status---

### \*Fuel Tanks\*

TankID	Internal Examinations		
	Previous	Last	Next
#5 port	-	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
#5 Starboard	-	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Port Svc Tank	-	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Stbd Svc Tank	-	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Ctr Svc Tank	-	30Apr2015	30Apr2020

### \*Boilers/Steam Piping\*

Maximum Steam Pressure Allowed/1100

Boiler/Piping ID	Hydro/Previous	Hydro/Last	Hydro/Next	Mounts	Mounts
				Opened	Removed
PORT STEAM PIPE	17Feb2012	30Apr2015	17Feb2017	-	-
#2 SDC75114	17Feb2012	30Apr2015	17Feb2017	30Apr2015	30Apr2015
#1 SDC75115	22Feb2012	30Apr2015	22Feb2017	30Apr2015	30Apr2015
STBD STEAM PIPE	22Feb2012	30Apr2015	22Feb2017	-	-

Boiler/Piping ID	Fireside			Waterside		
	Previous	Last	Next	Previous	Last	Next
PORT STEAM PIPE	-	-	-	-	-	-
#2 SDC75114	17Feb2012	30Apr2015	17Feb2017	17Feb2012	30Apr2015	17Feb2017
#1 SDC75115	22Feb2012	30Apr2015	22Feb2017	22Feb2012	30Apr2015	22Feb2017
STBD STEAM PIPE	-	-	-	-	-	-

### \*Pressure Vessels\*

Type	Location	Previous	Last	Next
Other	#3 SERVICE SPACE	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Air Receiver	ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Air Receiver	ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Air Receiver	ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Other	ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Other	ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Air Receiver	EMER GEN	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Air Receiver	EMER GEN	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Other	AUX MACH ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Other	AUX MACH ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
DC Heater	UPPER ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Air Receiver	ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020





Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard

# Temporary Certificate of Inspection

Certification Date:  
30Apr2015

USNS MERCY

Air Receiver	ENGINE ROOM	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020
Air Receiver	AFT STACK SPACE	31Mar2010	30Apr2015	30Apr2020

\*Tailshafts\*

Tailshaft ID	Date Drawn	Next Due Date
SINGLE (OL)	29Feb2000	30Apr2020
NDT	-	30Apr2020

\*Lifesaving\*

Number of Davits/22

Lifeboat/Raft ID	Full Wgt Test	Light Wgt Test	Falls Rnwd	Falls End/End
1	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
2	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
3	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
4	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
5	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
6	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
7	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
8	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
9	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
10	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	28Feb2013	-
10	-	-	-	-
LR DAVIT 10	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 14	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 4	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 6	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 8	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 13	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 11	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 12	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 3	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 5	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 7	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
LR DAVIT 9	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	08Feb2012	-
RB1	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	-
RB2	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	30Apr2015	-

---Lifesaving Equipment---

	Number	Persons		Required
Total Equipment for		2440	Life Preservers(Adult)	2576
Lifeboats(Total)	10	1220	Life Preservers(Child)	258
Lifeboats(Port)*	5	610	Ring Buoys(Total)	30
Lifeboats(Starbd)*	5	610	With Lights*	15
Motor Lifeboats*	10	1220	With Line Attached*	2
Lifeboats W/Radio*	2	300	Other*	13
Rescue Boats/Platforms	2	24	Immersion Suits	38
Inflatable Rafts	80	2000	Portable Lifeboat Radios	3
Life Floats/Buoyant App	0	0	Equipped with EPIRB?	Yes
Inflatable Bouyant App(IBA)	0	0	(* included in totals)	

---Fire Fighting Equipment---

Number of Fireman Outfits/	4	Number of Fire Pumps/	3
----------------------------	---	-----------------------	---





Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard

# Temporary Certificate of Inspection

USNS MERCY

Certification Date  
30Apr2015

\*Hose information\*

Qty	Diameter	Length
99	1.5	75
14	1.5	Other

\*Fixed Extinguishing Systems\*

Capacity	Agent	Space Protected
750	Foam	ENGINE ROOM, AUX MACH, INCIN
230	Foam	HELO DK, JP-5 PUMPROOM
1716	Halon 1301	AUX MACH SPACE
500	Halon 1301	HOSPITAL EMER GENERATOR
90	Halon 1301	FLAMMABLE STORES
1002	Halon 1301	OXYGEN ROOM
300	Carbon Dioxide	PAINT LOCKER
3960	Halon 1301	SERVICE AREA 3 (JP 5 STORAGE)
720	Halon 1301	O2/N2 COMPRESSOR ROOM
150	Carbon Dioxide	E/R CONTROL ROOM
150	Carbon Dioxide	GREASE LOCKER
	Water Mist	ENGINE ROOM, AUX MACH, INCIN
100	Carbon Dioxide	AUX GENERATOR ENCLOSURE
2	Other	GALLEY
2	Other	GALLEY

\*Fire Extinguishers - Hand portable and semi-portable\*

Qty	Class Type
230	A-II
23	B-II
6	B-V
62	C-II

\*\*\*END\*\*\*

Enclosure (5)



U.S. Department  
of Homeland  
Security

United States  
Coast Guard



Commanding Officer  
United States Coast Guard  
Sector Columbia River

2185 SE 12th Place  
Warrenton, OR  
97146-  
Phone: 503-861-6211  
Fax:

16711  
April 30, 2015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, BLDG 210

WASHINGTON, DC 20398-5100

Subject: Issuance of Requirements  
Inspection Case: 5050383  
Conducted: 04/30/2015  
Vessel: USNS MERCY

The requirements on the attached list were issued during the inspection noted above.  
You are reminded that these requirements are to be completed to the satisfaction of the  
cognizant Coast Guard OCMI.

Marine Safety Unit Portland: 503-240-9374

(b)(6)

CWO2, U. S. COAST GUARD  
Marine Inspector

(b)(6)



Vessel: USNS MERCY

VIN: 570876 Date: 04/30/2015

---List of Outstanding Requirements---

ITEM	COMPLIANCE DATE	DATE ISSUED	ISSUING PORT
RP01	and/or by 06/30/2015	04/30/2015	SEC ClmbiaRvr
SYSTEM	SUBSYSTEM	COMPONENT	
Communications System	Alarms/Indicators	Steering Failure Alarm	

---Description---

Revise the vessels current Periodic Safety Testing Procedures (PSTP's) dated Dec 2, 2008 to accurately reflect what machinery, alarms and equipment are on the vessel as of this date. Submit the revised PSTP's to the USCG for approval. 46 CFR 61.40

(b)(6)



## RIGHTS OF APPEAL

46 Code of Federal Regulations Subpart 1.03-15

33 Code of Federal Regulations Subpart 101.420; 127.015; 128.311; 154.1075; 160.7

Any person directly affected by a decision or action of an OCMI or an order or direction of a COTP may, after requesting reconsideration to the cognizant OCMI, make a formal appeal, via the office of the cognizant OCMI, to the District Commander of the district in which the cognizant OCMI is located.

When requesting that a decision, action, order or direction be reconsidered or reviewed, such request must be made within 30 days after the decision is rendered or the action is taken.

When making a formal appeal, such appeal must be submitted in writing and received by the authority to whom the appeal is required to be made within 30 days after the decision, action, order or direction being appealed, or within 30 days after the last administrative action required by this subpart. Upon written request and for good cause, the 30 day time limit may be extended by the authority to whom the appeal is required to be made.

A formal appeal must contain a description of the decision, action, order or direction being appealed and the appellant's reason(s) why the decision, action, order or direction should be set aside or revised.

Formal appeals made to the Commandant shall be addressed to:

- (1) Commandant (CG-543) for appeals involving vessel inspection issues, load line issues, and vessel manning issues; or
- (2) Commandant (CG-544) for appeals involving facility safety and/or security inspection issues.

Failure to submit a formal appeal in accordance with these procedures and time limits results in the decision, action, order or direction becoming final agency action.



## MASTER

(Position Code: 101)

### MAJOR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

The Ships Master is in overall command of the vessel and has full responsibility for all matters pertaining to management of the vessel, operations, supervision of the crew, safe navigation, physical security and safety. The Master must possess the ability to make analytical decisions in a rapidly changing work environment. Through the utilization of senior managerial personnel aboard, (i.e. Department Heads), the Master monitors all daily operations as well as plans for future mission requirements. The Master ensures that all orders, instructions, government regulations and Command directives are properly executed and maintained. The Master is responsible to the Command and Class Manager for sound fiscal management and strict adherence to budget guidelines. The Master is the designated Disbursing Agent on ATF, ARS, Zeus, JHSV, Prepo T-AKE and T-AH, ROS AOE ships and those without a Purser. Masters should complete a DD Form 577 prior to their reporting for duty.

The Master must be knowledgeable and familiar with a wide range of regulatory requirements, inspections and regulations, including CFR's, USCG, ABS, MSC, MSFSC, OPNAV, and NAVSEA. Responsible for the safety and security of the crew, cargo and ship, the Master shall ensure that the crew is trained in firefighting and damage control procedures as well as force protection. Ensures that all equipment associated with lifesaving, firefighting and shipboard security is available and in proper working condition. The Master is responsible for the proper planning, loading, stowage, and delivery of cargo. Provides oversight and planning for a wide range of mission requirements including UNREP, VERTREP, Cargo (Fuel, Dry Stores, Ammunition) loading, transfer and discharge as well as towing and salvage operations. Ensures the ship's stability is properly maintained at all times IAW the vessel's trim and stability book.

The Master is responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel, must be skilled in all facets of navigation and be able to manage and train bridge navigation teams. Through training and supervision of deck watch standing personnel as well as the development of a bridge team management plan, the Master is to ensure that the vessel is operated within the guidelines of the Rules of the Road, safe navigation, prudent seamanship, and implement Operation Risk Management. The Master shall be familiar with the specific handling characteristics of the



vessel, in all load conditions and operational situations. This includes heavy weather, docking/undocking, maneuvering in restricted water, underway replenishment and towing and salvage. The Master must be proficient in all aspects of underway replenishment, towing and salvage, cable laying and repair, special mission ops, and be knowledgeable and skilled in ship handling.

The Master is required to interact with a wide variety of people, including operational commanders, sponsors, crew, Foreign Military and State officials, port officials, office staff and unions. The Master must possess exceptional communication skills, both oral and written, to communicate effectively throughout the chain of command. The Master must be ready to represent both MSC and his/her command as well as act as a US Government Representative. The Master shall be familiar with reporting requirements unique to the naval operations (i.e. CASREPS, SITREPS, DRRS-N) as well as changes to those requirements dictated by operational commanders and ensure that all information is provided in a timely and concise manner.

The Master must be knowledgeable and intimately familiar with the MSC SMS system. As a steward of the marine environment, the Master will ensure that environmental protection programs are implemented, and that all anti-pollution regulations and laws are adhered to, and crew training is conducted as required. The Master shall ensure full compliance with all provisions of his/her vessel.

As lead member of the Shipboard Management Team, as well as the fiscal manager for the vessel's operating budget, the Master shall ensure government funds are used in a prudent and judicious manner. The Master shall review the annual operating budgets provided to the vessel on a regular basis to ensure adequate funds are available to meet mission requirements and will immediately identify any potential shortfalls to the program and budget managers. The Master shall ensure operations are conducted efficiently with due regard for budgetary guidelines and fiscal responsibility.

The Master is responsible to see that the material condition of the vessel is maintained in a mission ready condition. The Master plans, organizes, and oversees ship's maintenance on an ongoing basis, identifies potential problem areas and discrepancies, and oversees corrective actions. The Master must demonstrate superior management and leadership abilities and must be familiar with a full range of applicable computer software operations.



Carries out EEO policies and communicates support of these policies to subordinates; ensuring equality in determining qualifications, selections, assignments, training, promotions, details, discipline and awards to employees, cooperating fully in developing and carrying out affirmative action efforts regarding staffing motivation, and training to develop employees; and cooperating in the investigation of formal or informal discrimination complaints, ensuring expeditious actions. Everything in this Position Description is considered to be an essential function of this position.

Everything in this Position Description is considered to be an essential function of this position.

Performs other duties as assigned.

**KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ABILITIES REQUIRED TO PERFORM THE DUTIES:**

1. Planning, organizing, supervising, managing, and evaluating the work of others.
2. Interpret and analyze shipboard information and make decisions.
3. Appropriate written and oral communication.
4. Development and implementation of shipboard safety and security programs including life saving and firefighting equipment, methods, and techniques.
5. Conduct of Cargo/Underway Replenishment operations involving dry stores, munitions and petroleum products, Helicopter Operations (Vertical Replenishment), Towing and Salvage operations and other special missions.
6. Experience with ship handling, navigation, communications and bridge watch keeping including equipment, practices and procedures.

**PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS:**

Physical requirements IAW COMSCINST 6000.1, (latest edition). This position is also designated as TDP IAW CMPI 792.

**SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:**

Must obtain and maintain Top Secret Clearance.

**WORKING HOURS:**

In accordance with CMPI 610.



**LICENSING AND/OR CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:**

Must possess:

1. A U.S. Passport
2. A United States Coast Guard License endorsed MASTER OF STEAM AND MOTOR VESSELS OF ANY GROSS TONS UPON OCEANS, and RADAR OBSERVER - UNLIMITED
3. A STCW Certificate endorsed CAPACITY as - Master; STCW may not include limitations of validity on vessels operating in the GMDSS system, or aboard ARPA or radar-equipped vessels
4. A Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) or Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC) endorsed Any Unlicensed Rating in the Deck Department, or Able Seaman-Unlimited
5. A Federal Communications Commission GMDSS Radio Operator's License

**TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:**

Must meet current requirements of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code for the position.

**Note:** The Military Sealift Command is prohibited by law from providing access to guns and ammunition to anyone who has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence and, therefore, will not hire or promote or assign such a person into a position that requires access to guns or ammunition. To ensure compliance with this law, mariners will be requested to fill out a form identifying whether they have been convicted of a crime of domestic violence.

<div style="background-color: black; color: red; text-align: center; padding: 2px;">(b)(6)</div> <div style="background-color: black; color: red; text-align: center; padding: 2px;">(b)(6)</div> <p>SME/Port Captain East Coast</p>	<div style="background-color: black; color: red; text-align: center; padding: 2px;">(b)(6)</div> <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> <p>SIGNATURE</p>	<div style="background-color: black; color: red; text-align: center; padding: 2px;">(b)(6)</div> <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> <p>7 Nov 13 DATE</p>
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FIRST OFFICER - (104)

As the Deck Department Head, the First Officer is responsible for the safe, effective and efficient management and supervision of deck department employees. Ensures sound fiscal management and adherence to budget guidelines by deck department employees. Has a thorough knowledge of the CMPI and DHAMS. Serves as the ships' safety officer, training officer, damage control officer, vessel security officer, oil spill coordinator and (may be) gas free engineer. On ships without a Master, the OIC/Chief Mate is the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the entire CIVMAR contingent onboard regardless the disparity between formal pay rate designators.

As second in command of the ship, is directly accountable to the Master for all matters pertaining to management, operation, care, safety, and physical condition of deck department operations and keeps the Master informed in those areas. Keeps abreast of all ship's business matters and acts on behalf of the Master when he/she is not available. Maintains a functional understanding of ship's mission, operations, command relationships, and operational reports. Acts as a Command Duty officer (CDO) in charge of the Shipboard Reaction Force (SRF) and fire parties on ships so organized. Performs emergency duties as assigned by the Master and reflected on the Station Bill.

Responsible for the proper planning, loading, stowage and discharge of cargo and maintenance of the ship in a safe and stable condition. Prior to sailing, inspects the ship to ascertain there are no structural defects and that hatches, side ports, cargo gear, cargo and equipment are secured properly. Using Ship Automated Maintenance Management (SAMM) prepares and submits deck department repair list. Submits a list of Voyage Repair Requests (VRR's) to the Chief Engineer for maintenance and repair of deck related items that are beyond the capabilities of ship's force and require outside industrial assistance. Monitors the progress of VRR's; inspects repairs made by shoreside personnel and makes reports of inspections to the Master and Chief Engineer.

As training officer, is responsible for training of all personnel in their duties during replenishment or mission operations, and for the compilation and submission of all required departmental training reports. Ensures deck



officers maintain their proficiency in safe navigational practices and ensures crewmembers are properly trained to respond to all emergencies.

As Damage Control Officer, is responsible for ensuring that station bills are properly prepared and posted, that fire detection systems are maintained in proper working order, that fire fighting and lifesaving appliances are in good condition, and that the damage control book is properly maintained; and that the damage control book contains essential information on the ship's damage control organization, systems, machinery, controls and equipment and serves as a ready reference for both drills and emergencies.

Organizes and coordinates work to ensure its efficient and effective accomplishment. Ensures equitable distribution of overtime; ensures subordinates maintain proper hygiene, grooming and uniform standards; exercises disciplinary control over subordinates and initiates disciplinary actions as required; recognizes and rewards subordinates' work-accomplishments and achievements using the awards program; conducts career counseling, arranges training, monitors personnel career progressions, and encourages upgrading of licenses and documents; and prepares and submits MAP/Promotion Evaluation Reports to the Master as required. Maintains assigned berthing compartment (and office, if assigned) in a neat, clean, and orderly manner. Must be able to effectively use applicable shipboard software applications.

As AT/FP officer, issues orders to and ensures training of crewmembers to provide force protection, physical security of government property, and security awareness for classified documents and materials. Ensures maintenance of a continuous gangway watch to control personnel and material coming aboard or leaving the ship. Acts as Qual-Cert Board member on board ships with the program. Presides at deck department safety meetings, presents progress reports of outstanding and new safety items and recommendations. Maintains a safety library and keeps personnel and department heads informed on current safety procedures and developments. Oversees Ships Management System (SMS) administration and compliance as Safety Officer. Makes SMS reports as required.



First Officers may serve on some MSC ships, e.g., T-AH's and T-ATFs (in accordance with requirements of a MEO) with additional responsibilities for managing, supervising, organizing and coordinating the work of the ship to ensure effective and efficient accomplishment.

Towing and salvage First Officers shall be TOAR endorsed or tow qualified and have experience in towing and salvage. First Officers should be competent ship handlers capable of docking, undocking and mooring without tug assistance. They should have superior leadership skills working with Mobile Diving and Salvage Units (MDSU), foreign navy, and VIP personnel. Towing and Salvage Mates must be proficient at shipboard medical care and have knowledge of the US Navy Tow Manual.

Ensures continuing application of & compliance w/EEO laws, regulations, and policies.

**Collateral Duty:** After receiving certification from MSC Drug Free Workplace Program Coordinator, will serve as the primary Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT). Will be the alternate Collection Site Coordinator (CSC) for the Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) onboard ships with a Medical Service Officer (MSO), and will be the primary CSC on board ships without a MSO.



## PART II FIRST OFFICER CABLE (120)

During FOS serves as the Deck Department Head delegates duties to and is responsible for the effective and efficient management and supervision of deck department employees. Serves as the Senior Civilian Officer-in-Charge (SCOIC) during ROS. See SCOIC file for complete information and responsibilities.

Supports and assists the Master in successful mission execution.

Works in conjunction with all department heads and sponsors to maintain efficiency and successful mission accomplishment.

Maintains an understanding of the ship's mission and operations. Must adhere to command procedures and policies regarding administrative duties and OPSEC duties.

The Cable Mate ensures deck officers maintain their proficiency in safe navigational practices including dynamic positioning, and all phases of mission operations and deck evolutions.

Finally, the mission of the USNS ZEUS calls for the intermittent transition from Full Operational Status (FOS) to Reduced Operational Status (ROS) depending upon the operational schedule. The Cable Mate would ideally be able to ascend to an SCOIC position capable of performing all Master and Purser duties for the vessel while in ROS.

Ensures continuing application of & compliance w/EEO laws, regulations, and policies.

**Collateral Duty:** After receiving certification from MSC Drug Free Workplace Program Coordinator, will serve as the primary Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT). Will be the alternate Collection Site Coordinator (CSC) for the Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) onboard ships with a Medical Service Officer (MSO), and will be the primary CSC on board ships without a MSO.



### PART III FIRST OFFICER CARGO

As First Officer (CARGO) responsible for the loading, replenishing, consoling and discharging of all cargo ordnance and fuels. He is the responsible officer for ordnance administration and accountability, segregation, and safety.

The Master may modify this responsibility as situations dictate to conform to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Prepares a load plan that provides for load at maximum safe rate. The plan includes provisions for valve line ups, tank sequencing, personnel rotation, firefighting, telephone communications, plugged scuppers and the requirement to observe all safety and environmental precautions. Acts as tankerman Person in Charge during all cargo loads/discharges and transfers; must hold endorsements for tankerman-PIC.

Responsible for maintaining stable condition with respect to hog, sag, trim, list, load line, free surface effect and stability. Complies with approved and appropriate Oil Transfer Procedures Manual and ship's Cargo Loading Manual. Utilizes cargo loading software.

Ensures that cargo tanks are cleaned and that all safety precautions are observed such as the use of spark-proof equipment; and that tanks are vented properly, and are gas free and tested before crewmembers enter them. Trains tank cleaning personnel in safety, emergency procedures and equipment. Ensures tank cleaning equipment is properly stowed and maintained. Ensures fuel oil quality control standards are met in accordance with the NSTM. Oversees management of the Fuel Test Lab. Ensures that all fuel testing equipment is in proper working order. May be assigned collateral duty of Gas Free Engineer.

Inspects ship's holds, magazines, and cargo areas to ensure that they are clean, dry, properly ventilated and that alarms, fire fighting and security devices are in good working order. Ensures all ordnance is securely blocked, braced, and properly segregated. Prior to loading or discharging, has operational tests made on all cargo winches prior to rigging booms; ensures that booms are rigged and topped with preventer guys; that cargo gear is rigged according to the design specifications; that cargo spaces are properly prepared to receive the type of cargo



to be loaded; that fixed cargo lights on masts and in holds are tested for operation and that portable cargo lights are available and ready for use. Ensures that cargo is delivered in good condition and notes exceptions; takes necessary precautions to prevent pilferage, damage or loss during loading, transfer or discharging operations. Ensure winches, nets, slings, bridles and other cargo-handling gear are inspected for safe operation prior to use while cargo is being worked; and that cargo is distributed according to plan, properly blocked and braced, marked and secured in place. On ships fitted with cranes, ensures safe and efficient use.

Ensures ROLMS data base manager is accounting for all ammunition, including receipt and issuance, and fleet sentencing application. Verifies NAR / AIN as they are received. Maintains on-line access to NAR/AIN Database. Responsible for the Qual / Cert program verifying training of fork truck and elevator operators. Ensures the proper planning, loading, stowage, segregation and discharge of ammunition. Maintains magazine sprinklers and intrusion alarm systems. Ensures compliance with OPNAVINST 5530.3 (series) and OP4. Maintains the conventional ordnance Qual/Cert program, OPNAVINST 8023.24 (series). Acts as the physical security officer. Acts as key and lock custodian.

During vertical replenishment (VERTREP), ensures proper methodology of helicopter cargo and personnel transfer are used, that cargo is properly staged and weighed, readied for transfer, color coded and transferred to appropriate destination.

Organizes and coordinates work to ensure its efficient and effective accomplishment and equitable distribution of overtime; ensures subordinates maintain proper hygiene and uniform standards; initiate and exercises disciplinary control over subordinates; initiates disciplinary actions as required; recognizes and rewards subordinates' work-accomplishments and achievements using the awards program; conducts career counseling, monitors personnel career progressions, and encourages upgrading of licenses and documents; and prepares and submits MAP/Promotion Evaluation Reports to the Master as required. Maintains assigned berthing compartment (and office, if assigned) in a neat, clean, and orderly manner.

Makes proper use of SMS and makes required SMS reports.



Must be able to use applicable software applications.

Ensures continuing application of & compliance w/EEO laws, regulations, and policies.

Everything in this Position Description is considered to be an essential function of this position.

Performs all other duties as assigned. Masters and Department Heads may add to this duty statement to clarify specific shipboard duties.

**Collateral Duty:** After receiving certification from MSC Drug Free Workplace Program Coordinator, will serve as the primary Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT). Will be the alternate Collection Site Coordinator (CSC) for the Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) onboard ships with a Medical Service Officer (MSO), and will be the primary CSC on board ships without a MSO.



## **KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND/OR ABILITIES REQUIRED**

1. Knowledge of navigation and bridge watchkeeping equipment, methods and techniques and ship handling practices.
2. Ability to communicate orally and in writing to include using shipboard computer systems and programs.
3. Ability to interpret and analyze shipboard information, make decisions, plan, organize, supervise, manage, and evaluate the work of others.
4. Knowledge of shipboard safety and security programs including lifesaving and fire fighting equipment, methods, and techniques.
5. Knowledge of cargo operations including those involving dry stores, munitions, petroleum products and helo operations (VERTREP), ROLMS/OIS ammunition management and Qual/Cert program.
6. Knowledge of towing and salvage.

Although not required for consideration, candidates that hold Tankerman PIC (person in charge)/DL (dangerous liquids), or the appropriate Towing credentials as specified in 46 CFR, Towing Officers Assessment Record (TOAR), possess credentials or certificates demonstrating proficiency with unusual and technical shipboard operations systems and programs such as Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems, salvage operations, cable operations, command ship operations, or foreign naval auxiliary operations shall provide that information on the Promotion Application form.

**PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS:** Must be able to stand, walk and climb ladders for extended periods aboard ship during repair periods, loading and discharging of cargo, inclement weather, and during other hazardous conditions and situations. Physical standards are in accordance with COMSCINST 6000.1. Employees are subject to drug urinalysis testing in accordance with CMPI 792. Must be medically cleared and hold necessary certification to take custody of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

**SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:** Employee must obtain and maintain appropriate security clearance.



**WORKING HOURS:** In accordance with CMPI 610. This is a **Key Position** IAW COMSCINST 1001.2A (latest edition); it is essential to DON's mobilization effort and continuity of operations.

**LICENSING AND/OR CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:**

Must possess and maintain:

1. A U.S. Passport.
2. Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) in accordance with current USCG rules and MSC waiver.
3. A Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) or Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC) endorsed Any Unlicensed Rating in the Deck Department, or Able Seaman - Unlimited.
4. A United States Coast Guard License endorsed Chief Mate Of Steam Or Motor Vessels Of Any Gross Tons Upon Oceans (or higher), and Radar Observer - Unlimited.
5. A STCW Certificate endorsed CAPACITY as - Chief Mate, or Master; STCW may not include limitations of validity on vessels operating in the GMDSS system, or aboard ARPA or radar-equipped vessels.
6. A Federal Communications Commission GMDSS Radio Operator's License/certificate.

**TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:** Must meet current requirements of the International Safety management (ISM) Code for the position.

(b)(6)

Port Captain, West, N00PCW SIGNATURE  
Print Name

27 Sep 2013  
DATE

(b)(6)

Port Captain, East, N00PCE SIGNATURE  
Print Name

27 SEP 13  
DATE



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

### PART I-SECOND OFFICER (WATCH)

Serves as a member of the Deck Department under the supervision of the First Officer. Assists the Master and First Officer in carrying out their responsibilities and duties and performs such duties that may be assigned, including assuming command of the ship in their absence. The Second Officer (Watch) is the designated Navigation Officer, directly accountable to the Master for the navigation responsibilities of the ship. Prepares a comprehensive voyage plan and briefs the Master and watch officers ensuring that the classified nature of the mission and specific information on ship's voyages, movements and position are not indiscriminately revealed.

Assists the First Officer and/or Master in training lookouts and watchstanders in safe navigational practices and in the proper use of navigational equipment. Updates and maintains navigational supplies and the efficient operation of all instruments and accessories used in navigation such as charts, coast pilots, light lists, almanacs, tide and current tables, sailing directions, course recorders, magnetic compasses and adjustment methods, gyro compasses, barometers, chronometers, and all other associated equipment essential to supporting the safe navigation of the vessel. Performs such duties as docking/undocking, anchoring, and underway steaming. Must be able to effectively use applicable shipboard software applications to include loading digital charts, ensure voyage plans are synchronized in ECDIS system, and serves as Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) primary operator.

Ensures that hydrographic and oceanographic observations are handled properly; weather reports promptly made, and that appropriate nautical charts and publications are aboard and maintained. Drafts and maintains Movement Reports (MOVREPS and Optimum Track Ship Routing (OTSR) Reports. Completes monthly Ship Automated Maintenance Management (SAMM) reports as assigned, ensures Safety Management System (SMS) is in compliance, and record keeping is properly maintained.

Ensures posting of applicable placards in the Wheelhouse area. Submits supply, repair lists and voyage requirements for navigation equipment to the First Officer in a timely manner. Responsible for electronic navigation equipment and accountable for all ship's equipment assigned via custody cards. As senior watch officer, instructs deck watch officers in the proper etiquette and display of flags, sending and receiving Morse code by flashing light, the international code of signals,



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

international distress signals, and visual storm warning displays; and the proper use of signal flares. Ensures that halyards are properly rigged and that flags are clean and in good condition. Responsible for the training of all watches on bridge to include deck alarm systems, fixed fire, smoke, flooding systems, security rounds and systems, and gangway watch procedures.

As senior watch officer, responsible for bridge decorum. Will ensure quiet bridge, only appropriate personnel are present on bridge, helmsman is not distracted, lee helm officer during Replenishment at Sea (RAS) events is attentive and all personnel are aware of emergency responsibilities.

Ensures that the ship's position is determined accurately during scheduled intervals while underway and notifies the Master of results. Furnishes daily reports of the ship's position and movement to personnel designated by the Master to receive them. Ensures proper navigation and engine room data are entered into the deck log daily and that chronometers are compared daily. Adjusts all ship's clocks to conform to the geographical location (zone) of the ship. During his/her watch, maintains a continuous plot of the ship's position using all available means of navigation including visual bearing and radar fixes when navigating harbors or other restricted waters. Tests steering gear and bridge equipment in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) requirements.

When acting as the senior watch officer, ensures that all standard navigation day's work is performed by all watches and that operational checklists are maintained. Ensures event records on the bridge coincide with engine room records by synchronizing clocks at noon each underway day and after each time change increment. Maintains assigned berthing compartment in a neat, clean, and orderly manner.

Must be eligible to have access to, handle and be qualified in small arms in accordance with OPNAVINST 3591.1 series.

**Collateral Duty:** After receiving certification from MSC Drug Free Workplace Program Coordinator, will be the alternate Collection Site Coordinator (CSC) for the Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) onboard ships without a Medical Service Officer (MSO). Will be the alternate Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT). Ensures continuing application of & compliance w/Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) laws, regulations and policies.



## **SECOND OFFICER (106/105)**

### **PART II-SECOND OFFICER (CARGO)**

Serves as a member of the Deck Department under the supervision of the First Officer. On ships with First Officer/Officer in Charge (OIC) the cargo officer works in support of the OIC, substantially as outlined below with additional attention to the ship specific SMS instructions. Responsible for the operational readiness of all rig crews, underway replenishment gear, all running and standing gear, and the condition of the cargo holds.

As Second Officer (CARGO), inspects ship's holds and cargo areas to ensure that they are clean, dry and properly ventilated. Prior to loading or discharging, has operational tests made on all cargo winches prior to rigging booms; ensures that booms are rigged and topped with preventer guys; that cargo gear is rigged according to the design specifications; that cargo spaces are properly prepared to receive the type of cargo to be loaded; that fixed cargo lights on masts and in holds are tested for operation and that portable cargo lights are available and ready for use; that installed cranes are ready for use. Ensures that cargo is delivered in good condition and notes exceptions; takes necessary precautions to prevent pilferage, damage or loss during loading, transfer or discharging operations. Ensures winches, nets, slings, bridles and other cargo-handling gear are inspected for safe operation prior to use while cargo is being worked; and that cargo is distributed according to plan, well dunnaged, marked and secured in place. On ships fitted with cranes ensures safe and effective use.

During Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP), ensures proper methodology of helicopter cargo and personnel transfer are used, that cargo is properly staged and weighed, readied for transfer, color coded and transferred to appropriate destination. Ensures all VERTREP equipment is properly maintained and utilized. Serves as Flight Deck Officer (FDO) during VERTREP operations.

As Second Officer (CARGO) on Oilers responsible for the loading, replenishing, consoling and discharging of all cargo and fuels. The Master may modify this responsibility as situations dictate to conform to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Prepares a load plan that provides for load at maximum safe rate. The plan includes provisions for valve line ups, tank sequencing, personnel rotation, firefighting, telephone communications, plugged scuppers and the requirement to observe all safety and environmental precautions. Acts as Tankerman -Person-in-Charge (PIC; must hold endorsement for Tankerman-PIC.



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

Responsible for maintaining stable condition with respect to hog, sag, trim, list, load line, free surface effect and stability IAW vessel's trim and stability book. Complies with approved and appropriate Oil Transfer Procedures Manual and ship's Cargo Loading Manual. Ensures cargo Fuel Record Book is maintained. Ensures ballast Record Book is compliant in accordance with applicable laws. Properly utilizes cargo loading software.

Ensures that cargo tanks are cleaned and that all safety precautions are observed such as the use of spark-proof equipment; Butterworth temperature and pressure limitations; and that tanks are vented properly, and are gas free, well lighted and tested before crewmembers enter them. Trains tank cleaning personnel in safety, emergency procedures and equipment. Ensures tank cleaning equipment is properly stowed and maintained. Ensures fuel oil quality control standards are met in accordance with the Fleet Oiler Manual. May be assigned collateral duty of Gas Free Engineer.

Personnel under 2/0 supervision receive safety brief, use proper PPE and utilize established communications methods, and back up communications for all fuel transfers. Applies all Operational Risk Management (ORM) protocols.

Maintains assigned berthing space (and office/lab, if assigned) in a neat, clean and orderly manner.

Familiar with and effectively utilizes all applicable Safety Management System (SMS) procedures.

**Collateral Duty:** After receiving certification from MSC Drug Free Workplace Program Coordinator, will be the alternate Collection Site Coordinator (CSC) for the Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) onboard ships without a Medical Service Officer (MSO). Will be the alternate Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT).

Ensures continuing application of & compliance w/ EEO laws, regulations and policies.



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

### PART III-SECOND OFFICER (AMMO)

This crewmember is a representative of the Deck Department and is under the direction of the First Officer Cargo Mate. This officer is responsible to the First Officer Cargo Mate for all administrative and accounting aspects of ammunition handling and transfers.

As Second Officer (Cargo) onboard Ammunition capable vessels, this officer is to properly inspect and sentence all ammunition, both received and issued in accordance with the most current Naval Supply Publication 724 (NAVSUP PUB 724) (Conventional Ordnance Stockpile Management Volume II- Afloat), NAVSUP PUB 805 (Receipt, Segregation, Storage and Issue Sentencing), NAVSUP PUB 807 (Fleet Sentencing), NAVSEA OP-4 (Ammunition and Explosives Afloat) and all other data included on the Explosive Safety Tech Compact Disk (EST CD). All ammunition must be properly inventoried for quality control and quantity received/issued in order to avoid. Intransits must be resolved under the direction of the First Officer (Cargo). This involves contacting the vessel Ammunition Transaction Report (ATR) representative periodically and receiving an ATR/Intransit Report and then working out each intransit from past ammunition transactions on a case by case basis.

In addition, the Second Officer (Cargo) onboard Ammunition capable vessel is also the Retail Ordnance Logistics Management System (ROLMS) Administrator. This duty involves the proper entry for the Requisitioning, Receiving and Issuing of all Conventional type ammunition. All ammunition is to be managed and accounted for IAW NAVSUP P-724 and applicable Fleet Directives. ROLMS will be upgraded to Ordnance Information System - Retail (OIS-R) which this Officer will also administer.

There are several records that must be maintained for various periods of time. A list of the records to be maintained as well as their periodicity are listed in the COSR I/II (Conventional Ordnance Supply Report) checklist. Various messages must be generated from the ROLMS system itself each time a transaction occurs. These are to include, but not limited to: ATR (Ammunition Transaction Reports submitted in MILSTRIP format) submitted each time an ammunition transaction takes place, monthly PLR reports, (Periodic Lot Reporting) and CAISR (Conventional Ammunition Inventory Status Report) which is put out monthly to inform other unit as to the quantity and type of ammunition is available for transfer. Other administrative



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

messages include the receipt, organization and maintenance of NAR (Notice of Ammunition Reclassification) AIN (Ammo Information Notice) and OHF (Overhead Fire) messages. ESQD (Explosive Safety, Quantity and Distance) Report is a summarization of the vessel's NEW (Net Explosive Weight) and is mandatory for most ports of call to inform the port what the vessel's explosive distance would be in the event of an emergency.

During periods when the vessel is explosive laden, the Cargo Second Officer is involved in the duties of the CDO (Command Duty Officer) along with the First Officer (Admin) and First Officer (Cargo). As CDO, a direct representative of the ship's Master, resolves any administrative/security issues that may arise while the vessel is in port. Conducts Security Alerts drills, training and is capable of providing appropriate and timely response to all shipboard emergencies.

Responsible for the proper planning, loading, segregation, stowage and discharge of ammunition under the First Officer (Cargo). As assigned, is responsible for the maintenance of magazine sprinklers and intrusion alarm systems. Functions as a Qual/Cert Board member and assists the First Officer (Cargo) with program documentation, training, and on deck supervision of ordnance handling safety standards. Verifies all personnel who handle ammunition are properly certified IAW OPNAVINST 8023.24 series.

During VERTREP operations, the Second Officer Cargo may be assigned as the FDO (Flight Deck Officer). Responsible for the safe and successful movement of dry stores and ammunition. Ensure that all flight deck personnel are conducting operations in a safe and effective manner and are wearing all personnel protection equipment at all times during flight deck operations.

During fire and emergency operations serves as a repair locker leader.

**Collateral Duty:** After receiving certification from MSC Drug Free Workplace Program Coordinator, will be the alternate Collection Site Coordinator (CSC) for the Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) onboard ships without a Medical Service Officer (MSO). Will be the alternate Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT).

Ensures continuing application of & compliance w/ EEO laws, regulations and policies.



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

### PART IV-OPERATIONS OFFICER

Serves as a member of the Deck Department under supervision of the Master. Responsible for the scheduling of operational tasking and harbor movements, naval message operational traffic, tactical maneuvering coordination and communication underway, and Helicopter Control Officer (HCO). Member of the Master's Staff and Safety Council.

The Second Officer Operations-Officer (OPSO) is the designated position replacing the Military Detachment Officer-in-Charge. The Operations Officer provides key information to the Master and Navigator concerning ship schedule, maneuvering and flight operations. The OPSO also works in conjunction with the Cargo Officer and CIVMAR Supply Officer to ensure all cargo evolutions are within the capability of the ship's manning and Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment (ROC & POE).

The OPSO is the link and primary point of contact from the ship to Afloat Training Group (ATG), Sealift Logistic Area of Responsibility (SEALOG AOR), Battle or Strike Group Commander, and customer ships in coordinating all logistics events; keeping informed through email, naval message, and voice communications. Attends logistic and/or pre-deployment conferences as required.

Maintain Naval Warfare publications library and associated naval guidance and instructions.

Scheduling of harbor movements for Arrivals, Departures, Shifts, and Cargo fuel loading dates/times with MSC SEALOG AOR, Battle or Strike Group Commander and Port Operations to include Harbor Pilots and tugs is an intricate responsibility of the OPSO and a primary concern to the Master.

Ship's Operations Officer is knowledgeable in standard Naval Message drafting with emphasis on the following message formats:

- Operational Tasking Replenishment at sea (OPTASK RAS).
- Operational Summary (OPSUM Daily and Weekly).
- Logistics Request (LOGREQ).
- Ship Locator report.
- Operational Status Unit (OPSTAT UNIT).
- Casualty Reports (CASREP).



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

- Incident Reports that include, but not limited to Operation Report - 3 (OPREP3) PINNACLES, OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE and UNIT SITREP as well as telephonic reports as required.
- Various Reports to change Operational Commander (INCHOP reports) such as Medical Joining Report, Summary of Outstanding CASREPS and Ship's Operational Readiness Training Status (SORTS) Database.
- Drafts and sends Fuel Issues Report.
- Command Logistics Fleet Report (CLF Report).
- Mail Routing Instruction (MRI).
- Explosive Safety and Quantitative Distance (ESQD) Waiver Request (not required on all ships).
- Also knowledgeable and responsible for internally distributed shipboard reports that include Weekly Plan of Events, Extended Schedule, Port Reports, and UNREP "Scoop" Sheets in coordination with the Chief and Cargo Officers.
- Environmental reports regarding fuel spills and other environmental issues.
- Marine Mammal reports.
- Other messages and reports as directed.

Operation Officer is responsible for maintaining verbal communications over Fleet Tactical radio circuit during operational underway re-fueling to all customer-receiving ships; and to ensure direct communication with the navy customers in real time Command Chat as necessary. Responsible for ensuring the daily AKAI-6 CALL SIGNS and customer ship Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Publication (JANAP CALL SIGNS are provided to the Mate on Watch as well as any other pertinent information so the watch officer can maintain situational awareness.

The Operation Officer must be familiar with FLEET and TASK FORCE Web Sites and be able to locate and become familiar with OPORDs, publications, instructions, messages and points of contact for the Operating Area.

The Operations Officer must be cognizant of Political Sensitive Areas (PSA), Marine Sanctuaries, Military Exercise Areas, MARPOL (IMO) Special areas or any other locations to be avoided in the current Operating Area.

The Operations Officer must be well versed in the interpretation and application of Territorial Waters, Economic Zones, Innocent Passage, and Transit Passage. All these are found in the applicable OPORD.



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

The Operations Officer must be aware of approved PLANNED RESPONSES for Specific Country/Navy Queries and responses over VHF Radio.

The Operation Officer is responsible for overseeing proper display of International Code Flags when used in conjunction with Underway Replenishment, Helicopter Operations, and Harbor Movements.

When no other Helicopter Control Officer (HCO) is assigned, HCO is a duty and responsibility of the OPSO. The job requires the knowledge of helicopter operations for all classes of MSC capable ships. Safety to the flight deck crew, communications involving terminology, and hand signals surrounding flight ops. HCO needs to know the conditions to safely maneuver a helicopter around or on the ship. These conditions include wind speed, flight deck status, and optical/visual signal lights.

OPSO may also serve as the Afloat Environmental Protection Coordinator (AEPC) and the Public Relations Officer.

Maintains assigned berthing space (and office/lab, if assigned) in neat, clean, and orderly manner.

Everything in this Position Description is considered to be an function of this position.

Performs other duties as assigned.

**Collateral Duty:** After receiving certification from MSC Drug Free Workplace Program Coordinator, will be the alternate Collection Site Coordinator (CSC) for the Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) onboard ships without a Medical Service Officer (MSO). Will be the alternate Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT).

Ensures continuing application of & compliance w/ EEO laws, regulations and policies.

### KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ABILITIES

1. Knowledge of navigation methods, equipment, and techniques.
2. Skill in oral and written communication to include using shipboard computer systems and programs.



## SECOND OFFICER (106/105)

3. Ability to interpret and analyze information, make decisions, plan, organize, evaluate and supervise the work of others.
4. Knowledge of shipboard safety and security programs, including lifesaving and firefighting equipment, methods and techniques.
5. Knowledge of cargo operations including those involving dry stores, munitions, petroleum products and helo operations (VERTREP).
6. Knowledge of ammunition administration, cargo fuel quality assurance and accounting, special mission ship operations, towing and salvage operations, or fleet support operations as Operations Officer.

Although not required for consideration, candidates that hold Tankerman PIC /Dangerous Liquids (DL), or the appropriate Towing credentials as specified in 46 CFR 15.805(a)(5), Towing Officers Assessment Record (TOAR), possess credentials or certificates demonstrating proficiency with unusual and technical shipboard operations systems and programs such as Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems, salvage operations, cable operations, command ship operations, or foreign naval auxiliary operations shall provide that information on the Promotion Application form.

**PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS:** Physical standards are in accordance with MSC Medical Manual (COMSCINST 6000.1). Employees are subject to drug urinalysis testing in accordance with Civilian Marine Personal Instruction CMPI 792, DFWP.

**SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:** Employees must obtain and maintain appropriate security clearance.

**WORKING HOURS:** Work rules and hours are contained in CMPI 610, Work Rules. This is a Key Position IAW COMSCINST 1001.2A (latest edition); it is essential to DON's mobilization effort and continuity of operations.



**SECOND OFFICER (106/105)**

**LICENSING AND/OR CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:**

Must be a United States Citizen of at least 18 years of age and possess and maintain:

1. U.S. Passport.
2. Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) in accordance with current USCG rules and MSC waiver.
3. A United States Coast Guard (USCG) License/Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC) endorsed Second Mate Of Steam or Motor Vessels Of Any Gross Tons Upon Oceans (or higher), and Radar Observer - Unlimited.
4. A Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Certificate endorsed CAPACITY as - Officer-In-Charge of a Navigation Watch, or Chief Mate, or Master; STCW may not include limitations of validity on vessels operating in the GMDSS system, or aboard ARPA or radar-equipped vessels.
5. A Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) or MMC endorsed Any Unlicensed Rating in the Deck Department, or Able Seaman - Unlimited
6. A Federal Communications Commission GMDSS Radio Operator's License - Above credentials and endorsements must be valid for at least seven months.

**TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:** Must meet current requirements of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code for the position.

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Port Captain, West, N00PCW Print Name	SIGNATURE	
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### **THIRD OFFICER (107/108)**

As a member of the Deck Department works under the supervision of the Second Officer (Navigator) and Department Head, Chief Mate. Serves as a deck Watch Officer and assists the Master and senior deck officers in carrying out their responsibilities; in their absence assumes command of the ship. May be assigned collateral duties of Assistant Damage Control Officer, CBR-D Officer, or Special Service Officer or others as directed.

As directed/designated by the Chief Mate: (1) makes required inspections of all lifesaving equipment onboard the vessel, including lifeboats, life rafts and associated securing devices, and any other equipment; (2) performance duties of CBR-Readiness Officer, provides direct input to the Chief Mate about CBR training and readiness of the vessel/crew to counter all threats; keeps informed on all matters concerning equipment, the ship's fire main system and any other material condition reports having a direct impact on the ship's CBR status. Assist senior officers in training lookouts and watchstanders in safe navigational practices and in the proper use of navigational equipment. Assist in updating and maintaining navigation supplies, instruments, and accessories used in navigation. Assist senior officers performing duties such as docking/undocking, anchoring, and underway steaming. Must be familiar with shipboard software applications. Act as the Afloat Environmental Program Coordinator (AEPC) or assistant to ensure that the ship and crew operate safely and in accordance with environmental regulations.

Acquires a thorough familiarity with the MSC shipboard Safety Management System (SMS). Assist senior deck officers with training, compliance, reporting, and record keeping.

Assists with the timely and accurate update of the ship's navigational publication library and electronic chart system under the direction of the Second Officer (W). Make chart corrections or post chart correction cards only with the permission of the Master and under the supervision of the Second Officer (W). Must be able to use, perform daily tests, and monitor all bridge GMDSS equipment. Must be able to properly communicate with radio telephone, both secure and non-secure circuits.

During at sea periods, (1) maintains the watch in accordance with USCG, COMSC, MSFSC and Master's standing orders and (2) ensures that the Watch is properly trained in standard helm commands and lookout duties and to respond to a steering casualty scenario, a THIRD OFFICER (107/108)

man overboard incident, emergency maneuvering situations, and ship's security procedures.



Maintains a proper lookout and an accurate ship's position at all times while on watch. Provides the Master information immediately about ship's position, course and speed, navigation hazards and traffic information, using any and all means available. Adheres to the ColRegs Rules of the Road and appropriate restricted visibility guidelines. Maintains a continuous radar/surface plot of all surrounding traffic to a scale appropriate to the traffic situation. During periods of restricted visibility, heavy traffic, any emergency or when in doubt, contacts the Master, providing him/her ample time to survey the situation and make an informed decision.

Demonstrates the ability to maneuver in formation and operate within a CVNSG with minimal assistance. Thoroughly familiar with UNREP/VERTREP and embarked HELO Operation procedures. During in port periods conducts the watch in a proper and safe manner, including the safe and appropriate lighting of the vessel at night. Maintains a proper security posture, properly tended mooring lines; and, an alert, attentive gangway watch. Ensure accurate communications between the Deck and Engine Watch so as to remain alert for conditions of fire or flooding, or any incidents that may hamper damage control efforts. Perform duties consistent with Federal, Local and Command oil and environmental pollution regulations whenever fuel is being transferred during his/her watch. As a deck officer must maintain a proper uniform IAW CMPI.

Both at sea and in port, Maintains required security posture, including being armed when required.



## PART II THIRD OFFICER (D) AMMO/CARGO (107)

As a member of the Deck Department works under the supervision of the Second Officer (Ammo/Cargo), and First Officer (Cargo). The Third Mate (D) assist senior officer in maintaining operational readiness of all rig crews, underway replenishment gear, all running and standing gear, ammunition administration, and all cargo holds and evolutions.

Primary responsibilities include administration of the ROLMS/OIS system, testing of fuel cargo, management of security armories, inventories, docking/ undocking repair locker leader, and flight deck officer.

Day to day responsibility for on-line management for NARs/AIN. May be assigned either AA&E accounting officer or AA&E inventory officer. Must be able to take custody of AA&E including firearms. Must be able to take custody of AA&E including firearms. Be qualified in fleet sentencing for receipts and issues.

Management of the Fuel Test Lab. Ensures that all fuel testing equipment is in proper working order. Keeps adequate amount of clean sample bottles and related glassware. Upon receipt of fuel cargo tests F-76 and JP-5 for flashpoint, API gravity, bottom sediment and water IAW NSTM 541. Retains and manages fuel samples for required period.

Part of the bridge team for UNREP/VERTREP/HELO OPS or on the flight deck as FDO. Familiar with Electronic Chard Display and Information System (ECDIS).

Prior to underway replenishments the day third produces fuel test reports and affixes them to the probe for the customer ship. Prepares UNREP firearms and places them on station to send shot lines. During underway replenishments assists as directed by the Cargo Mate and as needed on deck.

Ensures that spill gear lockers meets or exceed requirements and orders new equipment as necessary. Assists in instructing crew members on environmental protection policies (including annual Right Whale training if applicable). Works with the First Officer to conduct oil spill drills and oil spill voice notification drills.

Management of security armories. Maintains weapons and FP security gear in clean and proper working order with the assistance of Bosn Mates. Ensures that all safety gear is clean and readily available for issue.

During dock/undock evolutions takes charge or assists Second Officer (Ammo/Cargo). This task includes but it not limited to conducting a safety brief, communicating with the bridge giving



**PART II THIRD OFFICER (D) AMMO/CARGO (107)**

distances off obstructions and vessel traffic reports, and ensuring that no lines get fouled.

Must be able to effectively use applicable shipboard software applications.

Ensures continuing application of compliance w/EEO laws, regulations, and policies.

Everything in this Position Description is considered to be an essential function of this position.

Performs all other duties as assigned by the ship's Master, First Officer (Cargo), or Second Officer (Ammo/Cargo), including qualification as CDO.



## **KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND/OR ABILITIES**

1. Knowledge of navigation methods, equipment, and techniques.
2. Skill in oral and written communications, to include using shipboard computer systems and programs.
3. Ability to interpret and analyze information, to make decisions, plan, organize, evaluate, and supervise the work of others.
4. Knowledge of shipboard safety and security programs, including lifesaving and firefighting equipment, methods and techniques.
5. Knowledge of cargo operations including those involving dry stores, munitions, petroleum products and HELO operations (VERTREP).

Although not required for consideration, candidates that hold Tankerman PIC (person in charge)/DL (dangerous liquids) or the appropriate Towing credentials as specified in 46 CFR 15.805(a)(5), Towing Officers Assessment Record (TOAR), possess credentials or certificates demonstrating proficiency with unusual and technical shipboard operations systems and programs such as Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems, salvage operations, cable operations, command ship operations, or foreign naval auxiliary operations shall provide that information on the Promotion Application form.

**PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS:** Physical standards are in accordance with COMSCINST 6000.1C (latest edition). Employees are subject to drug urinalysis testing in accordance with CMPI 792.

**SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:** Employees must obtain and maintain appropriate security clearance.

**WORKING HOURS:** Work rules and hours are contained in CMPI 610. This is a key position IAW COMSCINST 1001.2A (latest edition), it is essential to DON's mobilization effort and continuity of operations.

## **LICENSING AND/OR CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:**

Must possess and maintain:

1. A U.S. Passport.
2. Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) in accordance with current USCG rules and MSC waiver.
3. A Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) or Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC) endorsed Any Unlicensed Rating in the Deck Department, or Able Seaman - Unlimited.
4. A United States Coast Guard License endorsed THIRD MATE OF STEAM AND MOTOR VESSELS OF ANY GROSS TONS UPON OCEANS OR NEAR COASTAL WATERS (or higher), and RADAR OBSERVER - UNLIMITED
5. A STCW Certificate endorsed CAPACITY as - Officer-In-Charge of a Navigation Watch, or Chief Mate, or Master; STCW may not include limitations of validity on vessels operating in the GMDSS system, or aboard ARPA or radar-equipped vessels.



5. A Federal Communications Commission GMDSS Radio Operator's License/Certificate.

**TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:** Must meet current requirements of the International Safety management (ISM) Code for the position.

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## MASTER'S STANDING ORDERS

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Enclosure (7)



## MASTER'S STANDING ORDERS

### Section 1

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS

##### GENERAL

The purpose of these Standing Orders is to provide you with the necessary guidance you'll need to carry out the ship's mission safely and effectively. All Deck Officers shall comply with these standing orders while on watch or duty. They shall be reviewed as often as necessary to ensure complete understanding. Additionally, as the Ship's Master I reserve the right to change or modify these orders at any time and by any means.

These Standing Orders should not be interpreted by any deck officer to either limit or restrict them in the performance of their duties. These orders are minimum standards of what I expect of you. Actions beyond what is called for herein may be expected of you consistent with the exercise of sound judgment and good seamanship. You are responsible to me for all actions you take in the supervision of the movement or activity of the ship.

Let me irrefutably state here and now: At no time do I expect these Standing Orders (or my Night Orders) to conflict with what I expect of you in the performance of your duties or in the execution of our mission. In the event these Standing Orders and/or Night Orders cannot safely be complied with; or they conflict with other guidance; or perhaps just do not seem to make sense, you shall immediately notify me to seek resolution. You will never be taken to task for requesting clarification if you sense ambiguity. Furthermore: Nothing in these orders should ever be construed as to obligate you to deliberately place this ship into danger!

##### CHAIN OF COMMAND

In my absence or disability, the Chief Mate assumes command authority of the ship. While in port and in the event of a general emergency, the senior Deck Officer aboard assumes command authority, regardless of whether actually on duty or not. In all other cases (e.g. not a general emergency), the Mate on Watch acts with the authority of the Master.

##### SAFETY

Safety is the paramount factor in all phases of any shipboard evolution. Each officer has a direct responsibility to ensure safe practices are adhered to at all times. This ship maintains voluntary compliance with the requirements of 33 CFR 96, Subpart B in having an approved Safety Management System. Follow the guidance provided in the latest Safety Management System (SMS) Procedures and Policy manual. The SMS Procedures and Policy manual can be found on the ship's network.

The Deck Officer charged with the supervision of a task (including watches) shall ensure adequate qualified personnel have been assigned to such task. Doubts as to numbers, qualifications, or readiness for duty of personnel assigned to the watch should be brought to the attention of the Chief Mate or me immediately.

The terms "un-safe" and "dangerous" are not necessarily synonymous. We can make a dangerous activity safe – what we cannot do is make a dangerous activity "un-dangerous." Take skydiving for instance (a sport I haven't tried because I am sane). Statistically, more people have been killed driving to the airport to go skydiving than have been killed actually skydiving. Why? Probably because the inherent danger of skydiving ensures those who enjoy the sport never to take for granted the necessary safety precautions. And yes...these precautions can and do make the sport safe; however, they never fully remove the danger of exiting an airplane in flight.

The nature of our work is inherently dangerous. Our job is to perform this work as safely as possible. Personnel shall not be unnecessarily exposed to risk of injury. When accidents happen, it is often due to the



failure of persons in authority to provide guidance, enforce proper safety measures, or provide the necessary safety equipment. Safety procedures and precautions must be rigorously enforced. Safety devices and protective equipment shall be available and used in connection with all hazardous work or dangerous operations. Most importantly: Never forget the danger associated with what we do for a living!

## **EMERGENCIES OR CASUALTIES**

I wish I could somehow guarantee that nothing will ever go seriously wrong while you are on watch or on duty...because if I could, it would justify a significant reduction in your salary. All of your training, education, examinations and experiences have brought you to the current position you now hold. However, it is during a shipboard emergency you will face your greatest challenge. This challenge will either validate your position as a ship's officer or it will serve to bust you back into some other line of work...or it will kill you. Believe me – shipboard emergencies can be ruthlessly Darwinian when it comes to a seagoing career. How you react to emergencies will distinguish you as either an asset; or a liability; or a statistic. Be ready and think ahead. DO NOT HESITATE IN TAKING APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY.

## **ORDERS AND REGULATIONS**

All Watch Officers shall obey all orders and regulations, and shall require the same of subordinates. The Watch Officer is responsible for the actions and performance of others assigned to the watch. Therefore, it will be the Watch Officer's duty to keep subordinates properly informed in regards to safety, security, proper conduct, enforcement of existing instructions, observance of port regulations, and wearing the prescribed uniform.

At no time are you obligated to immediately obey any order which may jeopardize the safety of the ship or which may be in violation of the law. If at any time you suspect an order to be unsafe or unlawful, you are to notify me at once. What's more - your subordinates are also under no obligation to obey any order they suspect to be unsafe or unlawful. In the event of conflict, call myself or the Chief Mate without delay to expedite resolution.

## **ATTENTION TO DUTY AND MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**

The Watch Officer, while on duty shall not engage in any activity that may distract from his or her attention to duty. Exercising constant vigilance and common sense is paramount in the performance of your job and the safety of the ship and crew.

While on duty, all deck officers are expected to keep abreast of what is going on within and around the ship. This is known as "maintaining situational awareness." You should know at all times where the ship is; where are we going; what the traffic situation is; what is next on our schedule of events; and so on. You should also keep yourself informed about the status of the propulsion plant, navigation equipment, steering gear, sliding water tight doors, water tight closures, fire fighting systems, UNREP rigs in use, important jobs being conducted, etc.

Nonetheless, while on watch you can expect there are going to be distractions. These are the routine and nagging little "taskers" requiring your attention at some point during the course of the watch. There will be weather messages to send; log entries to make; voice calls on the radio; phone calls to the bridge; and so on. However, always remember – first and foremost – when you are conning, nothing (and I mean absolutely nothing) has priority over your proper and safe conning the ship. Do not let these little distractions cause you to lose situational awareness or compromise your attention to duty. Notify me immediately whenever things start to pile up on you.

## **LOCATION AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT**

All Deck Officers shall be familiar with the location and operating procedures of all navigation, fire fighting, life saving, and emergency equipment and controls, as well as necessary procedures to combat or control any emergency which may arise while on duty. All Deck Officers, regardless of assigned duties, are expected to be able to assume the watch and conn on short notice and function effectively.



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**UNIFORMS**

Deck officers shall wear a clean, neat khaki uniforms at all times while on watch, complete with appropriate collar devices (mandatory when in port). Khaki or blue jumpsuits may be substituted for trousers/shirts while at sea or in port. Unlicensed deck department personnel shall wear clean, neat dungarees at all times while on watch. Clean, paint-free, blue jumpsuits may be substituted for dungarees. Frayed, filthy, or severely paint stained apparel is not permitted. Safety shoes are required to be worn by all on-duty watch personnel while not on the bridge underway and all personnel assigned to day-work. See CMPI for additional details.

It is important to remember to dress appropriately. During inport watches, you will often be meeting and dealing with shoreside personnel coming aboard. Yes - I know - we are not in the military; and I do not expect you to look like you are in the military. Nonetheless, if you are the person in charge you should at least LOOK like the person in charge. This is especially true during an emergency when people will be looking for someone in charge.

I once had a deck officer sailing for me who was a real piece of work. His clothes were shoddy, grubby, and seldom washed. His grooming habits left much to be desired - often unshaven and disheveled. He also seemed to have an aversion to bathing regularly. So one day this clown comes into my office to complain that he is not being treated with respect by the unlicensed members of his watch. *Oh really?* Take a little pride in what you look like and how you present yourself. It will go a long way.

**ASSUMING OR RELIEVING THE WATCH**

The changing of the watch, while usually routine, is one of the most critical evolutions to occur aboard ship. A significant number of maritime accidents have been the result of an oncoming watch officer not having full situational awareness prior to turnover. It is important to remember that mishap investigations will often hold the off-going watch officer every bit as accountable as the on-coming watch officer. Just because your relief says "OK, I got it" does not, in and of itself, let you off the hook. The off-going officer is responsible to take reasonable measures that ensure the relieving officer does in fact "got-it" before ever turning over the watch.

Aboard this vessel - it is required that both watch officers (the on-coming and the off-going) concur all conditions relating to ship's condition are known and understood before the watch is turned over. No officer shall assume the watch unless he/she is fully aware and confident as to the status of the ship and surroundings. No officer shall turn over a watch unless he/she is fully confident that the relieving officer is cognizant as to the status of the ship and surroundings. Let me reiterate: Both officers must be in concurrence before the watch may turnover. Both officers are responsible and accountable for a proper exchange.

The watch shall be relieved in sufficient time to obtain all necessary information from the officer to be relieved. The oncoming watch officer is expected to report no later than 10-15 minutes prior to the commencement of his watch to begin the turnover process. Watches commence on the whole hour

The watch shall never be turned over to any person whom you believe to be under the influence of alcohol, narcotics, or in any way impaired to properly assume a watch. This also includes impairment due to fatigue, illness, prescription or over the counter medications, etc. Any instance of someone attempting to assume a watch who is (in your judgment) under the influence or in any way physically impaired, shall be immediately referred to myself or Chief Mate.

**NIGHT ORDERS**

Prior to assuming the watch, the on-coming watch officer shall read and electronically sign the Master's Night Orders in SHIPSLOG. The Night Orders contain special orders and/or specific information pertinent to conditions or operations expected. Where conflicts exist between the Night Orders (both in port and at sea) and these standing orders, the Night Orders take precedence. When in port, the Chief Mate shall prepare the Night Orders with pertinent information relative to security measures in effect, cargo/stores operations, scheduled shifts, repair periods and other matters of importance.



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Night Orders remain in effect until complied with or superceded, regardless of time of day. If the Master or Chief Mate supercedes his written night orders with verbal orders, those orders shall, insofar as practicable, be entered into the watch officer's pass-down log with the comment that the entry was a result of a verbal order from appropriate authority.



Section 2**THE WATCH - AT SEA****GENERAL**

The Mate on Watch (MOW) is first and foremost responsible for the safe navigation of the ship. This responsibility ends only when properly relieved of the watch. Additionally, only the Master or Chief Mate may order the MOW to relinquish his/her duties.

The MOW may not leave the bridge area without being properly relieved by another licensed deck officer. If departing the pilothouse to a location not readily visible from the helm (i.e., the head, bridge wings, etc), the MOW shall advise the other on-duty watchstanders of his/her intended location.

At all times, know where you are and watch where you are going! The MOW shall spend as little time as necessary attending to the administrative requirements of the watch and shall maximize the time spent attending to those duties that ensure the safe navigation of the ship (i.e. keeping a proper lookout, radar monitoring, collision avoidance, navigation, etc.).

While logbooks may be kept current as the watch progresses, maintaining the smooth log is the least critical of the MOW's duties while he/she is on watch. The smooth log may be finalized (and 'committed' in the case of the electronic logbook) after the MOW has been properly relieved of the watch.

If more than one officer is assigned to a watch at sea, one shall always be forward in the wheelhouse, where a vigilant watch can be maintained and night vision preserved.

**VOYAGE PLANNING**

The key to a successful and safe voyage is proper navigation planning! "Fail to plan then plan to fail" has always been a favorite idiom of mine. However, a plan is never engraved in stone. There will always be changes to the plan (especially if you work for MSC). A really smart Captain I sailed with many years ago once told me, "The plan is only the baseline from which we will commence to deviate." Proper planning is the key to a successful mission; however, always remember it is our ultimate goal to execute the mission and not necessarily to execute the plan.

Good voyage planning begins with a set of waypoints from where we are to where we are going. This is called the voyage's "track." Our track should provide a safe transit to our destination at a minimum amount of time. Several factors go into laying out a track - shortest distance; weather; potential traffic; hazards to navigation; etc. The goal is to balance voyage safety with voyage economy.

Well in advance of execution (or, at least, as soon as practicable), the voyage should be laid out - on corrected charts - with all waypoints identified. When satisfied that a good track has been established, the waypoints are then compiled into the **official voyage track**. In addition to the waypoints, the voyage track will include the anticipated courses and distances as well as the projected speeds for each leg and the intended times at each waypoint. A hard copy of the official voyage plan will be printed out and kept handy at the chart table at all times during the voyage. Should a significant navigation change occur during the course of the voyage; a new official voyage track will be promulgated immediately.

The waypoints for the voyage track will be entered into the ECDIS as well as the primary GPS unit. The goal is to have a four tiered hierarchy. The waypoints on the official voyage track - are to be the same as the waypoints plotted on the chart - are to be the same as the waypoints entered into the GPS - are to be the same as the waypoints in the ECDIS. It is important to also ensure that the waypoint names and numbers correspond in all four tiers. This is because over the course of the voyage, you should be continually comparing the current ship's status against the planned voyage track - looking for any and all ambiguities. These ambiguities will be your indicators that something is possibly amiss and requires attention. In other



words, what you are seeing on the ECDIS; should be the same as what you are plotting on the chart; should be the same as what you're reading on the GPS display; and should be the same as the official voyage track.

## NAVIGATION

At all times underway, the MOW shall closely monitor the ship's position and progress along the intended track. You are authorized and required to take the necessary actions to maintain track. Always remember: The ship's navigation track is not a railroad track. The track is only a guide to measure progress along our voyage. While our goal is to follow the track, it is not necessary to take "extraordinary" measures to keep the ship directly on top of the track. Minor deviations from the track are often times required or inherent of the course of routine navigational practice.

Follow the track. However - and more importantly - navigate safely and efficiently! Routine adjustments of course for traffic and leeway are expected. Nonetheless, contact me immediately in the event you determine a course adjustment would possibly effect a significant deviation from the track. Any actions taken maintain track will always be made with due regard for traffic in the vicinity as well as applicable Rules of the Road

Should the MOW determine a noteworthy deviation to the track that is of an unknown origin, he/she will contact me immediately. Additionally, in the event the MOW cannot accurately determine the ship's position, or cannot recommend corrective action to an identified hazard, he/she shall ask for my immediate presence on the bridge.

**ECDIS** – The development of ECDIS (Electronic Charting Display and Information System) is perhaps one of the most significant technological developments in navigation since the advent of radar or even the chronometer. No other navigation device, system, or procedure provides the immediate situational awareness of a properly functioning ECDIS. All watch officers shall be familiar with the proper operation of the ECDIS. The Second Officer is responsible to ensure that the ECDIS contains the latest available electronic charts

Over the last few years, I have come to rely more and more on ECDIS as my primary means of piloting a ship – along with "looking out the window" of course. It is easy and convenient to use and provides a wealth of information...all presented in a logical and concise format. A remarkable tool ECDIS, although it is also not without its faults. ECDIS is still just a device; n electronic piece of equipment subject to failure. In June of 1995, the cruise ship Royal Majesty ran aground off Massachusetts. In the subsequent NTSB investigation, it was determined that the GPS antenna cable had disconnected causing the ECDIS to automatically shift into DR mode. For a period of some 34 hours (!?!?) none of the watch officers noticed the ECDIS was not receiving GPS updates. No other back-up means of navigation was employed and the ship drifted further and further from her intended track – and eventually up on to a reef. I don't know about you; but I personally believe running aground on a charted reef is not the preferred method for determining your ECDIS has malfunctioned.

Bottom line: We will use ECDIS to the fullest extent possible. However, we will also take appropriate measures to ensure the ECDIS is functioning properly as well as maintaining a charted plot (e.g. one made of paper) in the event of ECDIS failure. Watch officers are cautioned against relying solely on a single method for determining the ship's position. Every opportunity shall be used to verify the accuracy of the ship's position by independent means.

**"Prudent mariners will not rely solely on any single aid to navigation."**

**POSITION PLOTTING** - The MOW shall maintain an accurate plot (on an appropriate chart or plotting sheet) of the ship's position as often as prudent seamanship dictates. The following guidelines are provided:

- a) Open Ocean Transit: HOURLY.
- b) Coastal (within 12 miles of land): HALF HOURLY or half the time it takes to reach the nearest hazard to navigation (whichever is less).
- c) Harbor approaches (after "maneuvering detail" is set): Every 15 minutes or half the time it takes to reach the nearest hazard to navigation (whichever is less).
- d) Harbor limits: Every 6 minutes or half the time it takes to reach the nearest hazard to navigation (whichever is less).



Use any approved method or combination of methods to establish the vessel's position or eliminate any doubt as to the position. When taking and plotting GPS fixes, use a GPS unit other than the unit feeding the ECDIS – the secondary Furuno; or the WRN-6; or even the GPS located in INMARST-C. Mix them up from time to time. When in pilotage waters (visibility permitting) visual bearings and/or radar ranges shall also be used as a means of establishing the vessel's position. When feasible, three point fixes shall be used to verify the accuracy of positions. A good practice is to alternate visual fixes with GPS fixes. Remember: A fix on the chart does not tell you where you are - it tells you where you were. Always maintain an accurate DR track of your intended movement.

While the maneuvering detail is set, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Officer (W) has the primary duty of maintaining a constant running plot of the ship's positions on the charts in use, entering all bearings and observations in the Bearing Log.

**ELECTRONIC NAVIGATIONAL AIDS** - All electronic aids to navigation shall be kept in good operating condition and properly adjusted. Any malfunction shall be reported immediately to the Master. The Second Officer shall utilize SAMM as the maintenance log for each piece of electronic navigation equipment. This log shall indicate problems discovered during operation, recommended servicing, and a thorough description of all maintenance or repairs conducted. It is the duty of all deck watch officers to familiarize themselves with the proper use of all electronic devices found on the bridge, with particular attention to the radars and their associated ARPA systems, ECDIS, GPS/DGPS, AIS, or any other navigation system or aid that may be installed.

All deck officers are reminded that each of these systems are, in the final analysis, nothing more than **an aid to navigation**. No matter how accurate a system purports to be, no matter how easy or convenient, the presence of any electronic system does not disencumber the MOW from the responsibility to constantly check the data derived from one system against data derived from other means. Furthermore, the presence and utilization of any electronic system does not relieve you from the obligation to maintain a proper lookout.

**RADAR** - Today's radar units, with their collision avoidance systems, chart plotting capabilities, and numerous other navigational aids within the unit, have significantly added to the watch officer's ability to keep his or her vessel out of danger. As with all good things, there are drawbacks. Watch officer's can often become mesmerized peering into the radar screen interpreting the information. Time spent looking into the radar should not conflict with the overriding duty of keeping a proper visual lookout. Learn to develop your "seaman's eye." Make sure the information presented to you by the radar is in fact what is happening in the "real world" (e.g. the world outside the window).

At no time should the MOW become so reliant on radar information that he/she fails to keep a proper lookout or fails to track a visible contact visually. Additionally, at no time should the MOW be so reliant on radar (or other electronic) information that he/she fails to use all available visual navigation aids to determine the ship's position. **THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW!**

As a general rule, the 3-cm radar (X-band) is a more sensitive unit able to see smaller contacts (little boats) and provides a higher resolution of a coastline for navigation. The drawback to this being it is also more sensitive to weather – rain and wind (sea clutter) can wash out the display. The 10-cm (S-band) radar has a better capability to "look through" weather clutter; however, the display has far less resolution and can often fail to pick-up the smaller targets at higher ranges.

By and large, the radar next to ECDIS should be set depending on weather – use the 3-cm in fair weather and the 10-cm in squally weather. Radar contacts from this unit are to be overlaid onto ECDIS at all times. Set the other radar to the bandwidth opposite of the forward. Unless being specifically manipulated by the qualified observer (e.g. the MOW) the radars normal routine settings should be as follows:

- 1) The display shall be oriented "North Up" and gyro stabilized.
- 2) ARPA vectors shall routinely be in "Relative Motion" mode.
- 3) Vector lengths shall be set for 12 minutes.
- 4) Target trails OFF.



The radar operator is free to use any and all of the features associated with the radars, however, on completion (or change of watch); he/she should return the radar to these settings.

## RULES OF THE ROAD & COLLISION AVOIDANCE

Let me put this succinctly: Comply with the Rules of the Road! Always, always, always!

As a licensed deck officer, you were grilled and drilled in Rules of the Road getting ready for your Mate's examination. I know I was (many years ago)! And just when I thought I knew everything there was to know about Rules...I went to sea. I soon realized I had a lot more to learn...because only at sea will you be able to take the COLREGs from theoretical to practical. At over 30 years at sea, I find I'm still learning the Rules. The best advice I can give is to study the Rules regularly. Review these Rules often. As a Deck Officer, there will be a great many lessons to learn; however, nothing can or will be more important than learning and applying the Rules of the Road.

Of all the Rules, by far the most important is Rule 2. Although confusing at first, it is perhaps the most elegant law ever written. Essentially, Rule 2 requires you comply with the Rules of the Road. However, it also tells you that it sometimes may be necessary to deviate from the Rules. Ambiguous? Not really. In fact, what Rule 2 is saying is that the COLREGs have been promulgated for the specific purpose of preventing collisions at sea. And while you are required to obey the Rules, you SHALL NOT OBEY THESE RULES INTO A COLLISION.

In Part B of the COLREGs (Steering and Sailing Rules), actions taken to avoid collision must first be predicated upon Rule 7 - that a Risk of Collision does in fact exist. Radar is a good tool for determining risk of collision; however, the actual determination of risk of collision (according to the Rules) is not necessarily a specified CPA computed by radar. Example: Let's assume a situation where I have directed you to inform me of any vessel having a CPA of 3 miles or less. This directive does not automatically establish "risk of collision" as being anything under a 3-mile CPA. All it means is that I wish to be informed when a vessel is within 3 miles. Remember, nowhere in the Rules of the Road is there any mention of "CPA." The acronym CPA (Closest Point of Approach) is a radar/ARPA function. The bottom line is: When maneuvering to avoid collision in accordance with the Steering and Sailing rules of Part B, you must first determine that risk of collision exists and this determination is based upon the guidelines of Rule 7. Therefore, in the above example, it would be inappropriate to maneuver this ship based solely and exclusively upon a radar CPA being less than 3 miles.

What is important to remember is radar's CPA is only an indicator of a potential collision – a VERY GOOD indicator – but still just an indicator. Our ultimate goal is to get by other traffic safely and successfully. Theoretically speaking, this could be defined as any CPA greater than zero. Therefore, what is a proper "safe distance" to pass by other vessels on the ocean? The answer is not specified in the Rules of the Road. Therefore, the correct answer is: It depends. Many factors come into play in making a determination as to what constitutes a safe passing distance – and, naturally, more is always better than less. However, at no time will any watch officer violate the Rules of the Road solely for the purpose of opening or increasing a CPA!

The following is a few general guidelines to help you in determining when action may be appropriate and when and how to take such action:

- 1) DETECT EARLY. The earlier you detect a contact, the more time you have to plot and evaluate its movements and intentions.
- 2) VISUAL BEARINGS. Commence taking visual bearings whenever a potential risk of collision situation may be in question.
- 3) EVALUATE YOUR SITUATION AND OPTIONS. Are you in a meeting, crossing, or overtaking situation? What is the CPA? What is the approaching vessel's course and speed? What hazards to navigation (including other ships) need to be taken into account, and given those hazards, what are the available options? Only after these questions are answered, should you decide what action, if any, is the best for the situation.
- 4) TAKE ACTION AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. Obviously, the sooner you can take action the better. Keep in mind that whatever action you take will usually have some sort of impact on navigation or possibly put you into situations with other vessel traffic. A balance here is needed.



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- 5) **MAKE CLEAR YOUR INTENTIONS.** The key to successful collision avoidance is to avoid any action that may create uncertainty in the mind of the officer commanding the approaching ship. Avoid alarming the other guy by being unpredictable. In most traffic avoidance situations, it is preferable to alter course rather than speed, however changes in speed should not be ruled out at any time.
- 6) **VHF RADIO.** Use the VHF radio to try and establish contact with any vessel whose intentions are unclear.
- 7) **SOUND SIGNALS.** When appropriate, use sound signals to ensure mutual understanding.

Above all: **DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL ME IF IN DOUBT!** Remember, we are both in this together. Keep me informed when a situation is unclear or becoming unclear. Also keep me informed of any action taken or that you intend to take if time permits. Furthermore: **DO NOT** delay taking action necessary to avoid immediate danger because you haven't called me.

## USE OF VHF RADIO

The VHF is there to use; however, please use it only when necessary. By this I mean do not make perfunctory calls to any and all ships in our vicinity. If you are in a close quarter's situation with another vessel, and have a reasonable uncertainty as to this vessel's intentions, by all means give the vessel a call. In other words, call when necessary and only when necessary. Making too many VHF calls robs you of time away from your other duties. It also gives away our position (there are bad guys out there who wish you harm). Don't assist the bad guys by continually broadcasting who and where you are. Also, unnecessary VHF usage clogs up the frequencies for other ships that may need to use it...and it also makes you look stupid.

Keep the VHF tuned and adjusted to monitor calls on channel 16, or any other channel that may be required. When making VHF calls try and use the vessel's name from the AIS. I know sometimes these names can be hard to pronounce so also include the ship's international call sign when hailing. Speak clearly and slowly. Use simple speech. Confine your communications to business and use professional radiotelephone etiquette. (It is not a CB radio). As a Hospital Ship we are not permitted to use friendship call signs such as "Naval Vessel 19." When calling another vessel we are always "Hospital Ship Mercy."

When communicating with private or commercial vessels, do not EVER give these ships a "rudder order." This means do not direct a ship to carry out some specific maneuver (steer a course, make a turn, speed up or slow down...whatever). Giving specific steering directions, such as a specified turning direction or distance to maintain, is giving a rudder order. You are telling this ship how to maneuver. Be advised: You are not the Master of that ship. By telling the ship what to do in this manner, you are now accountable for this ship's actions. If this ship turns as you have directed, and proceeds to run over a fishing boat - an Admiralty court will more than likely hold you culpable. A proper way to convey this information would be something like, "I'm engaged in underway replenishment and restricted in my ability to maneuver...please keep clear of me." In this way you have informed the other ship as to what your status is and you have made a justifiable request - all in accordance with the Rules of the Road. If he now turns and runs over a fishing boat, it's his fault and only his fault. Feel free to advise the other ship of your intentions or ask about his intentions. You may discuss the situation to get clarity on how the other guy perceives it (is it overtaking, meeting, crossing, etc?).

## LOOKOUTS

The MOW is responsible for ensuring that a "proper lookout" is maintained at all times. Additionally, the MOW will make certain any person assigned as lookouts understands their duties and knows proper reporting procedures. The MOW must also be satisfied that lookouts are physically able to perform their duties, and these duties are carried out with proficiency and alertness.

Rule 5 of the COLREGs tells all vessels to maintain a proper lookout; however, it does not provide any specific detail to what the exact definition of "proper." Therefore it is the responsibility of the vessel to determine how best to deploy lookouts depending on prevailing circumstances. This depends not only on weather (e.g. visibility) but also on the vessel's architecture, personnel qualifications, and the waters being transited (e.g. traffic density). The posting of lookouts must be successfully integrated into the total bridge resource

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management operation. Therefore, how you are able to manage your lookouts is every bit as important as to where you post your lookouts or even how many lookouts you post.

A dedicated lookout shall be stationed on the bridge or bridge wing from sunset to sunrise and during periods of reduced visibility; also when navigating in restricted or congested waters; and at such other times as the exercise of reasonable prudence dictates. A person dedicated as a lookout should have no other duties. At night, a person shall not assume lookout duties until vision is acclimated to the dark. The lookout shall be properly attired for the existing weather elements and will remain where assigned while acting as the lookout. Additional lookouts may be posted on the bow or on the fantail when circumstances require.

The MOW shall log all training and instructions provided to lookouts. When new personnel are aboard, watch officers shall provide them the requisite training IAW the USCG STCW RFPNW requirements.

As a naval unit, we may be tasked to meet or steam in company with other ships. We are sometimes asked to identify other ships or aircraft. I expect deck officers to take every opportunity to improve their skills in recognizing ships and aircraft of both the United States and other nations. Recognition includes putting a name to a class and a class to a silhouette. This comes with time and practice, but it comes.

At least one pair of binoculars shall be assigned to each lookout for their use. Lookouts shall be instructed in proper use and care of binoculars. They will be turned over to his/her relief. The Second Mate will ensure that all binoculars are kept in good working order. Binoculars with damaged optics shall be replaced or repaired. Night vision equipment will be made available for use as the situation dictates. Watch Officers will provide training as required to lookouts on the proper use and care of the night vision equipment IAW the manufacturer's instructions.

## NAVIGATION LIGHTS

Navigation lights for POWER DRIVEN VESSELS shall be illuminated at all times while underway. Additional navigational or task lights called for by the applicable Rules of the Road shall be displayed as circumstances dictate (e.g. Restricted in Ability to Maneuver – RED-WHITE-RED (Task lights)). It is the Watch Officer's duty to ensure the proper lights are illuminated at all times.

## RESTRICTED VISIBILITY

The term "restricted visibility" is defined in Rule 3(l). Basically, anytime there is anything that inhibits visibility you are to assume yourself to be in restricted visibility. The question now becomes, "When is it necessary to take actions on account of restricted visibility?" For this, there is no absolute definitive measure. In other words, I cannot tell you to just assume when visibility is less than (example) 3-miles, you should now...reduce speed...sound signals...whatever. There are many other considerations to take into account. For instance; what are the traffic and navigation considerations? Are the radars cluttered by seas and rain? Is whatever hampering visibility regional or localized? Etc.

What is unequivocal is that Part B, Section II of the Rules of the Road (Rules 11 - 18) only applies when **vessels are in sight of one another!** Remember, Section III (Rule 19) only becomes appropriate **when vessels are not in sight of one another** due to restricted visibility. I mention this because quite often watch officers get confused over this significant detail. Case in point: A few years ago I was navigating off the Southern California coast in very thick fog (real thick – couldn't see the bow). We picked up a radar contact (ship) to starboard in a crossing situation. As I'm watching the radar plot develop, we get a VHF call from this ship "advising" me that I am the 'give-way' vessel and therefore required to maneuver. Of course, what this knucklehead was assuming is that the situation fell within the guidelines of Rules 15, 16 & 17. What he failed to take into account is when ships cannot actually see each other; these rules do not apply. Critical note: The actions you take to avoid a collision or close quarter's situation are not based directly upon the specific state of visibility. Rather, they are based upon if you can actually see, or not see, the other vessel.

In the event of restricted visibility, you shall take action to best insure the safety of navigation. First and foremost is to evaluate all prevailing conditions as well as post a dedicated lookout on the bridge wing. As conditions warrant, the following actions shall also be taken as required:



- 1) Call me immediately! Provide me with an estimated range of visibility as well as the cause (i.e., fog, rain showers, etc.), and a synopsis of traffic in the vicinity and an estimated duration of the restricted visibility.
  - 2) If there is other (close quarters) traffic in the vicinity, consider reducing speed.
  - 3) If no other traffic is visible on radar, you still must remember Rule 6 and 19 still require you to operate at a "safe" speed. Should an accident occur, an investigator's first assumption is very likely to be you were not operating at a safe speed. Be prepared to slow or stop as the situation dictates. This is a situation where seamanship comes into play.
  - 4) Post additional lookouts.
  - 5) Commence sounding proper fog signals IAW COLREGS.
  - 6) Verify operational status of the radars and set each on different range scales.
  - 7) Place the helm in hand steering.
  - 8) Ensure navigation lights are on.
  - 9) Keep noise on the bridge to a minimum and stay focused on safe navigation.
- I do not expect you to make decisions about restricted visibility on your own. When such situations develop, I fully expect you to call me and, if necessary, ask for my presence on the bridge!

#### GLOBAL MARITIME DISTRESS AND SAFETY SYSTEM (GMDSS)

The MOW shall maintain a proper watch on all GMDSS equipment. At the beginning of each watch, verify the position information in all GMDSS equipment. Additionally:

- Check that all DSC radios (VHF and MF/HF) are in "Manual" acknowledge!
- Check that the NAVTEX receiver is on.
- Monitor DSC-capable VHF radios.
- MF/HF equipment is scanning the required frequencies.
- INMARSAT-C is logged in and copying EGC messages.

The Second Officer shall be designated as the Primary GMDSS station operator. He/she shall ensure that all GMDSS equipment is in satisfactory working order and that all pubs and instructions are onboard and available to the station operators. The Second Officer shall also maintain the required GMDSS Equipment Test Log and the GMDSS Station Log. The Second Officer will also ensure that pre-departure tests are conducted on the GMDSS equipment prior to each voyage and daily tests are conducted while underway.

The Chief Mate, Cargo Mate and Third Officer(s) shall be designated as Secondary GMDSS station operators. Everyone shall be familiar with the operating procedures for each component of the GMDSS station and be fully prepared to use the system as designed. GMDSS operators shall provide a copy of their FCC GMDSS license where it can be accessed from the installed GMDSS console.

When a GMDSS distress alarm is received, the Watch Officer will switch to the appropriate GMDSS monitoring frequency and commence a listening watch and notify me. Do not acknowledge any alarms without explicit direction from me. Remember, the GMDSS shifted primary distress message acknowledgment from ships to shore facilities. We have no way of knowing if someone closer has responded, especially if the distress alert is received over MF/HF circuits.

#### WEATHER

Do not allow bad weather to sneak up on you! Read, study, and if necessary, plot all incoming weather messages. Inform me at once if there is indication of bad weather ahead. Copy and examine all available weather maps. Maintain all weather reports, weather-fax maps, etc., from 24 hours prior to departure until arrival at our next port. Perhaps most importantly, use your eyes and knowledge you have to evaluate the conditions as they actually exist at the ship. The weather the ship is experiencing is being caused by something. Practice correlating synoptic conditions to the weather that the ship is actually experiencing. Practice reading the weather conditions when you have synoptic data available will help prepare you for those times when you don't.



When underway, Watch Officers shall send synoptic weather reports as follows:

<u>Sea Height (ft)</u>	<u>True Wind Speed (kts)</u>	<u>Frequency from 0000Z</u>
0-11	0-33	every 6 hrs
15 and greater	35 and greater	every 3 hrs

Unless directed otherwise, weather observations will be sent with the same classification as our MOVREP with op-immediate precedence. Observations are due at 0000Z, 0600Z, 1200Z, 1800Z). These messages need to be sent promptly. The information they provide are used to help the forecasters give us our weather warnings. (c) Optimum Track Ship Routing (OTSR). When we utilize the services of the Navy's OTSR system, the Second Mate will put "OTSR" on the appropriate MOVREP line.

Should the ship encounter Heavy Weather (as defined by SMS Procedure 7.2-008-ALL) be ready to execute the Heavy Weather checklist (SMS Checklist 7.9-001-01).

## DUMPING OF TRASH

The MOW will be fully knowledgeable with all applicable rules for garbage disposal. Your primary guidance for this topic is the SMS Procedure 2.2-016-AH.

## TOUR OF THE SHIP

The MOW will ensure that a tour of the ship is made as often as necessary to ensure that maximum safety and good housekeeping conditions prevail at all times. Any safety or fire hazard noted shall be eliminated at once or corrective action taken as necessary.

Weather deck closures shall be secured during periods of inclement weather. If heavy weather is anticipated, notify the various departments, and then ascertain that all precautions to prevent damage have been taken.

All watertight closures required to be kept closed while at sea shall be checked and closed. The hydraulic sliding WTD shall be closed at all times while navigating in restricted waters and from sunset to sunrise. At no time shall power be secured to the sliding WTD without permission from the Master. This door must remain capable of being closed from the bridge remote panel.

## FORCE PROTECTION

When transiting areas of known or suspected terrorist/pirate activity, I will set an appropriate security condition. In areas of significant threat, we will embark a dedicated topside guard force (MARDET, FAST, EST, etc.) It is imperative that the members of the security team report to you on a regular specified schedule. If you feel that a higher security posture is needed, above what we are in, notify me immediately. Indications that might require us to set a higher security posture could include:

- high speed boats among slow fishing boats
- boats that are intent on approaching close aboard
- being approached by unlighted vessels at night
- suspicious radio communications
- questionable distress signals

The time to defend against pirates or terrorists is BEFORE we are under attack. We will only have done our job if we prevent pirates or terrorists from getting onboard or doing physical damage to us. Do not hesitate to speed up, sound the emergency signal, use the whistle, employ the searchlights, shoot flares (pencil or M-79) in the direction of the boat (NOT AT IT), turn on deck lighting, or anything else you can think of to thwart pirates or terrorists.



## EMERGENCIES

In case of a fire at sea, immediately adjust course and speed so that the fire is not being fanned by the forward speed of the ship or high relative winds. Monitor the smoke and adjust course/speed to clear it away from the fire-fighting teams.

In the event of an impending collision or grounding, immediately take whatever action you think will best avoid or minimize the impact. (Hopefully, you will have already called me prior to this last resort.)

In the event that someone falls overboard (while running free), the first and most important action to throw the rudder over hard in the direction that the person fell over. This swings the stern away from the person in the water. After ordering "hard-over", take the following actions:

- Hit the MOB button on the GPS and/or ECDIS (This marks the position)
- Sound the Man Overboard signal & drop smoke float
- Pass the word over the PA system
- Have lookout maintain visual contact with the person in the water
- Maintain integrity of the Williamson turn. (60 degrees off original heading, shift rudder)
- About  $\frac{3}{4}$ 's of the way through the turn, reduce speed.

## Section 3

### THE WATCH - AT ANCHOR

#### GENERAL

Due diligence will be exercised at all times while the vessel is at anchor. The MOW shall constantly monitor local weather and ships position - notifying the Master of any adverse conditions should they arise.

#### GROUND TACKLE.

All watch officers shall know the anchor windlass operating procedures. They shall also be familiar with procedures to veer chain, drop the other anchor, or slip the anchor chain in cases of emergency. Once the ship is "Securely Anchored", the roving patrol shall inspect the anchor chain at least hourly to determine how it is tending and shall report same to the MOW via portable radio. In addition to the roving patrol, the MOW will personally check the anchor chain regularly. If at anytime the chain reaches a "moderate" strain (or higher), the MOW is to notify me immediately. The chain and the ship's position will be monitored on a more frequent basis for signs of dragging.

#### POSITION PLOTTING

The vessel's anchored position shall be established at the time the anchor is dropped and the swing circle computed and drawn on the chart. The position and swing circle shall also be entered into the ECDIS. When at anchor, the ship's position shall be checked as follows:

- If sustained winds are 30 kts or less - Hourly.
- If sustained winds exceed 30 kts - 30 minutes.
- If winds exceed 40 kts - 15 minutes.

Positions will be checked using visual bearings or a combination of visual bearings and radar ranges where possible. Record all anchor bearings and radar ranges in the Bearing Log. Always compare plotted positions against the ECDIS! Neither radar nor ECDIS is to be used as the sole means of establishing the ship's position at anchor unless no other means are available. Call me immediately if there are any indications of dragging.



## LOOKOUTS, VHF RADIO, AND SIGNALS

While at anchor, the watch officer shall ascertain that a proper lookout and a proper VHF radio watch are maintained at all times. Additionally, the proper anchor lights or day shapes are displayed in accordance with applicable rules, and proper signals are given during periods of poor visibility. Signals that may be given on the whistle or searchlight to warn vessels approaching dangerously close shall be given in timely manner. We cannot stand idly by while another vessel plows into us. Be ready to use the VHF radio, searchlight, whistle, etc., to try and warn the approaching ship.

## MAIN PROPULSION AND STEERING ENGINE GEAR

Under normal conditions at anchor, main propulsion will be maintained in a 1-hour standby for getting underway. Watch officers shall keep the watch engineer informed of the vessel's status, or of the possibility of getting underway on short notice, if an emergency arises. The steering gear shall not be secured without the Master's permission. Under no circumstances will the main propulsion or steering gear be disabled (as for repair or maintenance) without the expressed permission of the Master.

## WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY

Watertight integrity conditions for restricted waters shall remain in effect unless conditions warrant otherwise. If at anchor in ports of doubtful security, additional defense security and protective measures shall be taken in accordance with the Inport Security Protection Plan. These standing orders will be supplemented in the Master's or Chief Mate's Night Orders.

### Water Taxi

If Water Taxis are being operated while at anchor, the MOW plays an integral role in their safe operation.

- Water Taxis will be properly vetted prior to coming alongside.
- Chief Mate will inspect all liberty boats to ensure they are satisfactory for safe operation.
- MOW will meet all schedule or unscheduled liberty boats.
- Life jackets are to be worn by ship's personnel tending the liberty boats.
- Have a life-ring immediately available.
- Have a rescue strop and tending line immediately available for pulling someone from the water.

Amplifying information for working with liberty boats will be put in the Master's or Chief Mate's night orders and in the Inport Security Protection Plan.

## HEAVY WEATHER OPERATIONS WHILE AT ANCHOR

Heavy weather is defined as any weather condition that causes undue strain on the ship's ground tackle caused by wind, sea state or current or any combination thereof. In addition to those steps required elsewhere in these orders, in the event of heavy weather, while at anchor, the following actions shall be considered as the situation warrants:

- Terminate liberty boat service.
- Raise the accommodation ladder off of breasting barge (if employed).
- Attempt to arrange for port services/operations to clear the side of any watercraft (i.e. breasting barges, CHT barges, etc.) If unable to arrange for removal of barges, consider casting and streaming the barge astern.
- Warm up anchor windless, walk second anchor to the water's edge.
- Walk out additional chain on the 'in use' anchor.

There is no definitive answer on what to do when the anchor starts dragging! There will be a lot going on (i.e., accommodation ladders, breasting barges, CHT barges, etc.) and a lot to be considered. Keep your wits about



you. Do the best you can and call for help! You'll likely need a lot of it! If the anchor is determined to be dragging, the following actions should be considered:

- Veer out additional chain (consistent with proximity to nearest hazard astern).
- Bring engines on-line and motor against the chain.
- Call for tug assist.
- Drop a second anchor. (This should be a "last ditch" action. It is real easy for the ship to spin tie the chain into knots. Nonetheless, use it if necessary!)

#### **FORCE PROTECTION – AT ANCHOR**

Prior to arrival, the ship will submit an Inport Security Plan (ISP) with our operational commander. This plan will outline our security posture for the particular port as well as the Force Protection measures we are putting in place. Detailed instructions for the watch officers will be provided in the Chief Mate's Night Orders.

#### Section 4

#### **THE WATCH - IN PORT**

#### **SUPPLEMENTAL ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS**

The standing orders contained in this section shall supplement the orders contained in Section 1. Port Regulations and SOPA Instructions issued by Naval and Harbor Authorities will be issued, compiled, and available on the bridge for your ready reference.

The ship's Vessel Security Plan (VSP), applicable Inport Security Protection Plan (ISPP), as well as this instruction are to be considered the primary standing orders for the conduct of watches in port. It is your responsibility to ensure the gangway watch complies with these orders. Modifications to these orders are found in the Chief Mate's Night Orders.

#### **MATE ON WATCH (MOW)**

A licensed deck officer - The Mate on Watch - shall be assigned at all times while the vessel is in port. The primary duty of the Mate on Watch is ensuring the safety and security of the vessel. As such, he/she will respond to all incidents of fire, flooding, injury, or breach of security providing leadership and coordination for the response effort. The MOW shall determine what further action (if any), is required. If the situation requires the Master's attention, the MOW is directly responsible for notification.

In the absence of the Master, command authority falls to the Senior Deck Officer aboard – this may or may not be the MOW. Command Authority is defined as the authority to make decisions affecting the ship which are normally reserved exclusively for the Master. (An example of a command decision would be to get the ship underway.) In the event of an emergency or special incident, and in the absence of the Master, the MOW will notify the senior deck officer aboard. This officer will then determine if it is necessary to assume command authority and act accordingly. The assumption of command authority does not relieve the MOW of his or her duties.

#### **ASSUMING OR RELIEVING THE WATCH**

The assumption or relieving of the watch shall be in accordance with the guidelines outlined in Section I. The duty keys, or information as to the location of all essential keys, shall be made available to oncoming MOW.



The watch and duty rosters for the various departments shall be properly posted. No changes shall be made, except in cases of emergency, without prior approval of the department head concerned.

The MOW shall ascertain that adequate ship-to-shore communications are maintained. A list of emergency telephone numbers shall be clearly posted in close proximity to the telephone. The MOW will be familiar with the means of accessing and use of the local phone system, land line, cellular, Iridium (satellite), BEST or INMARSAT for making OPREP-3 voice reports to COMPACFLT.

## **THE GANGWAY - INGRESS AND EGRESS CONTROL**

The vessel's gangway is the dedicated point of entry and departure for personnel coming aboard and going ashore. It has often been said that, "You only get one chance to make a first impression." For those people coming aboard this ship for the first time, the professionalism of the ship will be judged by the professionalism of the gangway. I therefore expect the gangway area to be kept clean and organized and the gangway watch to be appropriately trained and presentable.

Ingress and egress procedures are laid out in the Vessel Security Plan and supplemented by the Inport Security Protection Plan (ISPP) for each particular port's FPCON. Enforce applicable bag inspection procedures. You will most likely have to supervise this procedure yourself. The unlicensed watchstander will initially be hesitant to enforce this requirement.

The MOW shall constantly ascertain that positive control is maintained over all ingress and egress as well as movement of material at the gangway. All personnel boarding or leaving the ship in port are required to use properly rigged gangway(s), and register arrivals/departures with the visitor log and utilize the appropriate visitor badge.

## **SURVEILLANCE AND SEARCH**

The MOW shall maintain close surveillance over all possible hiding places to deter the possibility of stowaways. During hours of darkness, ensure that both sides of the ship and the bow and stern area are adequately illuminated. Ensure the installed waterline security lighting system is functioning properly. Particular care should be exercised to prevent the theft of ship's stores, equipment, mooring lines, brass fittings, cargo lights, etc., while in ports where thievery is prevalent. A close surveillance of the offshore side shall be maintained, particularly when barges or other small craft are moored alongside.

A complete and thorough search of the ship shall be conducted prior to departure from every port. The time of the search, and the names of the persons participating shall be entered in the ship's log. The Chief Mate, Cargo Mate, or the Mate on Watch shall conduct this search.

## **FORCE PROTECTION – IN PORT**

Prior to arrival, the ship will submit an Inport Security Plan (ISP) with our operational commander. This plan will outline our security posture for the particular port as well as the Force Protection measures we are putting in place. Detailed instructions for the watch officers will be provided in the Chief Mate's Night Orders.

## **INSPECTIONS**

The Mate on watch shall personally make periodic all-inclusive inspection rounds above and below decks. These rounds, at a minimum, shall include a check of the following:

- condition of mooring lines and/or anchor (adjust as required)
- condition and rigging of accommodation ladder, brow or gangway, including safety net and lower platform (or barge)
- topside lighting
- pumproom, work shop(s), engine room, shaft alleys (fire, flooding, security)
- all storerooms/workshops



- Radio Central (Interior door, exterior WTD)
- Master's Office (door)
- Chief Mate's Office (door)
- Hospital (door)
- Potable water risers (on shore). Look for signs of any tampering of ship's water supply.

The MOW is responsible for the enforcement of NO SMOKING regulations. Smoking is allowed only in designated areas and at designated times.

Any case of fire or flooding is sufficient reason for the ship to come to "emergency stations". Any other unsafe or unusual condition shall be investigated and corrected or reported to the Chief Mate or Master at once. If sufficient reason exists the MOW shall not hesitate to call away a security alert.

## EMERGENCIES OR CASUALTIES

In ALL cases of emergency, casualties or operational difficulties resulting in possible disruption of the in port schedule or affecting the safety of the ship, the Master and Chief Mate will be notified immediately. When a general emergency is called away (as signaled by sounding the general alarm) all crewmembers that are aboard are expected to respond.

The Mate on Watch is charged with leading and coordinating the initial response. He/she shall either exercise or report to the command authority as the situation dictates. The Mate on watch is charged with taking the initial steps required to contain the emergency until a response team arrives on scene.

The officer exercising command authority is responsible for any and all Special Incident Reporting requirements. This consists of ensuring proper notification of all interested parties, including off-ship assistance and the proper chain of command. The "Special Incident Reporting" binder is kept on the Bridge. All deck officers are to be familiar with the special incident reporting procedures in OPNAVINST 3100.6 (Series).

## HEAVY WEATHER OPERATIONS WHILE IN PORT

Heavy weather is defined as any weather condition that causes undue strain on the ship's mooring lines caused by wind, sea state or current or any combination thereof. In addition to those steps required elsewhere in these orders, in the event of heavy weather while in port, the following actions shall be considered as the situation warrants:

- Terminate ingress and egress on and off the ship.
- Bring engines on-line if it may be necessary to move from pier.
- Raise the accommodation ladder off of pier (if employed).
- Attempt to arrange for port services/operations to clear the side of any watercraft (i.e. CHT barges, etc.) If unable to arrange for removal of barges, consider casting and streaming the barge astern.
- Warm up anchor windless, walk outboard anchor to the water's edge or set anchor on the bottom.
- Call for tug assist.

## POLLUTION

The Mate on Watch shall make absolutely certain that all necessary precautions have been taken to prevent the spillage of oil while bunkering, pumping ballast or bilges from tanks which have contained oil, waste oil or oily products. In the event of an accidental spill:

- (1) Cease whatever fueling or pumping operations immediately.
- (2) Notify the Master, Chief Mate and Chief Engineer as soon as possible.
- (3) Initiate corrective action as quickly as you can with whatever shipboard assets are available.
- (4) Execute the ship's Integrated **VESSEL RESPONSE PLAN (VRP)** and **SHIPBOARD OIL POLLUTION EMERGENCY PLAN (SOPEP)**. (Note: this instruction is to be kept on the bridge and available to all



watch officers.) Watch Officers must become familiar with this instruction. An actual emergency is NOT the time to first read this plan.

- (5) If you are the senior deck officer aboard, do not hesitate in sending the required messages outlined in the plan.
- (6) DO NOT resume any operations until you are directed to by the Master or Chief Mate.
- (7) Compile complete information for a full report and note pertinent details in the log.

#### **DRAFT**

Immediately before leaving and as soon as practicable after entering a port, a licensed officer shall ascertain the draft and position of the load line marks entering the results in the log. The draft will be ascertained twice daily while in port, 0700 and 1700, and results entered into the log. Inform the Master and Chief Engineer immediately if an unexpected change in drafts occurs.

#### **COLLATERAL DUTIES**

Collateral duties assigned to deck officers may be performed while on watch in port, provided they do not interfere with their primary duty of ensuring the safety and security of the ship (including monitoring the performance of unlicensed personnel assigned to the watch.) This includes supervising any day-work projects assigned to members of your watch.



Section 5

**For Future Use**



## Section 6

### LOG BOOKS & RECORDS

#### GENERAL

The single most important thing to remember about logs and recordkeeping is consistency! The moment you write some event down in a log you must now and forevermore remember to continually log the same event. Failure to do so would be grounds for accusations of "falsifying a logbook." Allow me to provide an example:

Years ago, MSC had an "in house" requirement to maintain a VHF Radio Log. This was a holdover from some naval regulation (USS ships maintain such a log). Theoretically, you were supposed to record all conversations held over the VHF radio. Needless to say this was totally impracticable - unlike a naval ship, we don't have that sort of manpower on the bridge. Nevertheless, this was a check-off item on our regular yearly inspections. The usual practice was to procure a green ledger book from Supply - label the thing "VHF Radio Log" - and make a few perfunctory entries prior to any upcoming inspection. The inspectors would come aboard and review their checklist; note the ship did have a VHF Radio Log <<check>> and that would be that. This always seemed to me to be a really good way of getting into trouble...

Today there is no requirement (none that I know of anyway) to maintain a VHF Radio Log. Nevertheless, every now and then I go aboard a ship and, looking around the bridge, discover someone has drawn another green ledger out of Supply; labeled the damn thing "VHF Radio Log;" and parked it up near the forward part of the pilothouse. Now there is nothing illegal about having a VHF Radio Log - provided you log every single conversation or call made with the VHF radio! No picking or choosing; no making a few obligatory entries - you must log everything, or else! Remember: Many government agencies tape record the VHF channels. You could be accused of falsifying a log the first time you make a VHF call and fail to make a log entry. Of course, this is next to impossible. Watch officers are often times much too busy to devote this kind of effort for non-required recordkeeping.

Keep in mind that the importance of keeping correct, complete and accurate logbooks and records cannot be overemphasized. Also important is to ensure log entries are consistent. The Mate on Watch is responsible for maintaining the following logbooks and records on the Bridge:

- Ship's Deck Log (SHIPSLOG)
- Watch Officer's Pass Down Log
- Bearing Record Book (including anchor bearings)
- Compass Record Book
- Electronic Position Log
- Bell Book
- Trash Log (IAW 33CFR151.55)
- Bridge Maintenance Log.

The ship's Deck Log is the single most important document as it is the one legal document that is frequently used in court cases, sometimes decades after the fact. Often, people must testify as to entries contained in the ship's log. Keep in mind that in the event the log will be used in a legal matter, it will be reviewed by total strangers who know nothing about what happened on board. They should be able to get the point just by reading your log entries. Don't make up your own abbreviations. Use proper terminology. Make it a point to be complete in what you put in the log. Entries made in the ship's Deck Log shall be CONCISE, but complete enough to convey intelligently, important facts and data at any future date.

Other records cited above are often used to validate or support entries in the Ship's Log and are frequently used as supporting evidence in investigations.



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**SUPPLEMENTARY LOGS AND RECORDS**

In addition to the logs and records required above, the Mate on Watch shall ensure the following logs are maintained:

- Gangway Log
- Visitor Log
- Vehicle Log
- Visitor badge inventory

The MOW shall ensure these logs are complete and accurate. Each of the logs shall be reviewed at the end of every watch period and pertinent entries included in the Deck Log.

**CHARTS AND PUBLICATIONS**

The Second Officer (W) is responsible for ensuring all charts and publications relating to the navigation of the ship are maintained and corrected to the most recent Notice to Mariners available. The routine duties associated with this may be delegated as required to ensure the charts and publications are up to date, but delegation of these duties does not relieve Second Officer (W) of the responsibility to ensure the correctness or the timeliness of information on the charts.



Section 7**CALLING THE MASTER****GENERAL CONDITIONS**

Call me in any of the following conditions, regardless of whether at sea or inport:

- Whenever you are in DOUBT or you CANNOT COMPLY with any provision of the standing or night orders.
- In ANY event of fire or flooding regardless of how small or immediate the situation.
- In ALL cases of emergency, casualties or operational difficulties resulting in possible disruption of schedule or affecting the safety of the ship.
- For any sounding of the ship's fire alarm panel. Investigate first, call second. This includes false alarms unless it has been determined as a habitual nuisance alarm.
- When there is any significant change in weather conditions.
- When true winds exceed 35 knots from any direction.
- Any injury or sudden illness to a crewmember.
- Anytime oil or oil-based materials are discharged into the sea or observed in the waters surrounding the vessel.
- As noted in the Night Orders.

**AT SEA**

When at sea, I expect to be called in any of the following conditions:

- Unless otherwise directed in my Night Orders - when the CPA of an approaching vessel is going to be less than 3nm crossing or less than 2 miles meeting or overtaking. Call me for a CPA of less than 1 mile for small vessels (fishing & recreational boats) operating at or nearly DIW. Normally, I expect to be called as soon as you have determined that the oncoming vessel's CPA will be less than 3 nm regardless of the range of the vessel at the time.
- Whenever visibility becomes reduced or restricted and any significant changes thereafter (improvement or deterioration).
- In reduced visibility, when a radar contact is first detected and CPA information is developed.
- In the event of malfunction of any piece of bridge or navigation equipment.
- Any engineering casualty reported by the engineers to the bridge.
- Any abnormal difference between magnetic and gyro headings - defined as differences that cannot be explained by variation, deviation or charted magnetic anomalies.
- When sighting any naval vessel (U.S. or otherwise), when over-flown (or about to be over-flown) for surveillance by any military aircraft, or when sighting the periscope of a submarine.
- When sighting any distress signal, hazard to navigation, or floating object possibly requiring further investigation.
- When first detecting landfall by radar, and again when picking it up visually.

**INPORT**

In addition to those circumstances outlined in paragraph 9.1, while the vessel is in port, I expect to be called under the following circumstances:

- When an event has occurred either ashore or aboard that warrants my immediate attention.
- If at anchor, in accordance with Section 3 of these orders.
- In the event of a breach in vessel security, regardless of cause.
- If there is any significant delay in cargo (sponsor equipment) loading/offloading operations, regardless of impact on schedule.



No watch officer will be taken to task for calling me unnecessarily. Keeping the Master informed is a requirement based on law, custom and precedent. Readiness to assume responsibility and initiative are commendable, but the officer should not exceed the limits of his authority in exercising initiative.

Calling me should not be viewed as my lack of faith or trust in you. Rather, it should be viewed as keeping me advised of what is going on both within and surrounding my ship. In keeping me so informed, you actually enhance my trust and faith in you. The proper evaluation of various situations which you will be faced provides me with the foundations on which I can place greater trust in your abilities. Not calling me when you should have called me makes me doubt your judgment and ability to perform your duties.

Keep in mind, when calling me in the middle of the night; I may not be able to immediately absorb a great rush of information until I shake the cobwebs out. Keep it simple and to the point. If you want me on the bridge, say so. When calling for a traffic situation, do not simply read the ARPA information panel for a contact. Tell me, in your own words, what the situation is and what your recommended course of action is. I will ask for any additional information I need to know.



Section 8**SUMMARY****SECRETS**

The watch officers are my eyes and ears, both in port and at sea. You are often the first person to hear something that may directly affect the mission of the ship. Sometimes what appears to you as apparently random or seemingly inconsequential events or information is in fact a piece of information I am waiting for to fill in a bigger picture. Sometimes that event or information is a precursor to other events of greater magnitude that you may not be aware of.

By the same token, the old saying "there are no secrets aboard a ship" is very true. If, during the course of your duties, you commit a serious error - trust me - I will eventually find out about it. It is far better to own up to it and tell me about it ahead of time than to try to sweep it under the rug and have me to find out about it from a third party. I am generally lenient towards the honest mistake in which no one was hurt, there was no physical damage to the ship and a lesson was learned from it. I have little tolerance for mistakes the maker tries to hide from me and no tolerance of one I learn about from a third party. **DON'T KEEP ANY SECRETS - TALK TO ME.**

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**

I expect my watch officers to be constantly alert to what is going on around them, both within the ship and external to the ship. I expect them to be constantly scanning the ship as they stand their watch for safety deficiencies, unusual conditions, Irish pendants, extinguished lights, improper lights, or other out of the ordinary conditions which may exist (by intent or omission). When you see something of that sort, I expect you to do something about it - not leave it for the next person.

To a large degree, it is through you that I maintain my situational awareness. It is through you that I keep up with movements of other ships around us, weather changes, etc. If you are doping off or inattentive to what is going on around us, we all suffer for it.

**DOUBT**

Throughout these Standing Orders, you are encouraged and directed to call the Master any time in doubt. If you are debating with yourself as to whether or not to call, you are then by definition "in doubt". Give a call!

I have already stated that you will not be taken to task for calling me at any time. However, in deciding whether to call me, I urge you to exercise common sense. Consider such things as the immediacy of the information, the significance of the information, when is the next time you expect to see me, time of day or night, etc. There are some things you should report immediately. There are others that can wait for an opportune time. You will learn to differentiate between the two. In the meantime, be conservative in your judgment.

**RESPONSIBILITIES AS A NAVAL UNIT**

Let's review a little U.S. history for a moment:

1) In 1798, the so called Quasi-War occurs between France and the United States. This was primarily a naval war that was eventually resolved diplomatically. The cause of this war was French privateers marauding along the eastern seaboard attacking American shipping.

2) In 1801, the First Barbary War broke out between the United States and the Northwest African Berber Muslim states. The cause of this war was the Barbary corsairs attacking American merchant shipping - capturing merchant ships and enslaving their crews in an attempt to extort ransom for the lives of captured sailors, and ultimately tribute from the United States.



3) In 1812, President James Madison asked for, and was granted, a declaration of war against Great Britain. What became to be known as the War of 1812 was the result of the Royal Navy stopping American commercial shipping at sea and impressing (forcing into British naval service) American seaman.

4) In 1815, an American naval squadron again engaged the Barbary pirates in what became known as the Second Barbary War. The Barbary States took the opportunity of America engaged in the War of 1812 to return to their practice of attacking American merchant vessels in the Mediterranean and holding their crews and officers for ransom.

5) In 1898, the United States declared war against Spain. The reason for this war was primarily to end a brutal Spanish rule in Cuba. However, many historians refer to the explosion and sinking of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor as the trigger which started the conflict.

6) In 1917 the United States entered World War I. The reason President Wilson took this action was because of Germany's practice of unrestricted submarine warfare and the sinking of seven U.S. merchant ships.

7) In 1941 the United States entered World War II after the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.

8) In 1964 Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution serving as President Johnson's legal justification for deploying U.S. conventional forces and the commencement of open warfare against North Vietnam. This resolution was passed after the USS Maddox was attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

Here are eight points of history – eight occurrences of the United States entering into armed conflict on account of attacks on ships flying the Stars and Stripes. Never forget what flag flies on this vessel.

We are a naval unit, operating as a part of the U.S. Navy. Your actions (or inaction's) reflect on you, me, the ship, MSC and ultimately on the navy and the nation. Everything you do and everything you say which can be heard or seen by anybody outside the ship forms the basis of an opinion by that person. While that opinion may seem inconsequential to you, it may be a catalyst for a regional or national crisis. BE COGNIZANT OF YOUR ACTIONS AND THE POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS THEREOF.

To put all this into prospective I will introduce the "Washington Post Factor." In other words, before making a decision you should ask yourself, "How is this going to play out if the Washington Post discovers and decides to run with the story?" Because of what this ship is and what she represents, you - **and I mean YOU (personally...by name)** - are at any moment only a hare's breath away from the lead story in the media. That how important your job is, that's how devastating the consequences can be. There are a lot of people depending on you. Be thorough, stay informed and be ever vigilant.

Thomas J. Giudice  
Master  
USNS Mercy (T-AH 19)



## Navigation Brief Checklist


To be used in conjunction with SMS Arrival or Departure Checklists. The below items are information and discussion elements associated with special sea evolutions and to be incorporated into the Navigation Brief. The checklist and any supporting information will be retained onboard by the 2/O. The navigation brief will be conducted in a timely manner as determined by the Master within 24 hours of the evolution. A navigation brief is appropriate for arrivals, departures, transits within restricted waters, or situations as deemed necessary by the Master. A deck log entry is to be made on completion of the brief.

**Vessel Name** USNS Mercy **T-AH 19**

**Port:** Pearl Harbor, Hawaii **Voyage:** 04-15 **Date:** May 27 2015

**Description of Evolution:** PP15 Departure Pearl Harbor

The following individuals (where assigned duties associated with this event) have participated in applicable elements of this Navigation Brief. Mark "N/A" where not applicable.

Title	Printed Name	Signature
Mission Commander	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Master	Giudice, Thomas	
Chief Mate	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Chief Engineer*	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Cargo Mate / Bow	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Navigator	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Helm Safety Officer	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Watch (After Steering)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Stern Person in Charge	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Watch Officer	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Stand by Mate	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
CO	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
XO	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Ops	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
QM 1	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Chief Information Officer	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Cadet	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Cadet	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Cadet	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Cadet	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

\*As advised by the Master the Chief Engineer may report via email the status of the engineering plant and any equipment limitations in lieu of attending the brief.

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1. ☒ Arrival / Departure Times
6. ☒ **Departure 0730 Hotel 2/3**
2. ☒ Pilot ETA 0720
3. ☒ Pilot Pick-up Location
- ☒ **Hotel pier will confirm 1 hour prior with Pearl Harbor Control Ch. 69**
4. ☒ Updated Pilot Card
- ☒ **On chart table**
5. ☒ Drafts reviewed FWD 28 ft 00 in MID 30 ft 08 in AFT 32 ft 10 in
6. ☒ Minimum Under Keel Clearance 6 ft
7. ☒ Keel clearance in channel 8 ft in channel and at pier or anchorage 7 ft at hotel pier
8. ☒ Anticipated speed of transit
- ☒ **5 knots through the turning basin/harbor, 10 knots through the channel and**
9. ☒ ETA at berth 1030
10. ☒ VHF Channels for Pilot 69 and 13 VTS 69 Port Control 69
- ☒ **The harbor call sign is "PEARL HARBOR CONTROL" and monitors VHF channel 69 24/7. 1 HOURS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL CALL AND GAIN ENTRY PERMISSION AND VERIFY BERTHING AND TUGS. Once communications has been established, they will assign a working channel.**
- ☒ **Communication has already been made- pilot by sea, 3 tugs, working channel 14**
- ☒ **When exiting Pearl Harbor, check out with Pearl Harbor Control at "Papa Hotel."**
11. ☒ Sailing Directions and/or Coast Pilot Port Information reviewed
- ☒ **UP DATED TO 22/15 week**
12. ☒ Charts and courses used for transit
- ☒ **19366 and all course are on the chart and sail plan which is posted on the window.**
13. ☒ Turn/Danger Bearings and ranges
- ☒ **There is a range astern at 153.6 true**
- ☒ **Use Nav aids noted on the course sheet for tuning points.**
- ☒ **Largest course change is rounding hospital point 44 degree turn to the port**
14. ☒ Prominent navigational aids and references for each leg of transit
- ☒ **The following is a description of the range markers:**
  1. Forward Range: FL G 4s 15ft 5m.
  2. Aft Range: Oc R 4s 97ft.
15. ☒ Transit passage plan entered on ECDIS and GPS (equipment limitations discussed) and attached to the Navigational Brief Checklist.
- ☒ **Inputted into the ECDIS and layout onto the chart.**
16. ☒ Verify latest editions and corrections for charts and DNC
- ☒ **22/15 week**
17. ☒ Local Notice to Mariners reviewed
- ☒ **A virtual AIS added to the papa hotel buoy**
- ☒ **HAZARD TO NAVIGATION - MARINE DEBRIS**
- ☒ **The warm and shallow waters surrounding the Main Hawaiian Islands constitute one of the World's most important Humpback Whale habitats. Each winter, November through May, Humpback Whales migrate here to breed, calve, and nurse**

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18. ☒ Identify Navigational Hazards (shoals, reefs, wrecks, air draft obstructions, restricted marine life zones & sanctuaries, etc. chart ambiguities)
  - ✚ Whales
  - ✚ Tripod reef on the port and Ahua reef on the starboard when entering Pearl Harbor
19. ☒ Buoyage System & COLREGS Demarcation Line
  - ✚ A line drawn from Diamond Head Light to Barbers Point Light identifies the Line of Demarcation.
  - ✚ International rules apply seaward and Inland rules apply shoreward. : IALA region "B" is in effect. Red right return
20. ☒ Vessel Traffic System check-in points
  - ✚ When exiting and entering Pearl Harbor, check with Pearl Harbor Control at "Papa Hotel."
  - ✚ Make Security call on Ch 16 VHF reporting inbound or outbound Pearl Harbor any concerned traffic.
21. ☒ Traffic Separation Schemes
  - ✚ Stay in the middle of the channel, use range at the entrance and nav aids.
22. ☒ Speed Restrictions
  - ✚ 8 knots?
23. ☒ Large Course and/or Speed changes during transit
  - ✚ The largest course change is 38 degrees rounding hospital point between Ford Island (on the port) and the naval station (on starboard)
24. ☒ Areas to avoid
  - ✚ Entering pearl harbor-Tripod reef on the stbd and Ahua reef on the port
  - ✚ Iroquois point has shoaling that extends out
25. ☒ High traffic or crossing traffic areas
  - ✚ Naval traffic around Pearl Harbor
  - ✚ Milliknottet departing at 0600
  - ✚ Carl Vincent inbound 0900
26. ☒ Regulated areas (no wake, security, marine reserve, etc.)
  - ✚ Special anchorages are on the east side of the Pearl Harbor Entrance channel, West side of the channel in the lagoon South of Iroquois Point, And in Aiea Bay on the east side of East Loch.
27. ☒ Degaussing Ranges
  - ✚ There is a Navy degaussing station across from Waipi'o Point.
28. ☒ Currents throughout transit
  - ✚ The prevailing currents off Pearl Harbor are westerly, but ocean Currents in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands are variable. A dangerous W'ly set is nearly always present at the entrance to Pearl Harbor up to 0.8 knots
29. ☒ Tides
  - ✚ Low tide will occur at 0605 at 0.0 ft
  - ✚ High tide will occur at 1303 at 1.3 ft
  - ✚ Largest tidal rang is 1.3 foot.
  - ✚ Departing on the flood

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30. ☒ Updated weather report including visibility  
 ✚ Winds ENE 5 to 10, Partly cloudy, occasional showers. SSW swell 2-3 feet
31. ☒ Sunrise/Sunset  
 ✚ 0549 am and sunset will be at 1907 pm. 13 hours and 18 minutes of sunlight
32. ☒ Harbor Chart  
 ✚ The harbor chart for Pearl Harbor is 19366.
33. ☒ Port Authority concerns, restrictions, regulatory provisions  
 ✚ Pearl Harbor is a Defensive Sea Area Established by executive order. Permission must be granted prior to arrival by the Commander.  
 ✚ May have to get underway if a Tsunami alert occurs.
34. ☒ Force Protection Profile (inside the life lines and outside the lifelines)  
 ✚ Alpha WAM
35. ☒ Docking Pilot Pick-up Point  
 ✚ Hotel 2/3
36. ☒ Number of Tugs and Mooring Plan  
 3 tugs  
 PH has four contracted 4,000 horsepower azimuth stern drive reverse tractor tugs.
- 2 ☒ Pier / Anchorage Description  
 ✚ Hotel 3
- 3 ☒ Pier Heading  
 ✚ 067T
- 4 ☒ Equipment limitations affecting transit  
 ✚ Courses will be posted and use the range and nav aids
- 5 ☒ Identified Risks/Control Elements  
 ✚ Turning around within the turning basin. Bow and stern to give distance.
- 6 ☒ Status of Navigation Equipment.  
 ✚ All in working order
- 7 ☒ Status of ground tackle (Cargo Mate)  
 ✚ SAT
- 8 ☒ Status of engineering plant (Chief Engineer)\  
 ✚ SAT
- 9 ☒ Review emergency procedures for Man Overboard, Steering Casualties, Loss of Navigational Equipment, reduced visibility, emergency anchorage locations, collision, grounding, communications failure, propulsion failure, etc.
- 10 ☒ Lessons learned from previous transits  
 This ship is prepared to execute the described evolution.

*[Signature]*  
 Master's signature

/ \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date

/ May 27, 2015 *0630*  
 Time

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## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY ACT PROTECTED

USNS MERCY (T-AH 19)  
FPO AP 96672-4090

UIC: N21636

## CERTIFIED CREW AND PASSENGER LIST AS OF:

05/17/15

IAW MERCY MANNING SCALE NUMBER: P18 of 20 MAY 2011 / COMSC LTR 12500 SER N13 / 000545 of 23 JUN 11

THOMAS J. GIUDICE  
MASTER

## DEPARTMENT HEADS

DECK  
COMMUNICATIONS  
ENGINE  
PURSER  
SUPPLY(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

BILLET #	POSITION	NAME	SSN	LIFEBOAT	EOD	COMMENTS
<b>DECK</b>						
101-01	MASTER	GIUDICE, Thomas J.		Y	11/14/13	
103-01	1/O(D)	(b)(6)		Y	04/19/15	
105-01	2/O(D) - CARGO	(b)(6)		Y	02/01/14	
105-02	2/O(D) - OPS - A	(b)(6)		Y	12/10/14	
106-01	2/O(W)	GAPPED				(b)(6) - 105 / 2/O(D)
E 107-01	3/O(D)	(b)(6)		Y	04/21/14	
108-01	3/O(W)	(b)(6)		Y	12/29/14	
E 108-02	3/O(W)	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/15	
108-03	3/O(W) - A	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/15	
140-01	DECK CADET - A	(b)(6)			05/08/15	F
140-02	DECK CADET - A	(b)(6)			05/08/15	
140-03	DECK CADET - A	(b)(6)			05/08/15	
140-04	DECK CADET - A	(b)(6)			05/08/15	
150-01	BOS'N	GAPPED				(b)(6) - 164 / BM
161-01 (IHP)	AB(W)	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/12	
161-02 (IHP)	AB(W)	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/15	
161-03 (IHP)	AB(W)	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/15	
161-04 (IHP)	AB(W)	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/15	
161-05 (IHP)	AB(W)	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/15	
161-06 (IHP)	AB(W)	(b)(6)		Y	04/15/15	
162-01 (IHP)	AB(M)	(b)(6)		Y	02/26/11	
162-02 (IHP)	AB(M)	(b)(6)		Y	06/02/14	
162-03 (IHP)	AB(M)	(b)(6)		Y	04/18/14	
162-04 (IHP)	AB(M)	(b)(6)		Y	06/04/14	
162-05 (IHP)	AB(M)	(b)(6)		Y	06/05/14	
162-06 (IHP)	AB(M)	(b)(6)		Y	04/18/15	
163-01 (IHP)	OS(W)	(b)(6)		Y	05/11/15	
E 163-02 (IHP)	OS(W)	(b)(6)			04/21/15	
E 163-03 (IHP)	OS(W)	(b)(6)			04/18/15	F
164-01	BM - A	(b)(6)		Y	11/15/13	
E 164-02 (IHP)	BM	(b)(6)		Y	11/14/13	
164-03 (IHP)	BM	(b)(6)		Y	04/27/15	
<b>COMMUNICATIONS</b>						
E 210-01	RETC(W)	(b)(6)			04/28/12	



## ENGINE

	301-01	CHENG	(b)(6)	Y	05/02/14	
	303-01	1A/E(D)	GAPPED			(b)(6) 303 / 2A/E(D)
E	305-01	2A/E(D) - A	(b)(6)	Y	02/10/14	
	305-02	2A/E(D)	(b)(6)	Y	04/28/14	
	305-03	2A/E(D) - A	(b)(6)	Y	06/10/14	(b)(6) 305 / 2A/E(D)
	306-01	2A/E(W)	GAPPED			
	307-01	3A/E(D) - A	(b)(6)	Y	04/23/15	
	308-01	3A/E(W)	(b)(6)	Y	12/16/14	
	308-02	3A/E(W)	(b)(6)	Y	04/09/15	
E	308-03	3A/E(W)	(b)(6)	Y	02/10/14	
	308-04	3A/E(W)	VACANT - (b)(6) (05/09/15)			
	308-05	3A/E(W)	(b)(6)	Y	03/16/15	
E	308-06	3A/E(W) - A	(b)(6)	Y	03/29/15	
	310-01	ENGINE CADET	(b)(6)		04/25/15	
	310-02	ENGINE CADET	(b)(6)		04/25/15	
E	310-03	ENGINE CADET	(b)(6)		04/27/15	
	310-04	ENGINE CADET	(b)(6)		04/25/15	
E	310-05	ENGINE CADET	(b)(6)		04/27/15	
	310-06	ENGINE CADET	(b)(6)		05/08/15	
	321-01	CH ELEC	(b)(6)		04/07/08	
	323-01	REEFER	(b)(6)		10/11/13	
	323-02 (IHP)	REEFER	(b)(6)		12/23/14	
	323-03	REEFER	(b)(6)		04/22/15	
	328-01	DMACH	(b)(6)		07/11/04	
	328-02	DMACH	(b)(6)		11/14/13	
	328-03	DMACH	VACANT - (b)(6) (05/08/15)			
	328-04	DMACH	GAPPED			(b)(6) 335 / ET
	335-01	ET	(b)(6)		01/03/12	
E	335-02	ET - A	(b)(6)		04/12/15	
E	335-03	ET - A	(b)(6)	Y	04/12/15	
	351-01 (IHP)	2ND ELEC	(b)(6)		05/18/14	
E	351-02 (IHP)	2ND ELEC	(b)(6)		05/13/15	
	357-01 (IHP)	EU(D)	(b)(6)		09/21/11	
	357-02 (IHP)	EU(D)	(b)(6)		11/03/13	
	357-03 (IHP)	EU(D)	(b)(6)		04/15/15	
	357-04 (IHP)	EU(D)	(b)(6)		10/24/13	
	357-05 (IHP)	EU(D)	(b)(6)		04/17/15	
E	363-01 (IHP)	WIPER	(b)(6)		04/15/15	(b)(6) 5/26
	363-02 (IHP)	WIPER	GAPPED			
E	363-03 (IHP)	WIPER	(b)(6)		04/28/15	
	365-01 (IHP)	EU(W)	(b)(6)		04/15/15	
	365-02 (IHP)	EU(W)	(b)(6)		04/15/15	
	365-03 (IHP)	EU(W)	(b)(6)		04/28/15	
	365-04 (IHP)	EU(W)	VACANT - (b)(6) (05/07/15)			
	365-05 (IHP)	EU(W)	(b)(6)		04/28/15	
	365-06 (IHP)	EU(W)	VACANT - (b)(6) (05/11/15)			

## PURSER

701-01	PURSER	(b)(6)	04/12/15
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## SUPPLY

	802-01	JSO	(b)(6)		11/24/14	
	820-01	STWD CK	(b)(6)		11/14/13	
	823-01	YNSK	GAPPED			(b)(6) 352 / ASK
	840-01 (IHP)	2ND CK - A	(b)(6)		04/09/15	
	840-02 (IHP)	2ND CK	(b)(6)		12/15/14	
	842-01 (IHP)	COOK-BAKER	(b)(6)		04/10/15	
	845-01 (IHP)	ASST CK	(b)(6)		12/22/14	
E	848-01 (IHP)	SU	(b)(6)		04/09/15	
E	848-02 (IHP)	SU	(b)(6)		04/15/15	
E	848-03 (IHP)	SU	(b)(6)		04/15/15	
E	848-04 (IHP)	SU	(b)(6)		04/22/15	
	852-01 (IHP)	ASK - A	(b)(6)		04/18/15	



Pos Cd	Person Full Name	Latest Hire Date	Start Date	End Date	Days	Position Segmented Name
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	14-Nov-2013	PRESENT	561	101.Master.T-AH.MERCY
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	23-Sep-2011	03-Jan-2012	102	101.Master.T-AKE.RICHARD BYRD
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	02-Jun-2011	06-Sep-2011	96	101.Master.T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	02-May-2011	31-May-2011	29	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-AKE.AMELIA EARHART
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	08-Mar-2011	01-May-2011	54	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-ARS.SAFEGUARD
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	28-Jan-2011	07-Mar-2011	38	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-AS.FRANK CABLE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	04-Oct-2009	03-Nov-2010	395	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-AS.FRANK CABLE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	16-Oct-2008	27-Aug-2009	315	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	07-May-2008	15-Oct-2008	161	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-AFS-1.NIAGARA FALLS
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	12-Apr-2006	06-May-2008	755	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	02-Aug-2005	20-Feb-2006	202	105.2ND OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	16-Feb-2005	21-Jun-2005	125	105.2ND OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	04-Jan-2005	15-Feb-2005	42	105.2ND OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	16-Oct-2004	03-Jan-2005	79	103.1ST OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	04-Sep-2004	11-Sep-2004	7	105.2ND OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	24-Apr-2004	31-Jul-2004	98	105.2ND OFFICER (D).T-AOE.BRIDGE
101	Giudice, Thomas J	08-May-2000	25-Jan-2004	08-Mar-2004	43	105.2ND OFFICER (D).T-AO.GUADALUPE
103	(b)(6)					
103	(b)(6)					
103	(b)(6)					
103	(b)(6)					
103	(b)(6)					
103	(b)(6)					
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Enclosure (17)







108	(b)(6)	
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Enclosure (10)



**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY**  
**MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND (N1),**

DECLARATION OF Thomas J Giudice  
(Name)

USNS Mercy was U/W at 0730 on 27 May from H2 Pearl Harbor with Tiger 4 FWD on the Dutch Bollard and Tiger 5 with a line through the Stern Chock.

Skies were clear and winds were light and variable.

Pilot exchange was conducted and Pilot explained that we would pivot to the ship to STBD with the stern pointing toward the causeway. I had worked with this Pilot for many years as far back when (b)(6) would Pilot the USS Midway in and out of Yokosuka in 1985. With (b)(6) capability, TWO 4000 HP Tugs and the good weather, I felt confident (b)(6) could execute this plan with minimal risk.

We cleared the berth with tugs and a backing bell and ship commenced a swing to STBD with Right Rudder. A slow ahead bell was also ordered to check sternway for departure line-up.

I had the Chief Mate manning the Deck hand held radio. As the swing commenced I had (b)(6) concentrate on the Stern Mate for swing clearance, distances, opening and closing. I was focusing on relaying Helm and Engine Orders from the STBD Bridge Wing while listening to Tug Commands and Tug reports with the Pilot. A standard practice of mine.

The reports from the Stern and Tug at first indicated comfortable distances and a clear swing of any obstructions. After a few reports the stern communication became erratic and verbose and I told the Chief Mate to belay with the adjectives and get me usable distances and swing clearance reports.

From listening to the Pilot, Tiger 5 and Tiger 4 were pulling at 90 degrees. Ship's stern passed USS Missouri and we started to close the Arizona Memorial. A Slow Ahead was ordered and I observed that 20 RPMS's was indicated on the console.

I couldn't make out the communications between the Stern Mate and Chief Mate and focused on the Pilot and the reports from Tiger 5. Both Pilot and I ascertained we were still closing and ordered Half Ahead, I checked and confirmed that 40 RPMS was indicated on the consol.

The next call that I overheard from the Stern Mate on the Chief Mate's hand held radio was 25 feet and from Tiger 5 indicating we were not clear and going to hit.

I ordered Full Ahead and assumed the conn and almost immediately received an opening report. I am not sure if that opening report was the Stern Mate or Tug 5 at that point.



I retained the CONN and released the Pilot after Hospital Point. Not until then did the Pilot inform me that Tiger 5 said we rubbed the Platform. However, I was aware from radio chatter and bridge conversation that we did some damage with the Prop Wash.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that I have read the foregoing statement and that the information contained therein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated at SEA, this 28 day of May, 2012<sup>5</sup>  
(City) (State) (Month)

Signature [Signature] Position MASTER

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19,  
Address: FPO AP 96672-4090



09 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of Thomas J. Giudice

I, Thomas J. Giudice, declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am the Master of USNS MERCY (T-AH 19). I fell asleep about 2000 on the evening of 26 May 2015. On 27 May 2015, I woke up at approximately 0500, checked email, then checked on the pre-departure evolutions and checklists around 0530. The Mate on Watch talked to Pearl Harbor Control and confirmed our 0730 underway time and that we had two tugs. I was happy to learn that (b)(6) was the Pilot. I've known (b)(6) and observed (b)(6) as a Pilot for 30 years. (b)(6) has years of experience with large ships and I know (b)(6) as the "Carrier Pilot." On that morning, winds were light and current was negligible. The COMPACFLT Change of Command scheduled for that day causing our underway time to change from 0900 to 0730. I knew about the change days ahead of time. I didn't like the change, but, with the exception of not getting to eat breakfast, I didn't feel rushed. I had the best pilot and it was a beautiful day. The navigation brief occurred at 0630 and all personnel were alert and ready to get underway.

The Pilot came aboard and we had a good conversation. We discussed the departure plan to include placement and movement of tugs. At no time did I feel rushed during the underway preps. Tiger 4 would start on the starboard bow (Dutch bollard) and Tiger 5 would be made fast astern through the centerline chock. I always ask for 3 tugs as a standard LOGREQ requirement and Pearl Harbor Control only gives me two. Since RIMPAC this has been their stance due to the fact that the tugs are 4000 HP. On my first visit during RIMPAC we came to a compromise over VHF Radio that I will accept 2 tugs as long as the winds are below 20 Kts. This compromise has worked on 5 previous Arrival and Departure evolutions.

The Pilot said (b)(6) would "take us out, clear the pier, and pivot in place" with the stern ending up pointing at the causeway. The Pilot and I were positioned on the Bridge Wing as the tugs pulled us off the pier and a Slow Astern bell was ordered to clear the Hotel pier. The Pilot called for a right rudder, engine was All Stop and tugs were pulling us to start the pivot. I don't recall exactly when it happened, but the Pilot ordered Tiger 4 to shift the port side but I do remember (b)(6) giving an order to Tiger 4 to start pushing ahead. The Pilot ordered Slow Ahead and when we appeared to have checked our sternway, (b)(6) ordered All Stop. As we started to pivot, my focus was on the stern tug to ascertain our swing in relation to the New Jersey and Arizona memorial. The rudder was still over to starboard and the Pilot ordered a slow ahead bell which I was happy to hear and I'm hearing distances closing. As is my habit I check the RPM indicator to confirm the bell was answered. Although I checked GPS speed indication, I know that the GPS does not distinguish between forward, stern and lateral movement. Things appeared to be in order and I did not think we were in any danger. I was operating under the belief that the Pilot had both tugs positioned at a 90 degree angle.

I'm hearing distances closing a little more rapidly than I felt should have been during a twist with the Ahead Bell. The Pilot ordered a Half Ahead bell, which I concurred with and felt this was the proper call. I distinctly remember thinking that a Half Bell seemed a bit extreme for the inner harbor and I would need to be prepared to take it off before we developed significant headway. After confirming that we reached RPM, I felt this was adequate to move us away from the memorial. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Mate on the stern was positioned to give distances and was having some difficulties providing the distance and clearance information. I told the Chief Mate to get the Stern Mate to "dispense with the adjectives and give me the distances and let me know if looks like my stern is going to clear." I also told the Chief Mate to simply "fix it". I don't recall any reports from the pilot regarding lack of prop wash and although distances were still closing all indications and reports had us clearing. Then I heard my stern watch say "we're gonna hit" and almost simultaneously overheard the Tug indicate the same. I took the conn ordered Full Ahead. I remember worrying about the prop wash and was concerned about proceeding at full speed in the inner harbor. It seemed almost instantaneously we gained some separation from the memorial and I ordered a slow bell. I kept the conn for the remainder of the departure as I felt it was my responsibility to keep 100%

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control of the ship. I let the Pilot remain onboard until we passed Hospital Point, when I let Pilot debark. (b)(6) was on the phone with the tug just before (b)(6) left and that's when I learned as (b)(6) put it, that we did "rub" the landing dock on the Memorial.

I do not shy away from my responsibility to lead and train my officers. Everyone brings something different to the table and many times you have to make due. When I was a Chief Mate, I drove the ship during all maneuvering details to gain experience. I offered my Chief Mate every opportunity to drive out of Portland, San Diego and arrival Pearl Harbor but (b)(6) declined saying (b)(6) was not ready. Driving a ship is not something I want to force someone to do. It is the type of job that you have to want to do. On the morning of the 27 May I told (b)(6) wanted (b)(6) to drive the ship into and out of Pearl Harbor, but (b)(6) reaction was very telling and I didn't feel comfortable with a reluctant driver. In retrospect, had (b)(6) been driving, I feel I would have had better situational awareness.

I expect an officer, a Third Mate, to be able to tell me distances when standing a stern watch. I even tell them to super impose a football field, to assist with determining the distance. The Third Mate came to me afterwards to apologize and let me know (b)(6) thought (b)(6) had let me down. My normal stern watch, (b)(6), was being trained on the anchor. 3/O (b)(6) volunteered to stand the stern watch and that's a quality I like to see so I assigned (b)(6) to stern.

I know I have the tools and the capability to lead and train these mariners. The Navigator is my one of them. (b)(6) is learning very rapidly to become a good navigator. However, on this movement, (b)(6) never reported to me on the position of the ship as (b)(6) was charting with respect to distances to obstructions, etc. Everything throughout the evolution was routine until the distance to the memorial started decreasing rapidly and the ahead half was ordered. I did not get reports on whether we were standing into danger.

I think the watch teams in general had a tendency for complacency when a Pilot was embarked and we have tugs tied up, and that's something we need to work on.

Once clearing the harbor, I decided to continue on because of vessel traffic and because MILLINOCKET was waiting for me for a photo exercise (PHOTOEX). About an hour and a half after the incident, I called the U.S. Coast Guard, (b)(6), to make the initial report that we "rubbed" the memorial. The USCG acknowledged and didn't ask me to remain in vicinity. I didn't learn of the extent of the damage to the memorial until a day later. My assessment of the ship was that it was still safe to operate, so I continued on mission.

Given the information I had from Pilot, Stern Tug, Mates and my own observation, I did what I felt was necessary. In hindsight, if I had more information on the bridge wing, say an ECDIS monitor or lateral and astern motion indicators, it is quite possible I would have known I needed to take action sooner.

There were no delays answering bells from the propulsion plant or distractions contributing to this event.

There were no distractions on the Bridge other than perhaps "Pilot complacency syndrome," which refers to a tendency of the watch team to stand easy when the Pilot is embarked and tugs are assisting ship movements.

Based on what I now know and in particular having seen some of the photos and videos that were taken, I believe I was fighting the tugs for headway. And not until I had a full bell, was I able to counter and exceed their forces. I could not see what Tiger 4 was doing and it clearly appears to me that Tiger 5 was pulling us back at a 45 degree angle (abaft of beam) contributing to sternway. That tug should have at least been at a 90 degree angle, and forward of the beam especially as we got closer to the memorial.

  
Signature



SIGNATURE OF BEARER

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-1-ASK-NMC

Reference Number  
2533794

Expiration Date  
03-MAR-2020

Enclosure (11)



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

**THOMAS JOHN GIUDICE**

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

**IV/1; II/2; II/3; IV/4; IV/5; IV/2; V/1-1; VI/1; VI/2; VI/3; VI/4; VI/6**

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 03-MAR-2020.

Ref Num 2533794

Serial Num 000289387

**CAPACITY**

**LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)**

Master.

Not valid after December 31, 2016. Not valid for service on ECDIS equipped vessels after December 31, 2016.

Officer in charge of a navigational watch (OICNW).

Not valid after December 31, 2016. Not valid for service on ECDIS equipped vessels after December 31, 2016.

Able Seafarer - Deck.

Rating forming part of a navigational watch (RFPNW).

Proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats other than fast rescue boats (PSC).

Proficiency in

Ref Num 2533794

Serial Num 000289387

Enclosure (11)



## CAPACITY

## LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

fast rescue boats.  
Advanced Oil  
Tanker Cargo  
Operation.  
Advanced Chemical  
Tanker Cargo  
Operation.  
Medical First-Aid  
Provider.  
Advanced  
Firefighting.  
Basic Training.  
GMDSS Operator.  
Vessel Personnel  
With Designated  
Security Duties.  
Security  
Awareness.

Ref Num 2533794

Serial Num 000289387

The lawful holder of this credential,

**THOMAS JOHN GIUDICE**

as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

## CAPACITY

## LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Master

Of Self-Propelled Vessels Not Including Auxillary  
Sail Of Unlimited Tonnage Upon Oceans.

Master

Of Towing Vessels Upon Oceans. Restricted to Astern  
Towing Only.

Radar Observer  
(Unlimited)

Able Seaman-

Unlimited

Lifeboatman

Tankerman-PIC

Wiper

Limited to Dangerous Liquid (DL) Cargoes

Ref Num 2533794

Serial Num 000289387

Enclosure (11)




**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. § 802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: THOMAS J. GIUDICE

Signature:  Date 9 JUNE 2015



**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,**

DECLARATION OF (b)(6)

I was on the bridge for the ships departure from H-2 berth at Naval Base Pearl Harbor. Ship's master and pilot were on the port bridge wing, tugs Tiger 4 and Tiger 5 were made up on the bow and stern. All lines were cast off as the ship backed out of its berth with the assistance of tugs. The master and pilot then shifted over to the starboard bridge wing once the ship cleared the berth. The pilot then commenced swinging the ship to starboard with the assistance of tugs to center the ship in the basin. I radioed the bow and stern OIC's that the ship was starting its pivot in the basin and to call in distance reports to the bridge. The bow cleared Kilo berth and an ahead bell was ordered by the pilot. The stern called in clear of the USS MISSOURI and then reported closing distances to the USS ARIZONA Memorial, a half ahead was then order by the pilot.

The stern OIC and aft tug called in closing distances to the USS ARIZONA Memorial boat landing, the ship's master then ordered a full ahead. Stern OIC radioed damage to the landing dock and fenders. Once the ship was opening and clear, I could see the memorial, churned up water from the propeller wash and boat landing platform bouncing around rapidly. The ship continued outbound Pearl Harbor of sea.

(b)(6)  
Chief Mate

Dated 28 day of MAY, 2015

Signature (b)(6) Position Ch. Mate

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090



09 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6), declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am the Chief Mate onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH) 19. I have been with MSC since 2004. I reported aboard MERCY in April 2015. I have also served onboard the following ship classes or vessels: T-AKE, T-AFS, T-AE, T-AO, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and USNS COMFORT. I was on the COMFORT, MERCY's sister ship, in 2007 for CP 2007 and also served as the on-call Chief Mate for 10-15 day trips from Boston shipyard to Baltimore.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, I was awake at 0400 because I had to coordinate last-minute departure preps, take in storm lines, off load trash, and secure for sea. I attended the Navigation Brief, then we broke to prep for underway. This was an early departure time for us. I knew the COMPACFLT Change of Command ceremony was happening that day and I know our underway was moved from 0900 to 0730 to accommodate that. I don't know if any other harbor movements were scheduled for 27 May. While in Hawaii, there was a continuous rush of mission cargo and personnel on load.

I was on the port bridge wing when the Captain-Pilot exchange occurred in the Pilot House. Weather was nice. Light airs, good visibility. Captain Giudice typically draws the harbor chart pilotage on a sheet of paper with courses, hazards, pilotage notes, and navigation aids. I was occupied with the disconnecting the stair tower (brow). We were only provided two tugs, Tiger 4 was on the starboard side connected via Dutch bollard. Tiger 5 was made fast astern through the centerline chock. We began to single up lines. Then the Captain gave me the order to "let go all lines." The pilot had the tugs pull us off the pier and an astern bell was ordered, but I don't recall in which order that occurred.

This was my first time departing from Pearl Harbor. From experiences, assignments for restricted maneuvering situations vary based on the Captain's preference. The Captain and Chief Mate alternate conning the ship in restricted maneuvering scenarios. Because I was relatively new onboard, the Captain kept the conn for this departure.

Once clear H-2 berth, we shifted to the stbd bridge wing, the pilot started the starboard twist in the basin, everything seemed normal. The Pilot gave a slow ahead bell to check sternway. I gave direction to the bow and stern watches to report distances to the Bridge. I had no visual on the tugs because of my position on the Bridge. I don't recall whether the bow or stern watches reported when the tugs had repositioned. As we continued to twist, the bow reported clear of Kilo pier, the stern watch reported we had cleared the MISSOURI and were closing on the ARIZONA. I don't recall the distances the stern was reported. At that time, the Pilot ordered a half ahead bell, which still seemed normal for this maneuver.

I sensed trouble when we had the half ahead bell and we were still closing astern. I don't recall what distance the stern watch reported at this point. I called the stern and directed for reports to be made "distances, opening or closing." The Captain keeps his radio turned down, I was adjacent of him and the Pilot so they could hear my and the reports from the stern watch on my radio.

I couldn't really hear the reports from the tugs to the Pilot, but distances from the tug and stern watch were consistent even though tug was reporting in feet and stern watch was reporting in yards. I don't recall any conversation regarding the ship's prop wash, nor was I in view of the RPM indicator. I don't recall reports from the Navigator as I was focused on my duties. I don't recall the rudder position at this point. I kept listening and making reports expecting to hear opening. With rudder hard to starboard and a kick of the engines, you'd kick the stern over. The half ahead bell was on for at least a minute, the Captain ordered full ahead because we were still closing. After the first opening report, the stern continued reporting opening distances. I looked over the starboard side and could see churned up murky water as we made headway. We kept the full ahead bell on for a while.

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Enclosure (12)



is a seafarers' identity document.  
Seafarers' Identity Document  
of the International Labour

(b)(6)

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-1-ASK-NMC

Reference Number  
2645430

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)

(b)(6)

Expiration Date  
13-APR-2017

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

M170413

Enclosure (12)



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

(b)(6)

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

**II/1; II/2; II/3; II/4; II/5; IV/2; V/1-1; VI/1; VI/2; VI/3; VI/4; VI/5; VI/6**

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 13-APR-2017.

Ref Num 2645430

Serial Num 000264574

4

**CAPACITY**

**LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)**

Master.

Not valid after December 31, 2016. Not valid for service on ECDIS equipped vessels after December 31, 2016.

Officer in charge of a navigational watch (OICNW).

Not valid after December 31, 2016. Not valid for service on ECDIS equipped vessels after December 31, 2016.

Able Seafarer - Deck.

Rating forming part of a navigational watch (RFPNW).

Proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats other than fast rescue boats (PSC).

Proficiency in

Ref Num 2645430

Serial Num 000264574

5

Enclosure (12)



CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
fast rescue boats. Advanced Oil Tanker Cargo Operation. Advanced Chemical Tanker Cargo Operation. Medical First-Aid Provider. Advanced Firefighting. Basic Training. GMDSS Operator. Vessel Security Officer. Vessel Personnel With Designated Security Duties.	
Ref Num 2645430	Serial Num 000264574

CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Security Awareness.	
Ref Num 2645430	Serial Num 000264574



The lawful holder of this certificate  
(b)(6)  
as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Master	Of Self-Propelled Vessels Not Including Auxiliary Sail Of Unlimited Tonnage Upon Oceans.
Radar Observer (Unlimited) Able Seaman- Unlimited Lifeboatman Tankerman-PIC Wiper Steward's Department (F.H.)	Limited to Dangerous Liquid (DL) Cargoes

Ref Num 2645430      Serial Num 000264574

8

(b)(6)  
(b)(6) CAPT, USCG

Ref Num 2645430      Serial Num 000264574

9

Enclosure (12)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. § 802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Date 9 JUNE 2015



**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,**

DECLARATION OF (b)(6)

On the morning of May 27<sup>th</sup> 2015 I was part of the bridge team as the Navigator.

During part of the Master/ Pilot information exchange I was present showing the Harbor chart to both Captain Giudice and the pilot Captain (b)(6). The only concern that Captain (b)(6) showed was when (b)(6) would depart the Mercy to be able to beat the traffic on the island. Both Captain Giudice and Captain (b)(6) agreed on Hospital point would be the location that the Captain (b)(6) would depart.

After last line, I was getting visual fixes every 3 minutes with the help of the two Deck Cadets. I was working on getting the 0745 fix on the port bridge wing when the stern PIC, 3/m (b)(6) was giving closing distances to the Memorial. I noticed that the AFT tug was pulling more astern than at a 90 degree.

As the reports were coming in I stayed on the bridge wing as the tug was pulling hard. When the Stern reported 15 yards I heard on the Bridge wing amplifier a full ahead bell from Captain Giudice and Bridge acknowledged the order. Then distances were still closing when the Stern reported that we were going to hit.

After the report of opening from the stern I came back inside the bridge and talked to the Helm safety and Cadets. I continued to get 3 minute fixes until I was tasked with getting the weather. Both Deck Cadets assisted with getting the weather report.

Dated 28 day of May, 2015

Signature (b)(6) Position 2/0

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090



08 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6) declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I have reviewed my earlier statement and I have no corrections or additions to make. My earlier statement is consistent with my current recollection of events.

I am a Second Officer (2/O), position of Nav Ops, onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH) 19. I have been a civil service mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) for four and a half years. I reported aboard MERCY in March 2014 but (b)(5) I graduated from Maine Maritime Academy. *besides being on leave, I have been assigned to the mercy since.*

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. After waking up, I checked with 3/O (b)(6) to see how the pre-departure checklist was going. Then I went below to answer a few emails before returning to the Bridge. I conducted the Navigation Brief that was held at 0630. I was present for about half of the Master-Pilot exchange. Captain Giudice and the Pilot talked for a few minutes, then the Pilot wanted to see the chart. "The Pilot wanted to know when (b)(6) could get off the ship so (b)(6) could beat the traffic for the change of command ceremony that was happening that day." I interpreted this comment to mean that (b)(6) was concerned with getting off base prior to the COMPACFLT Change of Command, not in reference to vessel traffic in the harbor. It was agreed that the Pilot would disembark in vicinity of Hospital Point, which is earlier than where Pilots typically disembark when departing Pearl Harbor.

Prior to departure from San Diego, the originally planned underway time from Pearl Harbor was moved from 0900 to 0700 due to the Change of Command ceremony scheduled that day. The 0700 underway time was unusual for the crew because it's outside of normal working hours, requires overtime pay, and causes people to miss breakfast.

"We always request three tugs in our LOGREQs." Departing Pearl Harbor, we were told there were two tugs available with one on standby. Port Ops did not mention any vessel movements that might conflict with our outbound transit.

We try to get three visual bearings to get a fix. I report every three minutes that we are on track or left/right of track by how many yards, and recommend new course if appropriate, and distance and time to next turn. Fix reports to the Captain are about a minute time-late due to the time it takes to take and plot the visual bearings.

Until the stern reported that we were at 15 yds and still closing the Arizona Memorial, I did not perceive that things weren't going well. At around 0744, I was on the port bridge wing getting ready to take the 0745 lines of bearing when the stern watch reported that the memorial was 15 yards and closing. The Chief Mate and Captain were on the starboard bridge at this time. I went to the port bridge wing to take the lines of bearing so I wouldn't interrupt the communications between the Captain and Pilot on the port side. Because I was on the port bridge, I could see tug Tiger 5 and I noticed it was pulling more on the port quarter than at a 90 degree angle. I was seeing more of Tiger 5's bow than its beam, which led me to believe it was pulling more on the quarter.

I recall the winds as light that morning.

The Captain releases all message traffic. I believe the LOGREQ for the Pearl Harbor visit was sent in January, by (b)(6) Mate on Watch typically confirms the tug availability the morning of departure.



I usually reference Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) for position, but don't include ECDIS information in my verbal reports. I don't typically include the distance to the nearest hazard to navigation. I did not adjust any ship parameters in ECDIS prior to departure.

I did not notice at any point that we were sliding astern.

I did not hear any conversations between the Captain and the Pilot in the moments just before and after the allision.

End of Statement

(b)(6)

Signature

6-8-2015

Date

(b)(6)

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement



(b)(6)

**MERCHANT MARINER CREDENTIAL**

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-1-ASK-NMC

Document Number  
USA000292775

Type  
PGCountry Code  
USA

Reference Number  
2753362

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Citizenship  
USA

Say

Issue Date  
25-MAR-2015

Expiration Date  
25-MAR-2020

PGUSA

(b)(6)

0002927758USA

(b)(6)

2003256<<<<<<<<<<<<<0

Basic Oil And  
Chemical Tanker  
Cargo Operation.  
Medical First-Aid  
Provider.  
Advanced  
Firefighting.  
Basic Training.  
Vessel Security  
Officer.  
Vessel Personnel  
With Designated  
Security Duties.  
Security  
Awareness.

LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Ref Num 2763362

Serial Num 000292775

<sup>40</sup>“be useful holder of this evidence”

(b)(6)

as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

CAPACITY

LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Master

Of Self-Propelled Vessels Not Including Auxiliary  
Sail Of Less Than 1,600 Gross Register Tons (GRT)  
Upon Oceans.  
Of Self-Propelled Vessels Not Including Auxiliary  
Sail Of Unlimited Tonnage Upon Oceans.

### Second Mate

Radar Observer  
(Unlimited)  
Able Seaman-  
Unlimited  
Lifeboatman  
Tankerman

Limited to Dangerous Liquid (DL) Cargoes

Ref Num 2763362

Serial Num 000292775

En/lose/13)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name

Signature

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Date June 8 2015

Enclosure (137)



**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,**

DECLARATION OF (b)(6)

On 27 May 2015 the USNS Mercy departed Hotel 2 pier in Pearl Harbor, HI. The Navigator, 2/O (b)(6) conducted a Pre-Departure Navigation Brief at 0630 in the pilot house. At the brief 3/O (b)(6) offered to be the stern PIC for departure. 3/O (b)(6) had taken the stern for the past three arrivals/departures but due to the earlier departure time (b)(6) was going to be on watch. This was the first time 3/O (b)(6) had been the stern PIC on the Mercy. I was assigned to the brow and sideports and at approximately 0720 we let go the gangway and shortly after we began to move away from the pier. After securing the side port door I went to the bow to relieve 3/O (b)(6) for breakfast. At about 0740 I was on the bow turning over with 3/O (b)(6). I recall having to speak up because the tug boat pushing on the bow was very loud. I heard the UHF radio conversation from the stern stern report that the vessel was swinging clear and continued to include an additional description. Chief Mate (b)(6) called to the stern to only report distances, "no extra adjectives, just distances". From the bow we could hear the IJV amplifier from the bridge wings call for an ahead bell. The stern began calling distances to the Arizona Memorial; "30 yards" which the Chief Mate responded "Bridge copy". Stern continued to report "20 yards, closing" to which the Chief Mate continued to Roger-up for the Bridge. I heard "Half ahead" from the IJV bridge wing circuit. The stern gave additional reports with closing yardage and each time the Chief Mate acknowledged for the Bridge. At 5 yards 3/O (b)(6) turned to me and said "I bet there will be a full bell coming soon." At that point I heard Captain Giudice call for full ahead and I noticed the tug engines become very quiet like they had finally stopped pushing. I recall looking toward the tug and seeing stack smoke coming from approximately one point port of the bull nose. That was when 3/O (b)(6) called over the radio that we were going to hit. A short moment later (b)(6) reported we hit and after a moment of shock I began running to the stern, leaving 3/O (b)(6) on the bow. When I got to the stern I saw the wash from the vessel pushing the boat landing around and the gray rubber fender from the edge of the float partially knocked off. I began taking pictures and received reports from those on scene that there was no apparent damage to the ship. I returned to the bridge and waited to escort the pilot to the starboard side port.

I assisted the pilot in disembarking just after Hospital Point.

Dated 28<sup>th</sup> day of MAY, 2015

Signature

(b)(6)

Position 2<sup>ND</sup> OFFICER (D)

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090

Enclosure (14)



08 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6) declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am a Second Officer (2/O) onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH) 19. I have been a civil service mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) since July 2005. I have been assigned to USNS MERCY since December 2013. I have additional MSC experience as a Cargo Mate aboard USS FRANK CABLE, USNS BRIDGE, and USNS ARCTIC. I am a 2005 graduate of California Maritime Academy.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. For the departure I was as the side port to secure the brow. I then went to the starboard side to ensure everything was ready for the Pilot embark. I went to my room to get something to drink, then went to the bow to turnover with (b)(6). When I got to the bow, I heard the Chief Mate (C/M) order the stern watch to call distances. Then I heard the distances being called by the stern watch. (b)(6) said "I bet we hear a full bell come next" and soon after the full bell was ordered. Right after the bell was ordered, the tug Tiger 4 go quiet - that's what drew my attention to it. I looked over the bow and saw Tiger 4 was positioned at about a 45 degree angle and engine was decelerated.

After we hit, I ran to the stern and took pictures of the damage. Afterwards, I went to the side port and assisted the Pilot in debarking. (b)(6) did not say anything to me while debarking.

We always request three tugs when arriving or departing. We went in and out four times during RIMPAC, but Pearl Harbor Port Ops only provided two tugs each evolution. "You get the feeling Port Ops knows better than the ships."

I provided a video to MSC that was taken by SU (b)(6) the day of the incident.

End of Statement

(b)(6)

6/8/2015  
Date

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE



is a seafarers' identity document  
Seafarers' Identity Document  
of the International Lab

(b)(6)

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-ASK-NMC

Reference Number  
2592096

(b)(6)

**Field Notes**

(b)(6)

**Present Address**

(b)(6)

Citizenship	Height	Hair Color	DOB
USA			(b)(6)

Sex	Weight	Eye Color	Place of Birth
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18-FEB-2015

Expiration Date  
18-FEB-2020

**PGUSA**

(b)(6)

0002873626USA

(b)(6)

M2002189<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<6

Enclosure (14)



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

(b)(6)

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

II/1; IV/4; II/5; IV/2; VI/1; VI/2; VI/3; VI/4

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 18-FEB-2020.

Ref Num 2592096

Serial Num 000287362

4

**CAPACITY**

**LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)**

Officer in charge of a navigational watch (OICNW).  
Able Seafarer - Deck.  
Rating forming part of a navigational watch (RFPNW).  
Proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats other than fast rescue boats (PSC).  
Proficiency in fast rescue boats.  
Medical First-Aid Provider.

Not valid after December 31, 2016. Not valid for service on ECDIS equipped vessels after December 31, 2016.

Ref Num 2592096

Serial Num 000287362

5

Enclosure (14)



**CAPACITY****LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)**

Person in Charge  
of Medical Care.  
Advanced  
Firefighting.  
Basic Training.  
GMDSS Operator.

Ref Num 2592096

Serial Num 000287362

The lawful holder of this credential

(b)(6)

as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

**CAPACITY****LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)**

Second Mate  
  
Radar Observer  
(Unlimited)  
Able Seaman-  
Unlimited  
Lifeboatman  
Wiper  
Steward's  
Department (F.H.)

Of Self-Propelled Vessels Not Including Auxiliary  
Sail Of Unlimited Tonnage Upon Oceans.

Ref Num 2592096

Serial Num 000287362

Enclosure (14)



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CAPT, USCG

Ref Num 2592096

Serial Num 000287362

8

9

Enclosure (14)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: (b)(6)

Signature: (b)(6) Date 6/8/15

Enclosure (14)



DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,

DECLARATION OF (b)(6)  
(Name)

I was performing the duty of helm safety officer at the time of the incident. The Master and the Pilot were on the starboard bridge wing, and the Master was relaying the Pilot's engine and helm orders to me in the pilot house via sound-powered phone. At around 0746, I heard 3/O (b)(6) tell the bridge via radio that the stern was 30 yards from the pier. The Master assumed the conn at 0747. I received the order for a full ahead bell at 0747, and I immediately relayed it to the engine room. At that time, the rudder had been at hard right for several minutes. Approximately one minute after I relayed the order for a full ahead bell, I heard 3/O (b)(6) say over the radio that we were going to hit the pier, and several seconds later I heard (b)(6) say that we hit the pier.

Dated 28 day of November, 2015

Signature (b)(6) Position Third Officer

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090



07 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6) declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am a Third Officer (3/O) onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH) 19. I have been a civil service mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) since August 2014. This is my second ship. I have been assigned to USNS MERCY since April 2015.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. For the departure I was assigned duty as Helm Safety Officer, a duty I have performed five times while assigned to MERCY. There were no issues with communications or answering the bell from Chief Mate to Helm Safety Officer to Central Control Station (CCS). (b)(6) CAPTAIN

End of Statement

(b)(6)

6/8/15

Date

Attachments:


1. Signed Privacy Act Statement
2. Bow tug drawing

1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Enclosure (15)





is a seafarers' identity document  
Seafarers' Identity Document  
of the International Lab

(b)(6)

**REF**

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-1-ASK-NMC

Reference Number  
2994811

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Expiration Date  
21-JUN-2019

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

M1906213<<<<<<<<<<<<2



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

(b)(6)

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

II/1; II/4; II/5; IV/2; VI/1-1; VI/1; VI/2; VI/3; VI/4; VI/6

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 21-JUN-2019.

Ref Num 2994811

Serial Num 000250616

4

CAPACITY

LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Officer in charge  
of a navigational  
watch (OICNW).  
Able Seafarer -  
Deck.  
Rating forming  
part of a  
navigational watch  
(RFPNW).  
Proficiency in  
survival craft and  
rescue boats other  
than fast rescue  
boats (PSC).  
Basic Oil And  
Chemical Tanker  
Cargo Operation.  
Medical First-Aid

Ref Num 2994811

Serial Num 000250616

5

Enclosure (15)



CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Provider. Advanced Firefighting. Basic Training. GMDSS Operator. Vessel Personnel With Designated Security Duties. Security Awareness.	
Ref Num 2994811	Serial Num 000250616

The lawful holder of this credential,  
 (b)(6)  
 as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
 to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
 subject to any limitations indicated.

CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Third Mate	Of Self-Propelled Vessels Not Including Auxiliary Sail Of Unlimited Tonnage Upon Oceans.
Radar Observer (Unlimited) Able Seaman- Unlimited Lifeboatman Tankerman Assistant Wiper Steward's	Limited to Dangerous Liquid (DL) Cargoes
Ref Num 2994811	Serial Num 000250616

Enclosure (15)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: (b)(6) \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: (b)(6) \_\_\_\_\_ Date 6/8/15

*Enclosure (15)*



**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,**

DECLARATION OF (b)(6)  
(Name)

The morning of May 27th 2015 I attended the pre-departure navigation brief at 0630, for our Pearl Harbor departure. Following the navigation brief I went to the bow to prepare the starboard anchor to be ready to let go in case of emergency, per the Captains instruction. Shortly after 0700 I heard Pilot aboard. A few minutes later I reported to the bridge that we had one tug made fast to the Dutch bollard on the starboard bow. After we singled up lines on the bow, we took in the head and breast line and held the spring. Chief mate gave the word to take in all lines and I heard last line on the stern at 0730. As we backed out of the pier, the tug started bringing the bow around to starboard. The chief mate asked for distances from the bow to the pier and I relayed them. I radioed the bridge that the swing looked good on the bow and that we had plenty of room. At some point the bow tug cast off its line and moved to the port side, I don't know when but when the stern was closing on the Arizona it was pushing on the port bow. As we continued to swing, I belayed my radio calls as it became apparent the stern was reporting closing distances. I recall hearing the following reports in sequence "100 yards closing, 25 yards closing, 15 yards closing, 5 yards closing, were going to hit, we hit,". When calling in distances to the bridge I always try to communicate how the swing is shaping up, because of this when I heard distances on the radio with no additional information I visualized our sternway was bringing us into the Arizona and not the trend of the swing. When I heard fifteen yards and closing, I looked over at the cargo mate and said I think they're going to call full ahead. Immediately after that, I heard the engine room answer the bridge on the 1JV speaker on the bridge wing "Full Ahead I". After the report of we hit, The Chief mate called down to the stern for a damage report. We continued our transit out of pearl harbor, and disembarked the pilot on the starboard side. When we were clear of restricted waters, the bridge called down to secure the anchor for sea.

Dated 31 day of May , 2015

Signature (b)(6) Position 3<sup>rd</sup> Officer (Day)

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090



07 JUN 2015

Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6), declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am a Third Officer (3/O) onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH 19). I have been a civilian mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) for almost 2 years, USNS MERCY has been my only MSC ship. I signed off to go to Rescue Swimmers School and then signed back on about a year ago in April. I did RIMPAC last year. I am the most experienced third Officer on the this particular platform.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. I attended the pre-departure navigation brief. For the departure, I was on the bow. The pre-navigation brief was conducted by the Navigator 2/O (b)(6). At the end of the brief the Captain went around to make sure everyone knows what (b)(6) duties are.

Initially, the Cargo Mate was coordinating the removal of the brow. After (b)(6) finished (b)(6) came forward and relieved me on the bow. I was stationed up by the bull nose of the forecastle. I had BM (b)(6) and probably 3-4 Abs handling the lines but they would not have any significant input into the investigation because there attention was focused on stowing the bow running gear and lines.

The tug on the bow starboard side was made up to a Dutch bollard approximately 100 feet aft of the anchor. The lines were taken in. The Spring line was last. The tugs were pulling us off and we starting to get separation from the pier.

I could not see the stern tug from my location. After the ship cleared the slip, the knuckle on pier (K10), I let the Bridge know there was plenty of room ahead. This was my last report before I heard the stern report that the ship was closing (on the ARIZONA Memorial). From this point on, the stern reported distances as the ship continued to close. The ship was continuing to spin.

I remember noticing the forward tug on the port side. I don't know when it cast off it's line. I couldn't tell its angle. I was standing at the bullnose talking with the Cargo Mate when I heard that the ship was still closing 5 yards off the memorial and about to hit, I heard the tug's engine stop (cut off) and I looked over the rail. The forward tug was at an angle of about 45 degrees, laying too on the port bow (see attached bow tug position drawing).

The only time the Chief Mate lets me know what the tugs are reporting is when a tug needs a line passed to them. My concern with tugs is with the lines when they are under tension.

End of Statement

(b)(6)

Signature

06/08/15

Date

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement
2. Bow tug drawing

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Enclosure (10)



$\approx 45^\circ$



(b)(6)


3/0

06/07/15

(b)(6)

Enclosure (10)





It is a seafarers' identity document.  
Seafarers' Identity Documents  
of the International Labor

(b)(6)

This document is a seafarers' identity document for the purpose of the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003, of the International Labor Organization.

**(b)(6)**

SIGNATURE OF BEARER

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-1-ASK-NMC

(b)(6)

Reference Number  
3035785

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Expiration Date  
22-JUN-2018

PGUSA (b)(6)  
0002028220USA (b)(6) M18062



## CAPACITY

## LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

providing medical  
First Aid.  
Advanced  
Firefighting.  
Basic Safety  
Training.  
GMDSS Operator.

Ref Num 3035785

Serial Num 000202822

6

The lawful holder of this credential

(b)(6)

as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (Domestic Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

## CAPACITY

## LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Third Mate  
Able Seaman-Any  
Waters, Unlimited  
Lifeboatman  
Tankerman-Assst  
Wiper  
Stewards Dept (FH)  
First Aid Provider

Of Steam or Motor Vessels Of Any Gross Tons Upon  
Oceans. Radar Observer (Unlimited).

Limited to Dangerous Liquid (DL) Cargoes

Ref Num 3035785

Serial Num 000202822

7

Enclosure (10)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: (b)(6)

Signature: (b)(6) Date 06/07/15



DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,

DECLARATION OF (b)(6)  
(Name)

I WAS RELIEVED EARLY FROM HELM SAFETY OFFICER AROUND 0735. I WENT BACK AFT TO GET BREAKFAST, BUT STOPPED AT MY ROOM FIRST. WHILE I WAS IN MY ROOM I HEARD 3/0 (b)(6) RELAYING DISTANCES TO THE BRIDGE FROM (b)(6) STATION ON THE STERN. (b)(6) WAS CALLING IN DISTANCES IN YARDS TO KILO PIER, THE USS MISSOURI (b)(6) AND ARIZONA MEMORIAL. I DON'T REMEMBER THE NUMBERS BUT THE (b)(6) RANGE WAS CLOSING. AT ONE POINT THE BRIDGE ASKED IF THE DISTANCES HAD BEGAN TO OPEN YET. 3/0 (b)(6) REPLIED NO AND CONTINUED TO CALL OUT THE RANGE TO ARIZONA MEMORIAL STILL CLOSING. THEN (b)(6) SAID THAT WE WERE GOING TO HIT. THE BRIDGE ASKED IF WE HAD BEGAN OPENING WITH THE MEMORIAL YET AND (b)(6) SAID WE HAD STARTED TO OPEN RAPIDLY. I THEN WENT BACK UP TO THE BRIDGE AND WHIZED TO ESCORT THE PILOT TO THE SIDEPART FOR (b)(6) DISEMBARKATION.

Dated 28<sup>TH</sup> day of MAY, 2015

Signature (b)(6) Position 3/0

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090



08 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6) declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I have reviewed my earlier statement and I have no corrections or additions to make. My earlier statement is consistent with my current recollection of events.

I am a Third Officer (3/O) onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH) 19. I have been a civil service mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) for two years. Prior to reporting to MERCY, I spent 16 months onboard RICHARD E BYRD. I reported onboard USNS MERCY since the Monday after Christmas, 2014. So I've been onboard since December 2014. I stayed on the ship through the yard period in Portland, Oregon.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. For the departure, I was coming off the 0400-0800 watch, on which I was accompanied by a cadet. 3/O (b)(6) relieved me a few minutes early from watch and I had returned to my stateroom for a few minutes. I was relieved at about 0735.

I was sitting in my stateroom listening to my hand held radio. I heard the Bridge instruct watchstanders to stand by for distances as the ship was going to start twisting. After that I heard 3/O (b)(6) reporting distances from Kilo (end of the Kilo pier), the MISSOURI, and the ARIZONA Memorial. I could hear 3/O (b)(6) calling distances to the bridge. I don't recall the specific numbers (b)(6) reported, but at one point I recall hearing the Bridge ask if the ship had started to open on the Arizona Memorial and 3/O (b)(6) reported "no". 3/O (b)(6) continued to call out distances. At one point (b)(6) indicated the ship was going to hit the memorial.

I did not hear any reports from the bow or stern regarding tug placement on MERCY or indications of what type tug thrust was being used.

At approximately 0800, when the ship was near Hospital Point, I escorted the Pilot to the Pilot Ladder. We did not discuss what had happened during the evolution.

We report distances by visual observation. We do not use range finders when reporting distances.

End of Statement

(b)(6)

Signature

6/8/15  
Date

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement



(b)(6)

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-4-ASK-NMC

Reference Number  
2918089

Issue Date	Expiration Date
25-JAN-2013	25-JAN-2018

PGUSA (b)(6) <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<  
0001826175USA (b)(6) M1801259<<<<<<<<<<<<2

Enclosure (17)



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

(b)(6)

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

**IV/1; IV/4; II/5; IV/2; V/1-1; VV/1; VV/2; VI/3; VI/4; VI/5; VV/6**

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 25-JAN-2018.

Ref Num 2918089

Serial Num 000182617

4

**CAPACITY**

**LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)**

Officer in charge  
of a navigational  
watch (OICNW).  
Able Seafarer -  
Deck.  
Rating forming  
part of a  
navigational watch  
(RFPNW).  
Proficiency in  
survival craft and  
rescue boats other  
than fast rescue  
boats (PSC).  
Basic Oil And  
Chemical Tanker  
Cargo Operations.  
Proficient in

Ref Num 2918089

Serial Num 000182617

5

Enclosure (17)




CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
providing medical First Aid. Advanced Firefighting. Basic Safety Training. GMDSS Operator. Vessel Security Officer. Vessel Personnel Designated With Security Duties. Security Awareness.	
Ref Num 2918089	Serial Num 000182617

The lawful holder of this credential  
 (b)(6)  
 as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
 to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (Domestic Only),  
 subject to any limitations indicated.

CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Third Mate	Of Steam or Motor Vessels Of Any Gross Tons Upon Oceans. Radar Observer (Unlimited).
Able Seaman-Any Waters, Unlimited Lifeboatman Tankerman-Asst Wiper Stewards Dept (FH) First Aid Provider	Limited to Dangerous Liquid (DL) Cargoes
Ref Num 2918089	Serial Num 000182617

Enclosure (17)







**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Date

6/8/15

Enclosure (17)



**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,**

DECLARATION OF 3/O (b)(6)

My assigned duties on the May 27<sup>th</sup> departure were to supervise and report bringing in the stern lines with 5 A/B's and 1 boatswain mate. With that completed and while they were stowing lines and securing for sea, I was to advise the bridge via Chiefmate on the radio of relevant distances to piers and obstructions from the stern.

Tug 'Tiger 5' was made fast to the stern through the centerline chock. I noted last line of 0735 on my watch, Tiger 5 was pulling directly astern after bringing us off Hotel pier. My first report was "Stern is even with the end of Hotel Pier to port". In a couple of minutes I reported the stern passing the end of Kilo pier to stbd.

My first report of distance to the Arizona at 300 yds was acknowledged by the Chiefmate. Once clear of Kilo pier, Tiger 5 repositioned itself to port and took a heavy strain. After approximately 1 minute, the stern started to rotate slightly and I reported so. The Chiefmate requested distance and how the stern was doing. I reported "The stern appears to be rotating nicely and Arizona is 200 yds off the port quarter".

One of the Arizona tourist shuttles passed well clear of the stern as it looked to be heading to the embarkation dock. Shortly (maybe 1 minute), I reported 150 yd distance to Arizona. The Chiefmate requested "opening" or "closing" be added to distance reports. I reported "100 yd and closing to Arizona". Chiefmate acknowledged.

I started providing continuous distances - 80 yds to Arizona and 150 yds to Missouri to stbd; 50 yds closing; 30 yds. Visually our rotation seemed to slow and sternway continued. I reported 20 yd to Arizona dock. At 10 yds off the Arizona landing dock, considerable propwash was generated by Mercy. I reported 10 yd to dock, 7 yd, 5 yd.

The outboard western corner of the dock went beneath Mercy's stern overhang then started being pushed the opposite way. I reported "We hit". There continued to be a lot of propwash. The Arizona boat dock appeared to me to be pushed 5 - 7 yds out of position and the brow connecting the dock with the memorial started separating from the memorial. Hand railing sections from the dock broke away. I reported "distance opening".

Shortly, the cargomate was on the fantail and took a few photos to help document the incident when the stern was 20 - 40 yds from the Arizona dock.

Dated 28 day of May, 2015

Signature

(b)(6)

Position

3/O (wr)

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090

Enclosure (18)



07 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6), declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I was asked if I wanted to change anything on my original statement. I did. During the event, I did not actually see the rudder contact the floating pier. The angle of the stern prevents this. However, based on the effect of the movement of the floating pier, I believe the rudder touched the floating pier.

I am a Third Officer (3/O) aboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH 19). I have been a civil service mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) for four and a half years. I have been a Licensed Deck Officer (LDO) since May 2014. My first job as a LDO was onboard the USNS CHARLES DREW. I reported aboard MERCY in April 2015 at the end of the shipyard period in Portland, OR. I transited on the ship down the Columbia River. I missed the San Diego, CA, to Pearl Harbor, HI leg due to personal reasons.

Leaving Pearl Harbor was my second time on the stern watch. My first time as stern watch was arriving San Diego. Leaving Portland, OR, I was on the Bridge as Helm Safety Officer. I attended the navigation brief but did not sign the muster sheet because my name was not on the sheet. (b)(6) was penciled in as the stern watch, but he ended up as the Mate on Watch. The change had to do with the fact the ship was leaving at 0735, when a watch rotation was underway.

*on Mercy but have completed numerous tie-ups & departures on other ships*  
(b)(6)

Tiger 5 was made fast through the centerline chock and was off the starboard quarter pulling us off the pier. Once we were off the pier, (b)(6) position directly astern. Once we were near the Kilo piers, Tiger 5 was off to a 90 degree angle under heavy strain. It took a while to get the stern moving. There was a lot of inertia there.

My focus was on the ARIZONA and MISSOURI. At 300 yards from the ARIZONA memorial, Tiger 5 was in my peripheral vision, and not quite 90 degrees. Maybe at 75 to 80 degrees (see attached drawings RS1 and RS2).

My perception at this time was that we had a good rate of turn. When we were about 100 yards off the ARIZONA, the ARIZONA had 100% of my attention. I never had the memorial and the tug together in my line of vision. My perception is that Tiger 5 was not pulling as hard as earlier and we were not twisting as fast. I didn't see Tiger 5 back around the corner. (b)(6) I was watching for prop wash wondering if we were going to make it. Even at 20 yards, I thought we would make it.

I was stationed at the port corner (stern) because the ARIZONA was off the port quarter. At one point I remember walking back to the starboard side of the centerline. At this point, it seemed like the rotation had slowed, or even stopped, but sternway was still maintained. It felt like Tiger 5 wasn't producing enough thrust to get the job done. I saw some prop wash at 50 yards from the memorial, followed by a lot of prop wash at 10 yards against the memorial. With respect to the tug, at 20 yards from the memorial, the line was less taut and I didn't notice a lot of wash from the tug.

During the evolution, I was providing distances to the ARIZONA memorial reporting to the Chief Mate (C/M). Occasionally, I also hear (b)(6) making reports to the C/M. At some point before 200 yards, C/M said "give me distances closing/opening reports at 200 yards, 150 yards and 100 yards." I think the C/M acknowledged my reports. I recall a constant back and forth with the C/M.



End of Statement

(b)(6)

Signature

June 8 2015

Date



Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement
2. Drawing RS1
3. Drawing RS2



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE



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


3/0  
7 June 2015  
(b)(6)


RS 1

4

Enclosure (18)







(b)(6)

3/0

(b)(6)

7 JUNE, 2015

RS2

S

Enclosure (18)



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Full Name

(b)(6)

Present Address

(b)(6)

Citizenship Height Hair Color DOB  
USA (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sax

Weight Eye Color Place of Birth

(b)(6)

Issue Date  
27-JUN-2014

Expiration Date  
27-JUN-2019

PGUSA

(b)(6)

0002376781USA

(b)(6)

M1906279<<<<<<<<<<<<<0

~~The Government of the United States of America certifies that~~

(b)(6)

Serial Num 000237678

Ref Num 2851596

Serial Num 000237678

Enclosure (18)



## CAPACITY

## LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

GMDSS Operator.  
Vessel Personnel  
With Designated  
Security Duties.  
Security  
Awareness.  
Able Seafarer -  
Deck.

Ref Num 2851596

Serial Num 000237678

The lawful holder of this credential

(b)(6)

as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

## CAPACITY

## LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Third Mate  
  
Radar Observer  
(Unlimited)  
Able Seaman-Any  
Waters, Unlimited  
Lifeboatman  
Wiper  
Steward's  
Department (F.H.)

Of Self-Propelled Vessels Not Including Auxiliary  
Sail Of Unlimited Tonnage Upon Oceans.

Ref Num 2851596

Serial Num 000237678

7

Enclosure (12)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. § 802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name:

(b)(6)

Signature:

(b)(6)

Date June 7, 2015



**ENCL (18)**  
**Video (s)**



28 May 2015

On 27 May 2015 I was standing on the 03 level aft port side by the aft stack, watching as the tug was pulling us around. I was listening to 3<sup>rd</sup> Mate (b)(6) officer in charge of stern, giving distance to hazards over Channel One MSC Deck/Supply to the Bridge.

1. The first report was around 0735 or so then continues thereafter. The first report was at 200 yards and closing then 170,140,120, and then continued until 20 yards, 10 and 5 with we are going to hit the dock was the last report I heard.
2. As these reports were being sent I watched the aft tug at approximately 0740 back off loosened its tow line then tighten it back up. When backing off as he did it left him setting at an angle that was not a 90 degree off ships portside. It looked more as pulling us aft toward the Arizona Memorial, not spinning us like it should have been.
3. Then maneuvering to get in correct position at 90 degree off ships port side about 0743 or so then he began turning us. By then we had slide all the way back into the memorial with no way to recover. At the same time I seen the ship appeared to go all ahead full pushing the landing dock up and around back up under the ship, could not fully see what part of the ship hit the dock this all was around 0745 or maybe a little later possible 0748 did not look at my watch.

Very Respectfully, L. J.  
(b)(6)

Enclosure (19)



08 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6) declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am the Chief Radio Electronics Technician (CRET) onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH) 19. I have been a civilian mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) for 10 years, three of those assigned to USNS MERCY. Additionally, before becoming a CRET, I had earned a credential as an Able Bodied Seaman (AB). I have experience with line handling. Prior to affiliating with MSC, I retired from the U.S. Navy in 1994. I was an Operations Specialist (OS) during my time in the Navy. After I retired from the Navy, I became certified and worked as master mechanic for awhile before becoming employed by MSC.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. For the departure I was not assigned any watch, so I went out of the smoking level (02 level aft) to smoke a cigarette and watch the evolution. I've watched similar evolutions multiple times.

SU (b)(6) was taking pictures near my position. Around 0735, I had lit a cigarette and had a view of Tiger 5. I was about 65 feet from where Tiger 5 was up tight to the ship. Tiger 5 was not at a normal 90 degree position to assist the swing of the ship.

The ship started the twist. All looked good. All of a sudden we were sliding back. At about 230 yards, the tug line went slack and the tug repositioned to the aft quarter, maybe 25-30 degree angle abaft the beam, which I believe created some sternway for the ship, rather than just twisting. As the ship closed 200-150 yards to the memorial, the line from the tug became taut and the tug slid around to a 90 degree (beam) position.

I could hear 3/O (b)(6) reporting distances beginning around 230 yards, 200 yards, 150 yards, when I noticed anxiety in (b)(6) voice over the radio after (b)(6) reported 200 yards. From my vantage point, the distances called by 3/O (b)(6) appeared to be accurate. From somewhere at 30 yards or less from the memorial, I could see prop wash. I could look down and see the turrets of the sunken ARIZONA. I could tell an "ahead bell" had been ordered based on the shaking of the ship and prop wash. If the ahead bell hadn't been ordered when it was, we would have wiped out the memorial.

It was after 3/O (b)(6) reported that the ship was at 200 yards that Tiger 5 went to a 90 degree position. The ship was at 35-30 yards when it went all ahead full and I saw prop wash. Tiger 5 was at 90 degrees. Without the "ahead bell" the Memorial would have been wiped out.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE


2

Enclosure (19)



On each of the several attached ECDIS print-outs, I've drawn where, to the best of my memory and recollection, Tiger 5 was positioned in regard to angular aspect to the ship's keel. The time each print-out represents is handwritten and appears in the top left corner.

End of Statement


(b)(6)  
  
Signature

6/8/2015  
Date

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement
2. Drawing #1 (ECDIS screenshot 7:43)
3. Drawing #2 (ECDIS screenshot 7:44)
4. Drawing #3 (ECDIS screenshot 7:45)
5. Drawing #4 (ECDIS screenshot 7:46)
6. Drawing #5 (ECDIS screenshot 7:47)
7. Drawing #6 (ECDIS screenshot 7:48)





STW  
LOG

2.7 kn

COG  
GPS

240.4°

SOG  
GPS

2.9 kn

7:43

90°  
ABEAM  
UPTIGHT

Enclosure (19)

MONTFORD POINT

Ten Ten Dock

Sea wall

Caution



N  
UP

TM



1:1



NS-01 Not recom.

UTC

Prim

GPS

Sec: GPS

us5ha54m

Last up.:

Updated to:

System Information

Drift

Current

Sf. contour

True wind

Rel. wind

Water t°

Depth

ECHOSOUNDER

Tide

0.2 ft

STD Display

EBL / VRM 1 EBL

EBL 1 000.0

VRM 1 0.00

Main

Dual

Tasks List



STW  
LOG

2.4 kn

COG  
GPS

251.2°

SOG  
GPS


3.0 kn

Mode: DEMO

TC

Time step: 1

7:44



Navigation icons: Ship, Anchor, N, UP, TM, +, -, 1:1, i, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z.

Overlay

\* PLAY

Not recom.

UTC

Prim GPS

Sec: GPS us5ha54m

Last upd.: Updated to:

System Information

Drift

Current

Sf. contour

True wind

Rel. wind

Water t °

Depth

ECHOSOUNDER

Tide

0.2 ft

STD Display

EBL / VRM 1 EBL

EBL 1 000.0

VRM 1 0.00

Main

Dual

Tasks List



**2.7 kn**



**N  
UP**

TM



1:1

*i*

**NS-01 Not recom.**

UTC

```
Prim
GPS
Sec: GPS
us5ha54m
Last upd.:
Updated to:
System Informati
```

Drift	
Current	
Sf. contour	
True wind	
Rel. wind	1
Water t °	
Depth	
ECHOSOUNDER	

Tide

### STD Display

EBL / VRM 1 EB

VRM 1 0.00

Tasks List ▾



**2.5 kn**

7:46

STATE OF NEW YORK

ERIE CANAL

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Scale: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Miles

Scale: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Feet

Enclosure (19)

MONTFORD POINT

① Top 285 Rec

Sea wall

B-2  
A/Cautious

## Tasks List



VRM 1	0.00
-------	------



STW  
LOG

0.9 kn

COG  
GPS

302.5°


SOG  
GPS

2.2 kn

Mode DEMO

UTC

Time step: 1 1



Navigation icons: ship, anchor, compass, magnifying glass, and other standard charting symbols.

Overlay

\* PLAY

NS-01 Not recom.

UTC

Prim GPS

Sec: GPS

us5ha54m

Last up.:

Updated to:

System Information

Drift

Current

Sf. contour

True wind

Rel. wind

Water t°

Depth

ECHOSOUNDER

Tide

0.2 ft

STD Display

EBL / VRM 1 EBL

EBL 1 000.0

VRM 1 0.00

Main

Dual

Tasks List



STW  
LOG

0.0 kn

COG  
GPS

293.0°

SOG  
GPS

1.3 kn

Mode: DEMO

UTC

Time step 1 |

7:48

FLAGSTAFF

100 FWD  
BEAM

MONTFORD POINT

① Ten Tons Dock

Caution

Enclosure (19)

Icons for various functions: Boat, Compass, North Arrow, TM, Magnifying Glass, 1:1 Scale, Information, Plotter, Echosounder, Tide, etc.

Overlay

\* PLAY

NS-01 Not recom.

UTC

Prim GPS

Sec: GPS

us5ha54m

Last up.: Updated to:

System Information

Drift

Current

Sf.contour

True wind

Rel. wind

Water t°

Depth

ECHOSOUNDER

Tide

0.2 ft

STD Display

EBL / VRM 1 EBL

EBL 1 000.0

VRM 1 0.00

Main

Dual

Tasks List



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name:

Signature:

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Date

6/8/15



**ENCL (19)**  
**Voyage Data Recorder**  
**(VDR)**



Statement of QM1 (SW/AW) (b)(6) Regarding the incident of the USNS Mercy colliding with the Arizona Memorial on 27 May, 2015 in Pearl Harbor Hawaii.

I was on the Bridge standing by the ECDIS console. When we came in Captain Giudice had told me to stand by the ECDIS console and keep the way in front of the ship visible so he can see what is on the display by the centerline gyro repeater which is slave to the console I was at. He was using a combination of the display and Seaman's eye to steer. When we got underway I just put myself in the same position. I am unsure as to the time or circumstances surrounding the incident. The way we were orientied I could see out into the channel leading out to sea and into Southeast loch, which meant we were backing down in the direction of the Ford Island Causeway. I had just repositioned the display to show out into the harbor so I could have the display ready for the captain when he came back inside. By this time the Captain and the pilot were out on the Starboard Bridge wing steering the ship. I stepped back to coffee machine to refill my cup and returned to the console. I started to talk to AB (b)(6) who was the standby helmsman. As I was talking to (b)(6) I looked out the window forward scanning for small boats. At that time The Navigator (b)(6) came over and told us the Ship had hit the Memorial.

(b)(6)

Enclosure (20)



Supplemental Statement of QM1 (b)(6), USN

I, (b)(6), declare that the following statement is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I have reviewed my earlier statement and I have no corrections. It is consistent with my memory.

I am a Quarter Master First Class (QM1) in the U.S. Navy. I have 16 ½ years on active duty. I am currently assigned to the Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) embarked on the USNS MERCY.

I joined the ship around April 2015, when she was coming out of the shipyard in Portland, OR. I've served on a number of ships including the DENVER, RUSHMORE, and CLEVELAND. The BLUE RIDGE was my first ship.

During the departure from Pearl Harbor, I was assisting the Navigator and helping with bearings. I re-centered the ECDIS every few minutes. There were a couple of cadets with the navigator. I was at the console on the left side of the bridge.

I was on the ship assigned to the Navigator for the voyage from Portland down the Columbia River, into and out of San Diego, CA, and into Hawaii.

As far as I observed, everything was going smoothly during our departure from Pearl Harbor. Everything was "status quo." There were no issues as far as I knew. I went for some coffee and upon returning scanned the harbor for my own situational awareness to see if there were any ships present.

I did not hear the Navigation Officer make any reports to the Captain in regard to obstructions or shoal water. That said, I was not always in the proximity of the Captain.

I was out of ear shot so I did not observe or hear the tugs reports. My assignment was to keep the ship in the center of the screen on ECDIS.

(b)(6)

Signature

9/JUN/2015

Date

For Official Use Only

2

Enclosure (20)<sup>1</sup>



Attachment

1. Privacy Act Statement

For Official Use Only

3

Enclosure (20<sup>2</sup>)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name:

(b)(6)

Signature:

(b)(6)

Date 07 JUN 15



76.1

**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND (N1),**

DECLARATION OF: (b)(6)

I (b)(6) was stationed in the main propulsion engineering console during Mercy's 27 May 2015 departure from Pearl Harbor. During the entire maneuvering detail I witnessed all ordered bells be executed with urgency and accuracy. The engineering plant functioned exactly as designed before, during, and after the entire maneuvering detail.

During this maneuvering detail I monitored channel one (Deck dept) & channel three (Engine dept) on the vessels Motorola radio system. While listening to deck department channel one, I overheard vessel position information relative to shore side objects. All information appeared to be routine until approximately 0747 when the stern called in 25 feet and closing followed approximately seconds later by "we are going to hit". At approximately that same time a full ahead maneuvering bell of 60 RPM was ordered and it was immediately executed. With such an abnormally quick and accelerated load being placed on the propulsion train and boilers my undivided attention then went to maintaining complete propulsion plant functionality while providing and holding the requested RPM for the duration of its order. Less than one minute later I heard on channel one that distances of the stern from shore side objects were "opening up" and at approximately the same time 40 RPM ahead was ordered. As the propulsion plant stabilized from the rapid variation in steam demand I dispatched the watch engineer to investigate aft steering for damage, strange mechanical noises, or abnormal pressures or temperatures that could have resulted from the event. All systems were functioning as designed with no sign of mechanical malfunction from the events that had just transpired. The watch engineer returned to the engine room and I asked (b)(6) to inspect all salt water strainers for clogs or unusually high salt water strainer differential pressures due to the amount of silt that was turned up during the event. All systems salt water systems were functioning as designed.

The following is a chronological sequence of ordered RPM and actual RPM for the departure, times taken from console wall clock as vessel console not equipped with a master clock.

1. 0700 Set the detail
2. 0732 20 RPM astern ordered, 20 RPM astern answered

Enclosure (21)



08 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6), declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am a Chief Engineer onboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH) 19. On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the atmosphere in the Engine Room Control (ERC) during the departure maneuvering detail was routine. There were no personnel observed in a diminished capacity to perform their duties. Situational awareness was maintained at all times leading up to the allision.

Upon hearing the Deck Department radio report that the ship was going to hit, the engine maneuvering detail went into a heightened state of alertness. There were no distractions during the maneuvering detail.

Every Bridge ordered bell on the Engine Order Telegraph (EOT) was clearly backed up with a verbal order by the Bridge. All communications from the Bridge were clear and succinct. The engine room automation tender time clock currently runs one minute ahead of the ship's clock.

End of Statement

(b)(6)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature  
6/8/2015  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Present Address

(b)(6)

Sex	Weight	Eye Color	Place of Birth
-----	--------	-----------	----------------

(b)(6)

Expiration Date  
08-NOV-2015

PGUSA

(b)(6)

0000829331USA

(b)(6)

M1511088<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<2



<p>This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.</p> <p>The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.</p> <p>The Government of the United States of America certifies that</p> <p><b>(b)(6)</b></p> <p>has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)</p> <p><b>III/2; III/4; V/1; VI/1; VI/2; VI/3; VI/4</b></p> <p>Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 08-NOV-2015.</p> <p>Ref Num 2526847                      Serial Num 000082933</p>	
<p><b>CAPACITY</b></p> <p>Chief Engineer Tankerman - PIC</p>	<p><b>LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)</b></p> <p>Valid for service on Tankships carrying dangerous liquid oil or chemical cargoes.</p>
<p>Ref Num 2526847</p>	<p>Serial Num 000082933</p>



The lawful holder of this credential: (b)(6)	
as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (Domestic Only), subject to any limitations indicated.	
CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Chief Engineer	Of Steam, Motor, or Gas Turbine Vessels Of Any Horsepower.
Any Unlic Engine Rtg Lifeboatman Tankerman-PIC Ordinary Seaman Stewards Dept (FH)	Limited to Dangerous Liquid (DL) Cargoes
Ref Num 2526847	Serial Num 000082933

(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	CAPT. USCG
Ref Num 2526847	Serial Num 000082933



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: (b)(6)

Signature: (b)(6) Date 08 JUNE 2015



**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND (N1),**

DECLARATION OF: 2 A/E (b)(6)

At 0500 on 05/27/15. I began warming up the Main Engine and tested all throttles and EOT. The engine was left in auto rollover until standby engines. I manned the throttle for maneuvering, the chief engineer, (b)(6), 3 A/E (b)(6) and Chief Electrician were in the console for the maneuvering detail. We started to receive bells and answered them immediately and without any machinery complications. We were going half ahead at 40 rpm and received a bell for full ahead 60 rpm. I answered the bell and raised the throttle to 60 RPM. Shortly after the bell we heard the mate on the stern call out on channel one on the handheld radio that we are about to hit. I heard no strange noises or had any machinery failures. After this I stayed on the throttle and continued to answer bells. The chief engineer had the watch engineer 3 A/E (b)(6) head to the stern to see what was happening and inspect aft steering. After 3 A/E (b)(6) returned and reported we had hit the floating pier and aft steering was operating normally. Also no one in aft steering heard any strange noises. The chief engineer then had 3 A/E (b)(6) make a round of the engine room and AMR spaces to inspect for any damage, clogged strainers and machinery failures. None were found. I stayed on the throttle till the maneuvering detail was secured. I continued to answer all bells immediately with no machinery difficulty or failures.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that I have read the foregoing statement and that the information contained therein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated at USNS MERCY AT SEA this 28 day of 05, 2015  
(City) (State) (Month)

Signature (b)(6) Position 2 A/E

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19,  
Address: FPO AP 96672-4090

Enclosure (22)



07 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6), declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am a second assistant engineer (2 A/E) aboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH 19), a position I have held for three months. I have been a civil service mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) for three years. I have been involved in numerous maneuvering details while assigned to MERCY.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. All systems operated normally during the maneuvering detail. I observed a proper watch engineer turnover in the control room between the 0400-0800 watch and the 0800-1200 watch. Personnel assigned to the maneuvering detail did not appear to be distracted and were focused on maneuvering duties. My observation was that personnel maintained situational awareness throughout the maneuvering detail. I would describe the atmosphere in the control room as normal until just before the allision occurred. The engineering plant functioned as designed; there were no abnormalities or malfunctions during maneuvering detail.

End of Statement

(b)(6)

Signature

6/8/15

Date

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement



(b)(6)

Enclosure (22)



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

(b)(6)

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

III/1; III/4; III/5; VI/1; VI/2; VI/3; VI/4

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 03-FEB-2020.

Ref Num 2847615

Serial Num 000284890

CAPACITY

LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Officer in charge of an engineering watch (OICEW).  
Able Seafarer - Engine.

Rating forming part of an engineering watch (RFPEW).

Proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats other than fast rescue boats (PSC).

Medical First-Aid Provider.

Advanced Firefighting.

Not valid after December 31, 2016.

Ref Num 2847615

Serial Num 000284890

Enclosure (22)



CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Basic Training.	

Ref Num 2847615      Serial Num 000284890

The lawful holder of this credential,  
**(b)(6)**  
as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Second Assistant Engineer	Of Steam Propelled Vessels.
Third Assistant Engineer	Of Motor and Gas Turbine Propelled Vessels.
Qualified Member of the Engine Department (QMED)	Any Rating
Lifeboatman	
Ordinary Seaman	
Steward's Department (F.H.)	

Ref Num 2847615      Serial Num 000284890

Enclosure (22)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: (b)(6)

Signature: (b)(6) Date: 6/7/15

6      Enclosure (22)



08 JUN 2015

Supplemental Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6), declare that the following statement is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am an Able Bodied Watchstander (AB(W)) aboard USNS MERCY (T-AH 19). I have four years experience as an AB(W) and have served one month aboard MERCY. On 27 May 2015, I was assigned to after steering detail with Deck Machinist (DEMAC) (b)(6) for the ship's departure from Pearl Harbor, HI.

This evolution was my second time manning the after steering detail since being aboard MERCY. I have shifted steering control to the trick wheel only two times – both at the beginning of steering detail. I have not participated in any underway steering casualty drills yet.

I had no problem communicating with the Bridge on the 1JV using sound-powered phones and 1JV loud speaker in spite of the noise in the steering room. Steering operation appeared normal to me. I have never heard of the steering gear having any problems. 3/O (b)(6) arrived in after steering and reported that we allided with a dock. I was surprised as neither DEMAC (b)(6) nor I heard, saw or felt anything out of the ordinary.

I did not observe any personnel with diminished capacity to focus and perform their assigned task. We were fully alert during our after steering detail. I did not observe any loss of situational awareness.

(b)(6)

Signature

6/8/2015

Date

Attachment

1. Privacy Act Statement

For Official Use Only

Enclosure (23)<sup>1</sup>



DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND,

DECLARATION OF (b)(6) (ABW)  
(Name)

I WAS STATION AT THE AFT STEERING WHEN THE INCIDENT HAPPENED, I DIDN'T SEE ANYTHING, I JUST HEARD IT WHEN THEY ~~AT~~ TALK ABOUT IT IN THE RADIO. SO I REALLY DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT.

Dated 28 day of MAY, 2015

Signature (b)(6) Position AB(W)

Name of Ship: USNS Mercy, T-AH 19

Address: FPO AP 96672-4090



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Present Address

(b)(6)

Citizenship Height Hair Color DOB  
USA (b)(6)

Sex: [REDACTED] Weight: [REDACTED] Eye Color: [REDACTED] Place of Birth: [REDACTED]  
(b)(6)

Issue Date  
15-APR-2014

Expiration Date  
15-APR-2019

**(b)(6)**

PGUSA **(b)(6)**<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<  
0002390080USA**(b)(6)**M1904150<<<<<<<<<<<<8



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended.

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

**(b)(6)**

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

**II/4; II/5; VI/1; VI/2; VI/6**

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 15-APR-2019.

Ref Num 2696213      Serial Num 000239008

CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
<p>Able Seafarer - Deck.</p> <p>Rating forming part of a navigational watch (RFPNW).</p> <p>Proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats other than fast rescue boats (PSC).</p> <p>Basic Training.</p> <p>Vessel Personnel With Designated Security Duties.</p> <p>Security Awareness.</p>	

Ref Num 2696213      Serial Num 000239008

4

Enclosure (23)



The lawful holder of this credential,

(b)(6)

as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  
to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (National Only),  
subject to any limitations indicated.

CAPACITY

LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)

Able  
Seaman-Limited  
Lifeboatman  
Wiper  
Steward's  
Department (F.H.)

Ref Num 2696213

Serial Num 000239008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CAPT. USCG

Ref Num 2696213

Serial Num 000239008

Enclosure (23)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: (b)(6)

Signature: (b)(6) Date 6/8/15

6 ENCLOSURE (23)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: THOMAS GIUDICE

Rank/Position: MASTER

## Instructions:

1. For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
2. Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date
2. From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

## Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date:	F																									F
	W								X																	W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
b. Casualty Date-1:	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
c. Casualty Date-2:	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
d. Casualty Date-3:	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
e. Casualty Date-4:	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A

MISLE IIA # \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE (24)



(b)(6)

## 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Rank/Position: CHIEF ENGINEER

## Instructions:

- For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
- Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date.
- From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

## Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date:	F						F																		F	
5/27/2015	W																								W	
Departure:	M				M	M	M																		M	
	S	S	S	S																					S	
	C								C																C	
	R																								R	
	A																								A	
b. Casualty Date-1:	F							F				F							F							F
5/26/2015	W																									W
Fuel Load	M				M	M	M		M	M	M		M	M	M	M						S	S	S	S	M
	S	S	S	S																						S
	C																									C
	R																R	R	R	R	R					R
	A																		A							A
c. Casualty Date-2:	F							F				F							F							F
5/25/2015	W																									W
Arrival	M				M	M	M		M	M	M		M	M								S	S	S	S	M
	S	S	S	S																						S
	C																									C
	R														R	R	R	R	R	R						R
	A																		A							A
d. Casualty Date-3:	F							F				F							F							F
5/24/2015	W																									W
At Sea	M				M	M	M		M	M	M		M	M	M	M						S	S	S	S	M
	S	S	S	S																						S
	C																									C
	R																	R	R	R						R
	A																									A
e. Casualty Date-4:	F							F				F							F							F
5/23/2015	W																									W
At Sea	M				M	M	M		M	M	M		M	M	M	M						S	S	S	S	M
	S	S	S	S																						S
	C																									C
	R																	R	R	R						R
	A																									A

MISLE IIA # \_\_\_\_\_

2  
Enclosure (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: **(b)(6)** Rank/Position: Chief Mate

## Instructions:

- For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
- Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date
- From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date: 5/27/2015	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
b. Casualty Date-1: 5/26/2015	A																									A
	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
c. Casualty Date-2: 5/25/2015	R																									R
	A																									A
	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
d. Casualty Date-3: 5/24/2015	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
e. Casualty Date-4: 5/23/2015	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
	F																									F
	W																									W

MISLE HA #

3  
Enclosure (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: (b)(6)

Rank/Position: 2/O(D) Navigator

## Instructions:

- For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
- Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date
- From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400
a. Casualty Date:																									
WEDNESDAY MAY 27 2015																									
b. Casualty Date-1:																									
TUESDAY MAY 26 2016																									
c. Casualty Date-2:																									
MONDAY MAY 25 2015																									
d. Casualty Date-3:																									
SUNDAY MAY 24 2015																									
e. Casualty Date-4:																									
SATURDAY MAY 23 2015																									

4  
ENCLOSURE (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: (b)(6) Rank/Position: 2 A/E

## Instructions:

1. For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
2. Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date.
3. From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date: 5/27/15	F					F																				F
	W					W		W		X																W
	M																									M
	S	S	S	S	S	S																				S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
b. Casualty Date-1: 5/26/15	F								F				F								F	F				F
	W																									W
	M						M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	S	S	S									M
	S	S	S	S	S	S																		S		S
	C																									C
	R																R	R	R	R	R	R	R			R
	A																				A	A				A
c. Casualty Date-2: 5/25/15	F								F				F							F	F					F
	W						W	W	W	W																W
	M										M	M	M													M
	S	S	S	S	S	S																				S
	C																									C
	R													R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
	A																A	A		A	A					A
d. Casualty Date-3: 5/24/15	F								F				F				F									F
	W																					W	W	W		W
	M						M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M									M
	S	S	S	S	S	S													S	S					S	S
	C																									C
	R																	R								R
	A																									A
e. Casualty Date-4: 5/23/15	F								F				F				F									F
	W																									W
	M						M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M									M
	S	S	S	S	S	S															S	S	S	S		S
	C																									C
	R																	R	R	R						R
	A																									A

MISLE IIA #

Enclosure (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Rank/Position: THIRD OFFICER

## Instructions:

- For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
- Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date.
- From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date:	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
b. Casualty Date-1	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
c. Casualty Date-2	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
d. Casualty Date-3	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
e. Casualty Date-4	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A

MISLE HA # \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosure (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: (b)(6)

Rank/Position: 3/0

## Instructions:

1. For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
2. Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date.
3. From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

W = Watch/Duty

M = Maintenance work

S = Sleep

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

R = Recreation, including time ashore

A = Alcoholic drink

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date: May 27	F	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	F
b. Casualty Date-1 May 26	F	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	F
c. Casualty Date-2 May 25	F	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	F
d. Casualty Date-3 May 24	F	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	F
e. Casualty Date-4 May 23	F	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	F

MISLE: HA #

Enclosure (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: (b)(6)

Rank/Position: CRET

## Instructions:

1. For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
2. Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date
2. From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date:	F								F			F					F									F
5/27/15	W					W	W	X		W	W	W			W	W	W		W							W
	M							X																		M
	S	S	S	S	S			X														S	S	S		S
	C							X																		C
	R				R			X				R							R	R	R					R
	A							X																		A
b. Casualty Date-1:	F											F					F									F
5/26/15	W																									W
	M																					S	S	S		M
	S	S	S	S	S	S																				S
	C																									C
	R						R	R	R	R	R		R	R	R		R	R	R	R	R					R
	A											A	A			A										A
c. Casualty Date-2:	F								F			F					F									F
5/25/15	W					W	W			W	W	W		W	W	W	W		W							W
	M																									M
	S	S	S	S	S																	S	S	S		S
	C																									C
	R				R														R	R	R					R
	A																									A
d. Casualty Date-3:	F								F			F					F									F
5/24/15	W					W	W			W	W	W		W	W	W	W		W							W
	M																									M
	S	S	S	S	S																	S	S	S		S
	C																									C
	R					R													R	R	R					R
	A																									A
e. Casualty Date-4:	F								F			F					F									F
5/23/15	W					W	W			W	W	W		W	W	W	W		W							W
	M																									M
	S	S	S	S	S																	S	S	S		S
	C																									C
	R				R														R	R	R					R
	A																									A

Enclosure (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: (b)(6)

Rank/Position: QM1/E-6

## Instructions:

- For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
- Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date.
- From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400		
a. Casualty Date: <u>27 MAY 15</u>	F					X							X					X		X						F	
	W							X		X							X		X		X					W	
	M								X	X	X													X	X	M	
	S	X	X	X	X	X							X	X	X									X	X	S	
	C																									C	
	R																					X	X			R	
	A																									A	
b. Casualty Date-1: <u>26 MAY 15</u>	F						X					X														F	
	W							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							W
	M																					X	X	X	X	M	
	S	X	X	X	X	X																				S	
	C																									C	
	R																									R	
	A																									A	
c. Casualty Date-2: <u>25 MAY 15</u>	F												X													F	
	W						X	X	X	X	X	X														W	
	M																									M	
	S	X	X	X	X																					S	
	C																									C	
	R											X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	R	
	A													X							X	X				A	
d. Casualty Date-3: <u>24 MAY 15</u>	F												X						X							F	
	W						X	X	X	X	X	X						X	X	X						W	
	M																									M	
	S	X	X	X																			X	X		S	
	C																									C	
	R												X									X	X			R	
	A																									A	
e. Casualty Date-4: <u>23 MAY 15</u>	F																									F	
	W						X		X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X						W	
	M																									M	
	S	X	X	X	X								X	X									X	X	X	S	
	C																									C	
	R																					X				R	
	A																									A	

MISLE IIA # \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE (24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: (b)(6)

Rank/Position: THIRD OFFICER

## Instructions:

- For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
- Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date.
- From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

### Legend- Activity Types:

F = Meal

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

A = Alcoholic drink

W = Watch/Duty

S = Sleep

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	
a. Casualty Date	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
<u>MAY 27</u>	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
b. Casualty Date-1	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
<u>5/26</u>	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
c. Casualty Date-2	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
<u>5/25</u>	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
d. Casualty Date-3	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
<u>5/24</u>	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A
e. Casualty Date-4	F																									F
	W																									W
	M																									M
<u>5/23</u>	S																									S
	C																									C
	R																									R
	A																									A

MISLE- UA #

10

Enclosure(24)



# 96-Hour Work/Rest History Worksheet

Your Name: (b)(6)

Rank/Position: 3<sup>RD</sup> OFFICER (DAY)

## Instructions:

- For the date of the accident and the previous four days, enter the date in boxes a through e.
- Mark the time the casualty occurred with an "X" on the row for the Casualty Date
- From the time of the accident, back through the previous four days (96 hours), identify the type of activity done and when it was done by filling in the appropriate segment of the row representing that activity under the times during which it was done. See the legend below for the definitions of the activity types.

## Legend- Activity Types:

W = Watch/Duty

M = Maintenance work

C = Cargo Watch/Operations

R = Recreation, including time ashore

Time:	0000	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400
a. Casualty Date: 27 MAY	F								X																F
	W	S	S	S	S	W	W	W	X																W
	M								X																M
	S								X																S
	C								X																C
	R								X																R
A								X																A	
b. Casualty Date-1: 26 MAY	F																								F
	W						W			W	W	W		W	W	W									W
	M																					S	S	S	M
	S	S	S	S	S	S																			S
	C																								C
	R																R	R	R	R	R	R			R
A																								A	
c. Casualty Date-2: 25 MAY	F																								F
	W					W	W			W	W	W		W	W	W									W
	M																								M
	S	S	S	S	S	S																	S		S
	C																								C
	R																R	R		R	R	R	R	R	R
A																								A	
d. Casualty Date-3: 24 MAY	F																								F
	W					W	W			W	W	W		W	W	W	W			W	W				W
	M																								M
	S	S	S	S	S	S															S	S	S	S	S
	C																								C
	R																								R
A																								A	
e. Casualty Date-4: 23 MAY	F																								F
	W					W	W			W	W	W		W	W	W	W			W	W				W
	M																								M
	S	S	S	S	S	S															S	S	S	S	S
	C																								C
	R																								R

11  
Enclosure (24)



27 May 2015

INCIDENT REPORT: USNS MERCY CONTACT WITH ARIZONA  
MEMORIAL DOCK

USNS MERCY was moored port side to Hotel 1 / 2 and scheduled to get underway at 0730 27 May 2015. I was assigned pilot for the evolution. Ship got underway on time with tug Tiger 4 on starboard bow with headline and Tiger 5 thru stern chock with headline. Myself and Captain were stationed on the bridge. Ship was backed clear of Hotel pier with ships engine and tugs. As bow cleared the area of K10 a slow ahead bell was ordered to slow sternway. Tug Tiger 4 was shifted to port bow to push bow around and Tiger 5 was directed to pull stern to port. As stern way was reduced all stop was ordered. As bow passed end of K8 a slow ahead bell was again ordered. Ship's bow was swinging to starboard but Tiger 5 reported we were still closing Arizona. At about 100 feet distance a half ahead bell was ordered. Tiger 5 kept reporting a closing rate. At about 25 feet a full ahead bell was rung up. Tiger 5 reported that the rudder on MERCY rubbed on the Arizona float briefly then stated opening. Ship then proceeded to sea. No apparent damage to ship's rudder.

There apparently is some damage to the Arizona float probably caused by the wash on to the float. I had concern about getting headway too soon while the bow was passing K8. This is a normal concern when making this maneuver however I should have been more concerned with the failure to totally check up the stern way. I also was concerned with the time or I would have considered backing the ship further into the basin and spinning to port as we do with the carriers.

(b)(6)

Chief Pilot, Pearl Harbor, HI

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Enclosure (25)



## Investigating Officer Statement

At 0900 on Tuesday, 2 June, I observed the interview of (b)(6) Chief Pilot, conducted by LCDR (b)(6), USCG, in the course of the U.S. Coast Guard's marine casualty investigation into an allision which occurred on the morning of 27 May 2015 wherein the USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) struck the landing dock at the USS ARIZONA Memorial in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (b)(6) was the pilot onboard the MERCY at the time. Also observing the interview were (b)(6) (Port Captain-West) and (b)(6) (MSC Associate Counsel). Listening to the interview on the phone was (b)(6) of the Masters, Mates & Pilots (MM&P) union. To the best of my memory and belief, this statement records my recollection of (b)(6) statement.

LCDR (b)(6) began the interview by having everyone present introduce themselves. (b)(6) then explained to (b)(6) the purpose of the interview (a marine casualty investigation to determine the cause of the incident) and told (b)(6) that the interview was not being recorded, but that (b)(6) would take notes. (b)(6) further explained to (b)(6) that the investigation was administrative in nature and that nothing (b)(6) (b)(6) said could be used to incriminate (b)(6). (b)(6) also explained that the Navy was participating as an interested party and that the Navy could ask questions filtered through (b)(6) as long as the questions were germane to and pertinent to the USCG's investigation.

(b)(6) has been an active duty Navy pilot for approximately 13 years and earned (b)(6) license prior to leaving active duty in 1982. (b)(6) fully retired from the Navy in 1996. (b)(6) has been an active Pearl Harbor Civil Service Pilot for 19 years. (b)(6) has no limitations on (b)(6) credentials other than that (b)(6) must have a spare pair of prescription glasses onboard.

(b)(6) has worked with P&R Tugs for about 10 years. P&R Tugs has held the contract with the Navy for tug services for 10 years. Before that, there was another tug company, and before that, the Navy used Navy tugs. Under its contract with the Navy, P&R provides 4 tugs. That is generally enough to meet the need. P&R has also won supplemental tug service contracts issued by the Navy.

(b)(6) has known the masters (captains) of Tigers 4 and 5 since they started work. Broadly speaking, (b)(6) believes (b)(6) known the captain of Tiger 4 (forward tug in this evolution) since about 2004. (b)(6) doesn't remember how long (b)(6) known the captain of Tiger 5 who (b)(6) believes started in deck before coming up to be captain - but its been a long time. (b)(6) has done lots of evolutions with both captains.

The last evolution prior to the incident in question was earlier that morning. They handled a movement at 0600. (b)(6) noted that this movement was an add-on from the previous day. (b)(6) would need to check logs for other movements in days before. As a rough average, (b)(6) pilots about 25 movements related to the Navy

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ENCLOSURE (26)<sup>1</sup>



of all classes of vessels, each month. This includes submarines, carriers, destroyers, tankers, etc.

On the 27<sup>th</sup>, (b)(6) day started at 0500. (b)(6) first ship was in Pearl City. It was another Military Sealift Command (MSC) ship. This ship was underway at approximately 0630. (b)(6) stayed on the ship till it passed Hospital Point (b)(6) then returned to the pilot station to wait for the next move – USNS MERCY. (b)(6) could not remember how many ships (b)(6) piloted the days preceding the MERCY, however could provide the information if desired from (b)(6) log book.

Instead of using a pilot boat, the tugs are used to transport the pilot to ships scheduled for movement. In Pearl Harbor, there are no ships that you can walk onto, so (b)(6) takes a tug out for each movement. The only exception is the carriers, where (b)(6) flies via helo on/off the ship for transportation.

(b)(6) recalls riding Tiger 5 out to the MERCY. (b)(6) boarded via the pilot ladder on the starboard side. On the ride out, (b)(6) discussed the general plan with the Tiger 5 Master. One line to Tiger 5 on the stern and one line to Tiger 4 on the bow. (b)(6) stated that the plan was simple, pull the ship off the pier into the basin and twist to starboard.

Once onboard the MERCY, (b)(6) met with the Master and they signed the pilot card. When asked what (b)(6) recalled about the ship's characteristics, (b)(6) remembered that the ship is roughly 890 feet long and had a very old steam plant. (b)(6) didn't recall shaft horse power. (b)(6) reviewed the card and signed it. (b)(6) discussed the general plan of using the tugs with the ship's Master.

Before getting underway, when asked whether control of the ship (conn) was passed to (b)(6) (b)(6) said there had not been a hard designation. (b)(6) stated that this is not unusual with commercial ships and with MSC ships. The log may state (b)(6) had the conn, but (b)(6) didn't know. But there was not a declaration of the pilot having the conn in the pilot house.

The pilot and the Master were side-by-side the entire time. The Chief Mate was in close vicinity. The Master handled communications with the ship's company. (b)(6) (b)(6) did not know if the ship had posted look-outs, or if the Master was in communications with them if stationed.

(b)(6) stated (b)(6) role was to coordinate ship orders through the Master and tug orders through (b)(6) hand held radio. Communication with the tug captains was conducted on one of the working channels 14, 11, or 71 using a hand held radio. (b)(6) said (b)(6) was "... basically directing the operation; Captain taking it in and doing it." The Captain of the MERCY had no direct contact or control of the tugs.

(b)(6) and the Captain were on the bridge. Lines were taken in. The bow lines came in before the stern lines. Once the lines were clear, (b)(6) had the stern tug (Tiger



5) pull out a bit and (b)(6) had the ship go to slow astern bell to back MERCY out of the slip. The ship moved slowly while close to the pier with approximately 10-15 feet separation to the pier and a sternway of approximately 2 knots.

When the bridge was lined up to K10, (b)(6) ordered all stop. (b)(6) stated that before (b)(6) could spin the ship (b)(6) had to ensure it would clear K8 berth.

(b)(6) remembered thinking about the Change of Command (COC) that was scheduled that day at K10. It was because of the COC that the Port Operations schedulers had been "pressured" to get the ships out before 0900. (b)(6) received this guidance from Port Ops. (b)(6) was directed to get the ships underway before the ceremony. Port Operations wanted the tugs back to their berth prior to the COC. The schedule was shifted to get (b)(6) previous ship underway earlier with a navy cruiser underway at the same time as the MERCY, leaving only two tugs for the MERCY move.

As the MERCY bridge passed K10 and verifying the bow would not swing into K10, (b)(6) directed Tiger 4 to take in her line and shift from the starboard to port bow to support the twist. While stationed on the starboard bridge wing and with both the tugs now stationed on the port side, (b)(6) stated that (b)(6) did not have visibility on either of the tugs. Prior to the twist, (b)(6) ordered "slow ahead" to slow the ship down and check the effectiveness of the propulsion plant to slow the ship. The ship slowed but maintained some sternway which was desired to continue to back out of the slip and clear K8 during the twist to Port. When (b)(6) was certain the ship would clear K8, (b)(6) ordered Tiger 4 ahead full on the port bow and Tiger 5 half astern at a 90 degree angle from the stern to port to start the twist. To assist in the twist and after the bow had cleared K8, the order was relayed via the Master to answer 020 RPMs ahead with a right hard rudder to assist the twist. Sometime after this, Tiger 5 reported that the ship was closing on the memorial and stated that (b)(6) didn't see any wash from the MERCY's screw. (b)(6) was not able to explain why the ship had closed the memorial and why the sternway had remained. The ship had been slow ahead for "awhile." "The Master and I were not aware the ship was slipping back." At somewhere between 200 ft and 100 ft, we went to ½ ahead (040 RPM) with a hard right rudder. Tiger 5 was reporting in a "very extreme voice" and the Master stated, "How about ahead full," to which (b)(6) stated "let's do it!"

(b)(6) stated, "how and why the ship drifted back that far befuddles me."

Tiger 5 informed (b)(6) that the rudder had touched the memorial. (b)(6) then stopped all tugs and the ship drove out. (b)(6) called the supervisor at the memorial on the phone to report the incident. (b)(6) didn't know for a fact that the rudder had hit, but (b)(6) speculated that the wash from the ship might have caused some damage at the least.

(b)(6) did not have visual sight of the tugs during the movement. (b)(6) "could not see the tugs." The Captain was with (b)(6) the "entire time".



When asked to describe the sequence of orders to the tugs, (b)(6) said the vessel was backed straight out and ready to pivot. Tiger 4 (bow tug) moved from starboard to port side and began pushing "ahead full." The astern tug was at ½ astern. The tugs stayed in this propulsion configuration until the vessel was "in extremis". The Pilot ordered Tiger 4 to stop all propulsion and the astern tug (Tiger 5) wrapped (b)(6) around the port quarter pulling the ship forward to mitigate the sternway.

When asked what reports (b)(6) was receiving from the Master, (b)(6) couldn't recall any. (b)(6) was getting reports from Tiger 5 who was reporting distances. (b)(6) doesn't know if the Master was getting any reports. While not denying that (b)(6) might have received some, (b)(6) didn't recall getting any information from the Captain or (b)(6) bridge team: "it probably was as a matter of routine, but I just don't remember hearing any."

When (b)(6) realized the ship was out of position, (b)(6) ordered ½ ahead (040 RPM). The ship was still closing. That's when full ahead was ordered. A full bell is an extreme measure for any ship. The Captain gave the "full ahead" order.

The ship then proceeded down the channel to Hospital Point. Once the ship was clear of the point, (b)(6) slowed it down to ½ ahead.

When asked what (b)(6) thoughts were as to what happened, (b)(6) said (b)(6) "didn't know". This evolution was something "we do routinely." The whole area is a turning basin. Turning tankers, AOE's, and other vessels is a matter of routine. The distance across is approximately 1500 feet. The normal concern is too much headway and staying off K8. It's much easier to take off sternway with an ahead bell. Why the MERCY "kept getting sternway, I don't know".

When discussing the potential for the tugs to contribute to the sternway, (b)(6) (b)(6) stated that the vessel was "quite a way back before I told (b)(6) (Tiger 4) to get off; maybe (b)(6) was at the wrong angle."

When asked about the number of tugs, (b)(6) said several things go into the decision. How many are requested by the ship. Then there is the Port Operations Officer who has control of the scheduling of tugs. "We (pilots) have an input whether it should be 2, 3 or 4." We use four tugs for the carriers to avoid the ship answering a stern bell which could cause propulsion casualties. Weather also is considered. For example, adding an additional tug is normal for 20 knot wind. There is no magic instruction or anything of that nature.

(b)(6) has known the Master of the MERCY for years.

When asked how (b)(6) checks (b)(6) speed when coming out and turning, (b)(6) said it's "Basically visual, looking down and looking out." When asked if there are speed and RPM indications on the bridge wing, (b)(6) stated (b)(6) didn't know.



(b)(6) recalls that when Tiger 5 reported not seeing any wash as the stern was approaching the memorial landing, the Captain said he verified the ship was "getting RPMs." After the ship went to ½ bell, Tiger 5 reported seeing wash. Additionally, (b)(6) stopped Tiger 4 because (b)(6) realized that pushing on the bow could cause sternway.

When asked what was causing and maintaining the sternway, (b)(6) said "it had to be one or the other of the tugs, they were the only outside influence." (b)(6) then said that "they (the tug captain) were always trying to do a good job and (b)(6) didn't want to put the hammer on them."

(b)(6) didn't recall looking at any speed indicators or RPM indicators on the bridge wing. (b)(6) relied on seaman's eye and (b)(6) previous experience with handling the ship to maintain awareness of the ship's speed. Additionally, (b)(6) stated that (b)(6) was used to the tugs reporting distances in feet. Orders relayed to the pilot house by the Captain was done via the amplified sound powered phone circuit.

(b)(6) said "(I) can't tell you why we didn't realize we were still drifting back." That is something (b)(6) is always trying to impress upon those (b)(6) teaches, especially the young officers on destroyers. (b)(6) repeated (b)(6) thought. (b)(6) said "we did not realize the ship was drifting back." (b)(6) explained that (b)(6) used the plural "we" intentionally because (b)(6) knew that if Captain Giudice had seen it, he would have done something. ... I would have done something."

The bow was well past K8 when the initial slow ahead bell was put on to slow the sternway before the ship twisted and the ship responded as expected. During this ahead bell, the rudder was at amidships. When the ship was twisting in the turning basin, the slow ahead bell was ordered and maintained with a hard right rudder to assist in the twist. (b)(6) acknowledged there had to be an "outside influence".

When asked if (b)(6) could tell how well the bridge team was communicating, (b)(6) (b)(6) couldn't. (b)(6) said the atmosphere was calm. There was a limited number of people on the bridge, but that is very adequate for an MSC ship. (b)(6) said (b)(6) observed "no confusion." (b)(6) did not recall if the Master was talking to the Mate. The Mate was on the bridge wing, in the vicinity of the Captain and (b)(6). "We (Captain and (b)(6)) were literally right next to each other." The Mate was 4-6' away.

(b)(6) was communicating with the tugs in feet. Most commercial ships and MSC ships communicate often in feet. The Captain stayed with (b)(6) the entire time, using his hand held radio to communicate with his crew.

(b)(6) reported the Master saying "yes, you're getting RPMs" when Tiger 5 reported seeing no wash while approaching the memorial when answering a slow ahead with a right hard rudder. The Tiger 5 Master started calling off distances to the memorial.



(b)(6) ended (b)(6) statement saying that in (b)(6) mind (b)(6) has gone over and over what happened. (b)(6) feels bad. This is the first time (b)(6) had to come down to a meeting with the USCG ("you guys"). (b)(6) glad no one got hurt and that the ship wasn't damaged. (b)(6) played out the sequence and the 'what ifs' thousands of times in (b)(6) mind. After departing MERCY onto the Tiger 5 for the transit back to the tug berth, the only discussion (b)(6) recalled having with Tiger 5's Captain was something about "5 more feet and you'd have made it." Tiger 5 was wrapped around the corner. Buttering each other up, "but again, how'd we get back there."

The interview ended at 1000.

(b)(6)

6/8/2015

Date

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6

Enclosure (26)<sup>6</sup>



**ENCL (26)**  
**Damage Photos of**  
**USNS MERCY**



01 JUN 2015

STATEMENT FOR (b)(6) (TIGER 4 CAPTAIN)

I, (b)(6), provide the following statement pertaining to the allision of USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) with USS ARIZONA Memorial.

1. On 27 May 2015, I was the Captain of harbor tug Tiger 4 (forward tug), during USNS MERCY's departure from Pearl Harbor, HI. I have been a harbor tug Captain since June 2001 and I have not been involved in any significant marine incidents prior to this incident.
2. USNS MERCY's length is comparable to other vessels, such as U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, which take four tugs, for which I have acted as harbor tug Captain to assist with arrival or departure. The departure plan was similar to other vessels that were berthed at Pier H2 pier. The number of tugs was determined by Port Operations. Twisting vessels in the harbor is generally done in the same location and same direction for other vessels departing from pier H2.
3. USNS MERCY was moored port-side-to at H2. Tug Tiger 4 was made up on MERCY's starboard bow (Dutch bollard), approximately 80 ft. from the bow, beneath the bridge wing. Tug Tiger 5 was made up on the stern centerline chock. The two tugs lifted MERCY away from the pier. After clearing the knuckle of pier K10, at the direction of the Pilot, Tiger 4 cast off its line from the starboard bow and moved to the port bow, no line. I was in position on the port bow between the bullnose and the anchor. At that point, MERCY was well clear of the "Hotel" piers. When MERCY cleared the K10 pier, Tiger 4 was directed by the Pilot to push ahead full throttle on the port bow to start the starboard twist. Tiger 4 proceeded to push at a 90 degree angle to MERCY's keel. While in the vicinity of the K8 pier and in the channel, I heard the Pilot tell Tiger 5 "ok, watch for wash, gonna kick it ahead." My perception is that MERCY was still moving astern pretty fast at that point. I heard, via Channel 14, the Tiger 5 tug Captain report "still don't see any wash, getting close to Arizona Memorial." Then I heard Tiger 5 start calling distances when MERCY's stern was approximately 250 ft from the ARIZONA Memorial. Tiger 5 kept calling distances in feet, to which the Pilot acknowledged. Tiger 4 continued pushing full at the bow, at a 90 degree angle to MERCY's keel while Tiger 5 was pulling 1/2 astern at a 90 degree angle to MERCY's keel. After the allision occurred, the Pilot ordered both tugs to "stop" at which point MERCY gained headway. The Pilot instructed Tiger 4 to come around to MERCY's starboard bow. Tiger 4 remained on standby as the vessel went around Hospital Point and was released.
4. The evolution was not specifically briefed between the Pilot, Tiger 5, and my tug prior to arrival. However, the maneuvering of the tugs was discussed prior to commencement. At no point during the evolution did I feel a sense of urgency or being rushed. Following the event, I returned to the scene of the allision to take pictures, which I have provided to P&R's Port Captain.
5. From my perspective as the forward tug, MERCY was twisting as she should have. Additionally, 1.5-2 knots of sternway is normal for a vessel of that size, but I felt that the sternway was lasting longer than normal after the vessel was beyond K8.

Enclosure (27)



(b)(6)

6/2/15

(b)(6)

(Harbor Tug Tiger 4 Captain)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. § 802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date 6/1/15



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-2692 (Rev. 06-04)		<b>REPORT OF MARINE ACCIDENT, INJURY OR DEATH</b>				RCS No. G-MOA MISLE NOTIFICATION NUMBER					
SECTION I. GENERAL INFORMATION											
1. Name of Vessel or Facility <b>ASD PATSY MINK (TIGER 4)</b>			2. Official No. <b>1147078</b>		3. Nationality <b>US</b>		4. Call Sign <b>WDB 5867</b>				
5. USCG Certificate of Inspection issued at			6. Type (Towing, Freight, Fish, Drill, etc.) <b>TOWING</b>		7. Length <b>86'</b>		8. Gross Tons <b>97</b>				
9. Year Built <b>2003</b>			10. Propulsion (Steam, diesel, gas, turbine...) <b>DIESEL</b>		11. Hull Material (Steel, Wood...) <b>STEEL</b>		12. Draft (ft. - in.) <b>FWD 6' AFT 6'</b>				
13. If Vessel Classed, By Whom (ABS, LLOYDS, DNV, BV, etc.) <b>ABS</b>			14. Date (of occurrence) <b>27 MAY 2015</b>		15. TIME (Local) <b>0800HRS</b>						
16. Location (See Instruction No. 10A) <b>PEARL HARBOR</b>				17. Estimated Loss of Damage TO:							
18. Name, Address & Telephone No. of Operating Co. <b>TIGER TUG 2,3, &amp; 4 LLC 123 AHUI STREET PO BOX 2851 HONOLULU, HI 96803</b>				VESSEL _____ CARGO _____ OTHER _____							
19. Name of Master or Person in Charge <b>(b)(6)</b>		USCG License <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		20. Name of Pilot <b>(b)(6)</b>		USCG License <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO State License <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO					
19a. Street Address (City, State, Zip Code) <b>(b)(6)</b>		19b. Telephone Number <b>(b)(6)</b>		20a. Street Address (City, State, Zip Code)		20b. Telephone Number					
21. Casualty Elements (Check as many as needed and explain in Block 44)											
<input type="checkbox"/> NO. OF PERSONS ON BOARD _____ <input type="checkbox"/> DEATH - HOW MANY? _____ <input type="checkbox"/> MISSING - HOW MANY? _____ <input type="checkbox"/> INJURED - HOW MANY? _____ <input type="checkbox"/> HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASED OR INVOLVED _____ (Identify Substance and amount in Block 44) <input type="checkbox"/> OIL SPILL - ESTIMATE AMOUNT _____ <input type="checkbox"/> CARGO CONTAINER LOST/DAMAGED _____ <input type="checkbox"/> COLLISION (Identify other vessel or object in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> GROUNDING <input type="checkbox"/> WAKE DAMAGE				<input type="checkbox"/> FLOODING, SWAMPING WITHOUT SINKING <input type="checkbox"/> CAPSIZING (with or without sinking) <input type="checkbox"/> FOUNDERING OR SINKING <input type="checkbox"/> HEAVY WEATHER DAMAGE <input type="checkbox"/> FIRE <input type="checkbox"/> EXPLOSION <input type="checkbox"/> COMMERCIAL DIVING CASUALTY <input type="checkbox"/> ICE DAMAGE <input type="checkbox"/> DAMAGE TO AIDS TO NAVIGATION <input type="checkbox"/> STEERING FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> MACHINERY OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> ELECTRICAL FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> STRUCTURAL FAILURE				<input type="checkbox"/> FIREFIGHTING OR EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> BLOW OUT (Petroleum exploration/production) <input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> DRUG INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) _____			
22. Conditions											
A. Sea or River Conditions (wave height, river stage, etc.)		B. WEATHER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLEAR <input type="checkbox"/> RAIN <input type="checkbox"/> SNOW <input type="checkbox"/> FOG <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) _____		C. TIME <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DAYLIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> TWILIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT		D. VISIBILITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GOOD <input type="checkbox"/> FAIR <input type="checkbox"/> POOR					
						E. DISTANCE (miles of visibility) _____					
						F. AIR TEMPERATURE (F) _____					
						G. WIND SPEED & DIRECTION <b>ENE 0-5 MPH</b>					
						H. CURRENT SPEED & DIRECTION _____					
23. Navigation Information				24. Last Port Where Bound		24a. Time and Date of Departure					
<input type="checkbox"/> MOORED, DOKED OR FIXED <input type="checkbox"/> ANCHORED <input type="checkbox"/> UNDERWAY OR DRIFTING				SPEED AND COURSE _____							
25. FOR TOWING ONLY		25a. NUMBER OF VESSELS TOWED		25b. TOTAL H.P. OF TOWING UNITS		25c. MAXIMUM SIZE OF TOW WITH TOW-BOAT(S)					
		Empty Loaded Total				Length Width					
						25d. (Describe in Block 44.)					
						<input type="checkbox"/> PUSHING AHEAD <input type="checkbox"/> TOWING ASTERN <input type="checkbox"/> TOWING ALONGSIDE <input type="checkbox"/> MORE THAN ONE TOW-BOAT ON TOW					
SECTION II. BARGE INFORMATION											
26. Name		26a. Official Number		26b. Type		26c. Length					
						26d. Gross Tons					
26f. Year Built		26g. <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE SKIN <input type="checkbox"/> DOUBLE		26h. Draft FWD AFT		26i. Operating Company					
26j. Damage Amount				26k. Describe Damage to Barge							
BARGE _____											
CARGO _____											
OTHER _____											

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE



SECTION III. PERSONNEL ACCIDENT INFORMATION					
27. Person Involved <input type="checkbox"/> MALE or <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE <input type="checkbox"/> DEAD <input type="checkbox"/> INJURED <input type="checkbox"/> MISSING		27a. Name (Last, First, Middle Name) 27b. Address (City, State, Zip Code)		27c. Status <input type="checkbox"/> Crew <input type="checkbox"/> Passenger <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
28. Birth Date	29. Telephone No.	30. Job Position		31. (Check here if off duty) <input type="checkbox"/>	
32. Employer - (if different from Block 18, fill in Name, Address, Telephone No.)					
33. Person's Time A. IN THIS INDUSTRY - _____ YEAR(S) MONTH(S) B. WITH THIS COMPANY - _____ C. IN PRESENT JOB OR POSITION - _____ D. ON PRESENT VESSEL/FACILITY - _____ E. HOURS ON DUTY WHEN ACCIDENT OCCURRED - _____				34. Industry of Employer (Towing, Fishing, Shipping, Crew Supply, Drilling, etc.) 35. Was the Injured Person Incapacitated 72 Hours or More? 36. Date of Death	
37. Activity of Person at Time of Accident					
38. Specific Location of Accident on Vessel/Facility					
39. Type of Accident (Fall, Caught between, etc.)			40. Resulting Injury (Cut, Bruise, Fracture, Burn, etc.)		
41. Part of Body Injured			42. Equipment Involved in Accident		
43. Specific Object, Part of the Equipment in block 42, or Substance (Chemical, Solvent, etc.) that directly produced the Injury					
SECTION IV. DESCRIPTION OF CASUALTY					
44. Describe how accident occurred, damage, information on alcohol/drug involvement and recommendations for corrective safety measures. (See instructions and attach additional sheets if necessary)					
<p>Getting USNS MERCY underway from Pier H2 to Sea with Pilot Peter One Captain (b)(6) T4 on the bow. T5 on centerline stern. After clearing H2, I cast off my line from the starboard bow and came to port to push full. T5 was pulling half astern to port. The pilot told us halfway through the turn that (b)(6) was putting on an ahead bell to stop the sternway and asked T5 to let (b)(6) know when (b)(6) sees prop wash. No wash was seen. At 250 feet off the Arizona memorial, T5 told Capt. (b)(6) the distance and counted off every 25 feet the distance from the stern of the MERCY to the Arizona Memorial landing. T5 notified the pilot that light contact occurred with the ship's rudder and the Arizona landing. At this time both tugs stopped. Ship began to get way on and headed safely to sea.</p>					
<div style="background-color: black; color: red; text-align: center; padding: 5px;">(b)(6)</div> <div style="background-color: black; color: red; text-align: center; padding: 5px;">(b)(6)</div> <div style="background-color: black; color: red; text-align: center; padding: 5px;">(b)(6)</div>					
45. Witness (Name, Address, Telephone No.)					
SECTION V. PERSON MAKING THIS REPORT					
47. Name (PRINT) (Last, First, Middle)		47b. Address (City, State, Zip Code)		47c. Title	
47a. Signature				Captain, T4 47d. Telephone No. 5/27/15 47e. Date	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>FOR COAST GUARD USE ONLY</div> <div>REPORTING OFFICE:</div> </div>					
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Data Entry:</div> <div>MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number (if applicable)</div> </div>					
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <span>NONE</span> <span>PRELIMINARY</span> <span>DATA COLLECTION</span> <span>INFORMAL</span> <span>FORMAL</span> </div>					
Serious Marine Incident    Yes    No Major Marine Casualty    Yes    No		INVESTIGATOR (Name)		DATE	
		APPROVED BY (Name)		DATE	



ENCL (27)

Damage Photos of  
USS ARIZONA Memorial  
Landing Dock



01 JUN 2015

STATEMENT FOR (b)(6) (TIGER 5 CAPTAIN)

1. On 27 May 2015, I was the Captain of harbor tug Tiger 5 (aft tug), during USNS MERCY's departure from Pearl Harbor, HI. I have been a harbor tug Captain since approximately 2003, to include previous assignments for assisting with MERCY's movements in Pearl Harbor.

2. Environmental factors were negligible on the day of the incident. "It was a perfect day." The Pilot transited to the MERCY onboard Tiger 5 during which the Pilot and I had a brief discussion about the departure plan. The departure plan was similar to other vessels that were berthed at Hotel 2. The number of tugs was determined by Port Operations. Twisting the vessel in the harbor was generally done in the same location and same direction as other vessels departing from H2 pier, however, MERCY continued sternway towards Ford Island.

3. USNS MERCY was moored port-side-to at Hotel 2. Tug Tiger 4 was made up on MERCY's starboard bow, beneath the bridge wing. Tug Tiger 5 was made up on the stern centerline chock. Tugs pulled MERCY away from the pier. After clearing pier otel Kilo 10, at the direction of the Pilot, Tiger 4 cast off its line from the starboard bow and moved to the port bow but did not put up another line. After MERCY's bow cleared Kilo 10, Tiger 5 was ordered by the Pilot to stop pulling aft, let out some line and get to 90 degrees port side of MERCY (perpendicular to MERCY's keel). Once in position I informed the Pilot I was at 90 degrees and ready to work. I was then directed by the Pilot to come  $\frac{1}{2}$  astern at 90 degrees. Shortly after I began pulling at 90 degrees the Pilot indicated (b)(6) was coming ahead and directed Tiger 5 to watch for prop wash. I did not see any wash and reported this to the Pilot. I continued to look for wash as MERCY continued sternway. When MERCY was approximately 300 ft away from the Memorial, I realized something was out of the ordinary. At this point, Tiger 5 was still at 90 degrees to the keel of MERCY. I started calling distances (seaman's eye) at 275 ft. I also reported to the Pilot that there was still no prop wash. At 200 ft., I tried to check sternway by increasing my angle to 135 degrees. However, still no prop wash was visible and I reported this again to the Pilot. I saw some prop wash when the Memorial landing dock was 30 feet astern and 20 feet off the port quarter of MERCY. I then reported seeing prop wash to the Pilot. This was still much less wash than what I expected to see at that point. I witnessed heavy prop wash when there was 5-10 feet between MERCY's aft, port quarter and the Memorial landing dock, then MERCY's rudder contacted the Memorial landing dock, causing the dock to shift astern of MERCY. The rudder continued approximately 20 feet along the face of the landing. At that point MERCY slowly began headway away from the landing.

ENCLOSURE (28)



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(Harbor Tug Tiger 5 Captain)



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. § 802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
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**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Date

6-1-2015



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-2692 (Rev. 06-04)		<b>REPORT OF MARINE ACCIDENT, INJURY OR DEATH</b>				RCS No. G-MOA MISLE/NOTIFICATION NUMBER																																								
<b>SECTION I. GENERAL INFORMATION</b>																																														
1. Name of Vessel or Facility TIGER 5		2. Official No. 1166594		3. Nationality US		4. Call Sign WDC 3998																																								
6. Type (Towing, Freight, Fish, Drill, etc.) TOWING		7. Length 86.0		8. Gross Tons 94		9. Year Built 2004																																								
10. Propulsion (Steam, diesel, gas, turbine...) DIESEL		11. Hull Material (Steel, Wood...) STEEL		12. Draft (ft. - in.) FWD 6' AFT 6'		13. If Vessel Classed, By Whom: (ABS, LLOYDS, DNV, BV, etc.) ABS																																								
14. Date (of occurrence) 27 MAY 2015		15. TIME (Local) 0800HRS		16. Location (See Instruction No. 104) PEARL HARBOR		17. Estimated Loss of Damage TO: VESSEL _____ CARGO _____ OTHER _____																																								
18. Name, Address & Telephone No. of Operating Co. TIGER TUG 5, LLC 123 AHUI STREET PO BOX 2851 HONOLULU, HI 96803		19. Name of Master or Person in Charge (b)(6)		USCG License <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		20. Name of Pilot (b)(6) (P1)																																								
19a. Street Address (City, State, Zip Code) (b)(6)		19b. Telephone Number (b)(6)		20a. Street Address (City, State, Zip Code)		20b. Telephone Number																																								
21. Casualty Elements (Check as many as needed and explain in Block 44.)																																														
<table border="0"> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> NO. OF PERSONS ON BOARD 3</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> FLOODING, SWAMPING WITHOUT SINKING</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> FIREFIGHTING OR EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> DEATH - HOW MANY?</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> CAPSIZING (with or without sinking)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> MISSING - HOW MANY?</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> FOUNDERING OR SINKING</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> BLOW OUT (Petroleum exploration/production)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> INJURED - HOW MANY?</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> HEAVY WEATHER DAMAGE</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASED OR INVOLVED (Identify Substance and amount in Block 44.)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> FIRE</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> DRUG INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> OIL SPILL - ESTIMATE AMOUNT:</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> EXPLOSION</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> CARGO CONTAINER LOST/DAMAGED</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> COMMERCIAL DIVING CASUALTY</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> COLLISION (Identify other vessel or object in Block 44.)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ICE DAMAGE</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> GROUNDING <input type="checkbox"/> WAKE DAMAGE</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> DAMAGE TO AIDS TO NAVIGATION</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> STEERING FAILURE</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> MACHINERY OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ELECTRICAL FAILURE</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> STRUCTURAL FAILURE</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>								<input type="checkbox"/> NO. OF PERSONS ON BOARD 3	<input type="checkbox"/> FLOODING, SWAMPING WITHOUT SINKING	<input type="checkbox"/> FIREFIGHTING OR EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.)	<input type="checkbox"/> DEATH - HOW MANY?	<input type="checkbox"/> CAPSIZING (with or without sinking)	<input type="checkbox"/> LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.)	<input type="checkbox"/> MISSING - HOW MANY?	<input type="checkbox"/> FOUNDERING OR SINKING	<input type="checkbox"/> BLOW OUT (Petroleum exploration/production)	<input type="checkbox"/> INJURED - HOW MANY?	<input type="checkbox"/> HEAVY WEATHER DAMAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.)	<input type="checkbox"/> HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASED OR INVOLVED (Identify Substance and amount in Block 44.)	<input type="checkbox"/> FIRE	<input type="checkbox"/> DRUG INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.)	<input type="checkbox"/> OIL SPILL - ESTIMATE AMOUNT:	<input type="checkbox"/> EXPLOSION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> CARGO CONTAINER LOST/DAMAGED	<input type="checkbox"/> COMMERCIAL DIVING CASUALTY		<input type="checkbox"/> COLLISION (Identify other vessel or object in Block 44.)	<input type="checkbox"/> ICE DAMAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> GROUNDING <input type="checkbox"/> WAKE DAMAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> DAMAGE TO AIDS TO NAVIGATION			<input type="checkbox"/> STEERING FAILURE			<input type="checkbox"/> MACHINERY OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE			<input type="checkbox"/> ELECTRICAL FAILURE			<input type="checkbox"/> STRUCTURAL FAILURE	
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28. Birth Date	29. Telephone No.	30. Job Position	27c. Status <input type="checkbox"/> Crew <input type="checkbox"/> Passenger <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> (Check here if off duty)
32. Employer - (if different from Block 18, fill in Name, Address, Telephone No.)			
33. Person's Time A. IN THIS INDUSTRY - B. WITH THIS COMPANY - C. IN PRESENT JOB OR POSITION - D. ON PRESENT VESSEL/FACILITY - E. HOURS ON DUTY WHEN ACCIDENT OCCURRED -		YEAR(S) _____ MONTH(S) _____ _____	34. Industry of Employer (Towing, Fishing, Shipping, Crew Supply, Drilling, etc.) 35. Was the Injured Person Incapacitated 72 Hours or More? 36. Date of Death
37. Activity of Person at Time of Accident			
38. Specific Location of Accident on Vessel/Facility			
39. Type of Accident (Fall, Caught between, etc.)		40. Resulting Injury (Cut, Bruise, Fracture, Burn, etc.)	
41. Part of Body Injured		42. Equipment Involved in Accident	
43. Specific Object, Part of the Equipment in block 42, or Substance (Chemical, Solvent, etc.) that directly produced the injury.			
SECTION IV. DESCRIPTION OF CASUALTY			
44. Describe how accident occurred, damage, information on alcohol/drug involvement and recommendations for corrective safety measures (See instructions and attach additional sheets if necessary).  USNS MERCY underway from H2 to Sea. Tiger 5 had a single head line through the center chock on stern. After backing out of H2, Captain (b)(6) (P1) told me to put some line out and come to 90° angle and had me backing half. P1 said (b)(6) had an ahead bell on and to watch for wash, so I acknowledged (b)(6). After about 40-45 seconds I informed P1 that there was still no prop wash. As the ship closed to 250' to the Arizona, I started calling at intervals of every 25°. At that time I started pulling at an angle to try and stop the ship. At around 40' I saw prop wash and informed the pilot. The ship was still closing and made light contact with the landing. I informed the pilot that the ship made contact and was sliding down the side of the landing. Shortly after, the ship started making headway and was opening up from the landing.			
45. Witness (Name, Address, Telephone No.) (b)(6) (b)(6)			
SECTION V. PERSON INVOLVED AND REPORT			
47. (b)(6)	47b. Address (City, State, Zip Code) (b)(6)		47c. Telephone No. Tug Operator (b)(6)
47a. Signature (b)(6)	47d. Date 5/27/2015		REPORTING OFFICE:
MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Data Entry: NONE PRELIMINARY DATA COLLECTION INFORMAL FORMAL			
MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number (if applicable)		MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number (if applicable)	
Serious Marine Incident Yes No	Major Marine Casualty Yes No	INVESTIGATOR (Name)	DATE
		APPROVED BY (Name)	DATE



10 July 2015

Memo for Record

From: Investigating Officer CAPT (b)(6) USN

Subj: FACTS PERTAINING TO THE 27 MAY 2015 ALLISION

Encl: (1) Business Card of P&R Water Taxi President  
(2) 5 Photos of the landing pier and damages  
(3) Photos of MERCY Rudder post-allision  
(4) (b)(6) P&R Acct e-mail of Friday, 26 June 2015 14:07  
re: Tug SHP  
(5) Net Astern Thrust Calculations (Assumptions and Diagram)

1. During the course of my investigation, I learned the following:

a. Navy Contract N00033-12-C-2101, a definitive contract for marine services was awarded by Military Sealift Command to P&R Water Taxi LLC on 6 January 2012. The contractor's name and address is -

P&R Water Taxi LLC  
123 Ahui St  
Honolulu, HI 96813-5509  
(808) 526-9311.

I obtained this information from a public source available online at the following web address:

<http://government-contracts.insidegov.com/1/3189076/N0003312C2101>.

b. I visited the offices of P&R Water Taxi on 1-2 June and interviewed the Captains of Tigers 4 and 5. The Company's President, (b)(6) was present at the interviews and provided me with a copy of his business card. See enclosure (1).

c. I visited the landing pier of the USS ARIZONA Memorial on 1 June 2015 to view the damage that resulted from the allision. At the time of my visit, the memorial was closed to the public. I observed the pier listing. I also observed where the ramp from the pier to the memorial had broken free and damaged the handrail. I also observed the torn rubber fendering material and the damage to the surface of the lower portion of the pier. Enclosure (2) contains photos taken at my direction.

d. Enclosure (3) are photos taken of the MERCY rudder after the allision. The rudder has marks on the aft edge and bottom surface. A mark is visible on the port side of the rudder near the water line where the rudder struck the landing pier rubber fendering strip. Scrapes are visible on the lower portion of the ruder and on t the port side, potentially from the scraping the landing pier below the waterline or the anchoring system for the landing.

e. The SHP for Tigers 4 and 5 is 4400 HP. See enclosure (4).

f. Calculation of the net thrust in the astern direction was calculated based on Tiger 4 HP at ahead full and the MERCY ahead slow (20 RPM) bell with



a hard right rudder to show that the net stern thrust was 560 HP in the  
astern direction. See enclosure (5).

(b)(6)



(b)(6)



Curt





## P&R Water Taxi, Ltd.

P.O. Box 2851 Honolulu, Hawaii 96803

(b)(6)

*President*

### **Pier 36**

Office: (808) 521-2545

Fax: (808) 521-4904

### **Kewalo Shipyard**

Office: (808) 526-9311



Fax: (808) 526-9811

Cell: (808) 478-8785


E-mail: (b)(6)@pnrwatertaxi.com




Pearl Harbor, USS ARIZONA Memorial, Landing Pier 1 June 2015











## RUDDER STOCK ORIENTATION SKETCH


SCALE:  $\frac{1}{8}" = 1'-0"$

USNS Mercy  
07 June 2015 Dive Examination  
Suva, Fiji at King's Wharf


Encl (7A)

6



















(b)(6)

CAPT MSCHQ, N3/5

**From:** (b)(6) P&R Acct (b)(6)@pnrwatertaxi.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 26, 2015 14:07  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV MSCHQ, N3  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CAPT MSCHQ, N3/5 (b)(6)@pnrwatertaxi.com  
**Subject:** Re: Tug SHP

Yes that is correct 4400 HP

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPad

> On Jun 25, 2015, at 10:04 AM, (b)(6) CIV MSCHQ, N3 (b)(6)@navy.mil> wrote:  
>  
> Good morning (b)(6)  
>  
> From speaking with (b)(6) today, I understand the SHP for Tiger 4 and Tiger 5 is 4400 hp.  
>  
> Would you please confirm by email?  
>  
> Thank you.  
>  
> V/R,  
> (b)(6)  
> Military Sealift Command



### Net Astern Thrust Calculation


During the course of my investigation, this enclosure was developed by (b)(6) a Surface Warfare Officer, to determine the net astern component of the thrust associated with the tug pushing ahead full on at an angle 60 degrees to the keel and the ahead bell from MERCY. If the tug was pushing at 90 degrees to the keel, no stern thrust would have resulted. The astern component of Tiger 4 push on the bow was somewhat countered by the ahead thrust from the ship's ordered bell, lessened by the rudder angle of 35 degrees. The intent of this diagram is to show the thrust components of both Tiger 4 pushing on the angle portion of the bow based photos taken at the time of the ship allision and MERCY's waterline hull design, and the thrust components of the engine order ahead slow 20 RPM with a hard right rudder. Assumptions used in these calculations include:

- Tractor tug is pushing at 90 degrees to the hull of MERCY which is 60 degrees to the keel (as seen photos - separate enclosure)
- Tractor tug was pushing ahead full (based on statements) which is 4400 shaft horse power (shp)
- Rudder position was hard right rudder (35 degrees for T-AH)
- Hydraulic effects or lift of the rudder is not considered
- All of the thrust from the ordered ahead slow 20 RPM ordered bell was directed by the rudder.



# Slow ahead bell, 20 RPM

Net horsepower : 2200 – 1640 = 560 HP astern





Generated by ShipsLog™

Report Date: Friday, May 29, 2015 00:38

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

0000-0400800 (b)(6)

Watch begins with vessel securely moored port side to Hotel H2 U.S. Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii with 2 Head, 2 Spring and 2 Breast lines forward; and 2 Stern, 2 Spring and 2 Breast Lines aft w/ stbd anchor underfoot. Storm lines are attached to dutch bollards along the hull. Rat guards rigged. The vessel is on ship's power with both boilers on line. FPCON is Alpha (WAM). Vessel is conforming to ZD +10 (W). Shoreside (25 ft) brow and stair tower are rigged at the port sideport with safety net in place. Services from the pier include; Trash disposal, MSD connections, Potable Water, Rental Vehicles and Bus service. RAM #15 in effect. On watch - 3/O (b)(6) with A/E (b)(6) A/B (b)(6) and O/S (b)(6) alternating as gangway security, roving patrol, and standby roving patrol. 0058 W/O completed pre-departure tests of the GMDSS console IAW 47 CFR 80.1105(i)(2).

0100 AB (b)(6) reported rounds complete and all is secure.

0130 W/O completed security rounds of the ship and all is secure.

0220 AB (b)(6) reported rounds complete and all is secure.

0330 OS (b)(6) reported rounds complete and all is secure.

0345 Watch ends securely moored with partly cloudy sky, gentle NW'ly breezes and good visibility. Watch properly relieved by 3/O (b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 27, 2015 03:45

0400-0800

Moored as before. On watch 3/O (b)(6) with AB (b)(6) AB (b)(6) and OS (b)(6) rotating gangway security, standby and roving patrol. Security badge inventory: 10 Red, 10 Yellow, 10 White. 0445 MOW granted wheel clearance to ERC.

0448 Conducted SAT steering gear test in all modes IAW 33 CFR 164.25.

0450 ERC reported completed SAT test of EDG IAW 33 CFR 164.25.

0452 Conducted SAT test of all internal communications IAW 33 CFR 164.25.

0500 Conducted SAT test of Ahead and Astern propulsion /EOT IAW 33 CFR 164.25.

0505 AB (b)(6) reported rounds completed, all secure.

0549 Sunrise, all deck and security lights extinguished.

0625 AB (b)(6) reported rounds completed, all secure.

0630 Conducted Pre-Departure Navigation Brief IAW SMS Procedure 7.2.003-All & SMS Checklist 7.2-003-01-All. 18 personnel present. Observed Departure drafts FWD 28'0" MID 30'08" AFT 32'10". 2/O (b)(6) reported a maximum draft of 32'10" IAW 46 CFR 97.15-5 and minimum UKC of 6'0". 3/O (b)(6) reported vessel is in compliance with all stability requirements IAW 46 CFR 35.20-7.

0700 Set Sea, Anchor and Maneuvering detail. Capt Guidice and C/M (b)(6) on the bridge, 2/O (b)(6) navigating, 3/O (b)(6) as HSO with AB (b)(6) and DMAC (b)(6) in aft steering.

0707 Bow manned and ready. Anchors ready to let go.

0710 Pilot aboard.

0713 Tug "Tiger 4" made fast fwd to dutch bollard. Tug "Tiger 5" made fast aft centerline chock.

0716 Master / Pilot Exchange completed IAW 33 CFR 157.455(b). Pilot Capt. (b)(6) has the conn.



Generated by ShipsLog™

Report Date Friday May 29 2015 00:33

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

**0730 Last line. Took Departure. Commenced Voyage 04-15.**

0735 Watch ends with partly cloudy sky, light airs and good visibility. Relieved by 3/O (b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 27, 2015 07:35

0800-1200

Watch begins with vessel underway in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii with Pilot Captain (b)(6) at the conn. On watch - 3/O (b)(6) with A/B (b)(6) and A/B (b)(6) alternating as helmsman and O/S (b)(6) as lookout.

0747 Order given for engines full ahead. Master assumed the conn.

0808 Both tugs cast off.

**0814 Pilot Captain (b)(6) away.**

0822 3/O (b)(6) reported stern secured for sea.

0837 Vessel crossed COLREGS demarcation line.

0838 Secured the sea, anchor, and maneuvering details.

0854 3/O (b)(6) at the conn. Vessel steering 225°pgc, 212°psc for 225°T, 70 RPM, port steering unit in hand.

0945 A/C 222°pgc, 209°psc for 225°T.

1017 O/S (b)(6) completed round throughout the vessel. All in apparent good order.

1110 A/C 225°pgc, 214°psc for 225°T.

1114 A/B (b)(6) completed round throughout the vessel. All in apparent good order.

**1130 2/O (b)(6) REPORTED THE VDR SECURED FROM RECORDING AND THE MEMORY CARD PLACED IN THE CAPTAINS SAFE. IAW SMS 8.22-001-ALL**

1132 A/C 227°pgc, 215°psc for 225°T.

1145 Watch ends with vessel underway steering 227°pgc, 215°psc for 225°T, 70 RPM, port steering unit in hand. Vessel is riding easy in smooth seas under partly cloudy skies with a gentle ENE'ly breeze and good visibility. Watch officer properly relieved by 3/O (b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 27, 2015 11:45

1200-1600

Underway as before. On course 225 PGC 214 PSC on port steering unit at 70 RPM. On watch 3/O

(b)(6) and A/B (b)(6) A/B (b)(6) and O/S (b)(6)

1209 W/O granted permission to roll embarked helo out of hangar.

1253 O/S (b)(6) reported security round complete and all is secure.

1419 A/B (b)(6) reported security round complete and all is secure.

1530 A/B (b)(6) reported security round complete and all is secure.

1545 Watch ends securely moored with mostly cloudy sky, gentle NE'ly breezes and good visibility. Watch properly relieved by 3/O (b)(6)



Generated by ShipLog™

Report Date: Friday, May 29, 2015 00:38

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

(b)(6)

May 27, 2015 15:45

1600-2000

Underway as before. On course 225 PGC 214 PSC on port steering unit at 70 RPM. On watch 3/O

(b)(6) and Cadet (b)(6) with AB (b)(6) AB (b)(6) and OS (b)(6)

1612 C/C 210 PGC 195 PSC for wind envelope.

**1615 Set flight quarters.**

1618 Rescue boat 1 manned and ready.

**1626 Master granted permission to conduct helo operations.**

1640 Amber deck.

1644 Red deck.

1654 Green deck.

1656 Helo away.

**1658 Aft steering manned and ready 2/O (b)(6) and DMAC (b)(6)****1700 Set modified Maneuvering detail.**

1702 All stations manned and ready.

1705 OS (b)(6) reported rounds completed, all secure.

**1800 Secured from modified Maneuvering detail.****1802 Set helo refueling detail.**

1804 Green deck.

1807 Helo on deck. Red deck.

1817 Amber deck.

1818 Secured rescue boat detail.

1819 C/C 230 PGC 218 PSC for track.

1825 AB (b)(6) reported rounds completed, all secure.

1826 Rescue boat secured for sea.

1829 Amber deck.

1841 Red deck.

**1849 Secured from flight quarters.**

1911 Sunset, all navigation lights are bright.

1935 AB (b)(6) reported rounds completed, all secure.

1945 Watch ends with cloudy sky, light NE'ly breeze, smooth sea and good visibility. Relieved by 3/O (b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 27, 2015 19:45

2000-2400

Watch begins with vessel underway steering 230°pgc, 218°psc for 226°T, 70 RPM, port steering unit in hand. Vessel is riding easy in smooth seas under cloudy skies with a moderate NNE'ly breeze and good visibility. On watch - 3/O (b)(6) with A/B (b)(6) A/B (b)(6) and O/S (b)(6) alternating as helmsman, lookout, and roving patrol.



## Daily Log

## Remarks Sheet

USNS Mercy

Generated by ShipsLog™

Report Date: Friday May 29, 2015 00:38

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

2058 A/B (b)(6) completed round throughout the vessel. All in apparent good order.

2218 A/B (b)(6) completed round throughout the vessel. All in apparent good order.

2308 A/C 226°pgc, 214°psc for 226°T.

2324 O/S (b)(6) completed round throughout the vessel. All in apparent good order.

2345 Watch ends with vessel underway steering 226°pgc, 214°psc for 226°T, 70 RPM, port steering unit in hand. Vessel is riding easy in slight seas under cloudy skies with a gentle NE'ly breeze and good visibility. Watch officer properly relieved by 3/O (b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 27, 2015 23:45

Approved on Friday, May 29, 2015 00:38 by Giudice, Thomas J.  
Reviewer's Comments

Reviewed By

Date

Approved By

Date

*Giudice* 28 May 2015



# T-AH DEPARTURE CHECKLIST

(\*\*) Items req'd to be logged IAW 33 CFR 164.25

USNS Mercy T-AH 19

Port: Fearl Harbor Voyage: 4-15 Date: 5-27-15

Observed Departure Drafts: Fwd: 28 Mid: 30' 08 Aft: 32' 10"

- ☒ Review charts and publications, intended track. Ensure waypoints match in / on all applicable nautical charts, GPS, ECDIS and approved voyage plan.
- ☒ Check that GPS datum matches chart datum.
- ☒ Compute Tides and Currents for Departure.
- ☒ Compute and log maximum draft IAW 46 CFR 97.15-5.
- ☒ Compute and log under keel clearance
- ☒ Check Gyro Error 1.6 E/W Take Azimuth / Amplitude or use terrestrial references
- ☒ Conduct Navigation Brief IAW SMS Procedure 7.2.003-All & SMS Checklist 7.2-003-01-All
- ☒ Entry in ship's log attesting that vessel is in compliance with all stability requirements IAW 46CFR35.20-7

- ☒ GPS
- ☒ RADARS/ARPA/3cm/10cm
- ☒ NAVTEX
- ☒ VHF/DCS Radios
- ☒ NAV LIGHTS

- ☒ FATHOMETER
- ☒ DOPPLER
- ☒ GYRO
- ☒ SVDR
- ☒ GMDSS (IAW 47 CFR 80.1105(i)(2))
- ☒ SARTS
- ☒ SCTs
- ☒ EPIRB
- ☒ ECDIS

☒ AIS

Test Electronic Equipment

\*results entered in GMDSS Log

## 1 HOUR BEFORE DEPARTURE

- ☒ Test Whistle and General Alarm\*\*
- ☒ Close Sliding Watertight Door(s)
- ☒ Test Engine Order Telegraph / Synch Time
- ☒ Compare Gyro Repeaters with Main Gyro
- ☒ Grant Wheel Clearance to the Engine Room 0445 (time)\*\*
- ☒ Test Steering Gear in all Modes/Compass Check 0448 (time) \*\*
- ☒ Test Internal Communications 0452 (time) \*\*
- ☒ Test Emergency Generator for as long as necessary to show proper functioning, including steady state temperature and pressure readings.\*\*
- ☒ Test Engines Ahead and Astern 0500 (time)
- ☒ Prepare to Connect to Shore Power (as per ship's operating procedures)

- ☒ Confirm ETD, Pilot, Tugs, Line handlers w/port control. (2 hours prior) 0540
- ☒ Set up Bridge and Bridge Wings (Bell/Bearing Book, Alidades, Megaphone)
- ☒ Chief Mate completed stowaway and contraband search (log results).
- ☒ Chief Mate reported vessel secured for sea.
- ☒ Rat guards, gangway net taken in, shore connections (steam, CHT, phone lines) disconnected.
- ☒ Make Call Outs 0700 (time).
- ☒ Start and annotate Course Recorder. Start Fathometer
- ☒ Turn on Automated Identification System (AIS), check for accurate data. Set to "Underway at Last Time" Mode.
- ☒ Anchor and Maneuvering Detail manned and ready/ Anchors Ready for Letting Go
- ☒ Waterline security lights swung in and properly secured.


- ☒ Master / Pilot information exchange IAW 33 CFR 157.455(b) and entered in Deck log/Bell Book.
- ☒ Check off List complete / Master notified at time: 0720 0716

(b)(6)

Military Sealift Command, Government Operations Safety Management Procedures Manual		Revision 0.3 28 Sept 2009
2nd Mate	6 Months	NAV Files
Checklist 7.2-001-01-AH, T-AH Departure Checklist		Page 1 of 1

Enclosure (31)





Predicted heights are in metres above Chart Datum  
British Crown Copyright © 2013



## 6636 HONOLULU

21°18'N 157°52'W Hawaiian Islands Wednesday, May 27, 2015 System  
Data Area 8. Pacific Ocean, New Zealand, N & S America (W coast) Version 15

5/27/2015			5/28/2015			5/29/2015			5/30/2015		
	Time	Height		Time	Height		Time	Height		Time	Height
High	1:03 PM	0.4 m	High	1:37 PM	0.5 m	High	12:43 AM	0.3 m	High	1:25 AM	0.3 m
	11:59 PM	0.3 m					2:09 PM	0.5 m		2:42 PM	0.6 m
Low	6:05 AM	0.0 m	Low	6:33 AM	0.0 m	Low	7:02 AM	-0.1 m	Low	7:31 AM	-0.1 m
	6:50 PM	0.2 m		7:49 PM	0.1 m		8:39 PM	0.1 m		9:24 PM	0.1 m
5/31/2015			6/1/2015			6/2/2015					
	Time	Height		Time	Height		Time	Height			
High	2:05 AM	0.3 m	High	2:46 AM	0.2 m	High	3:27 AM	0.2 m			
	3:15 PM	0.6 m		3:50 PM	0.7 m		4:27 PM	0.7 m			
Low	8:01 AM	-0.1 m	Low	8:33 AM	-0.1 m	Low	9:07 AM	-0.1 m			
	10:07 PM	0.1 m		10:49 PM	0.0 m		11:33 PM	0.0 m			

Predicted heights are in metres above Chart Datum  
British Crown Copyright © 2013



At Wednesday, May 27, 2015 12:54 AM...

The sun is at azimuth 009°, altitude -47°.

The moon is at azimuth 266°, altitude +14°. It is waxing, gibbous, in its second quarter and 66% of the face is illuminated

Astronomical events in the next 7 days...

1:54 AM Moon Set azimuth 271°  
4:56 AM Start of Nautical Twilight azimuth 061°  
5:25 AM Start of Civil Twilight azimuth 064°  
5:49 AM Sun Rise azimuth 067°  
12:28 PM Solar Transit altitude +90°  
2:16 PM Moon Rise azimuth 091°  
7:07 PM Sun Set azimuth 293°  
7:32 PM End of Civil Twilight azimuth 296°  
8:01 PM End of Nautical Twilight azimuth 299°  
8:24 PM Lunar Transit altitude +67°

Thursday, May 28, 2015

2:30 AM Moon Set azimuth 267°  
4:56 AM Start of Nautical Twilight azimuth 061°  
5:25 AM Start of Civil Twilight azimuth 064°  
5:49 AM Sun Rise azimuth 067°  
12:28 PM Solar Transit altitude +90°  
3:05 PM Moon Rise azimuth 095°  
7:08 PM Sun Set azimuth 294°  
7:32 PM End of Civil Twilight azimuth 296°  
8:01 PM End of Nautical Twilight azimuth 299°  
9:07 PM Lunar Transit altitude +63°

Friday, May 29, 2015

3:07 AM Moon Set azimuth 263°  
4:55 AM Start of Nautical Twilight azimuth 061°  
5:24 AM Start of Civil Twilight azimuth 064°  
5:49 AM Sun Rise azimuth 066°  
12:28 PM Solar Transit altitude +90°  
3:55 PM Moon Rise azimuth 099°  
7:08 PM Sun Set azimuth 294°  
7:33 PM End of Civil Twilight azimuth 296°  
8:02 PM End of Nautical Twilight azimuth 299°  
9:52 PM Lunar Transit altitude +59°

Saturday, May 30, 2015

3:46 AM Moon Set azimuth 259°  
4:55 AM Start of Nautical Twilight azimuth 061°  
5:24 AM Start of Civil Twilight azimuth 064°  
5:49 AM Sun Rise azimuth 066°  
12:29 PM Solar Transit altitude +89°  
4:47 PM Moon Rise azimuth 103°  
7:09 PM Sun Set azimuth 294°  
7:33 PM End of Civil Twilight azimuth 296°  
8:02 PM End of Nautical Twilight azimuth 299°  
10:39 PM Lunar Transit altitude +56°

Sunday, May 31, 2015

4:28 AM Moon Set azimuth 256°  
4:55 AM Start of Nautical Twilight azimuth 061°  
5:24 AM Start of Civil Twilight azimuth 064°  
5:49 AM Sun Rise azimuth 066°  
12:29 PM Solar Transit altitude +89°  
5:40 PM Moon Rise azimuth 106°  
7:09 PM Sun Set azimuth 294°  
7:33 PM End of Civil Twilight azimuth 296°  
8:03 PM End of Nautical Twilight azimuth 300°  
11:27 PM Lunar Transit altitude +53°



5/27/2015	12:00 AM 0.4 m	1:00 AM 0.3 m	2:00 AM 0.2 m	3:00 AM 0.1 m	4:00 AM 0.1 m	5:00 AM 0.0 m	6:00 AM 0.0 m	7:00 AM 0.0 m	8:00 AM 0.1 m	9:00 AM 0.1 m	10:00 AM 0.2 m	11:00 AM 0.3 m	12:00 PM 0.4 m	1:00 PM 0.4 m	2:00 PM 0.4 m	3:00 PM 0.3 m	4:00 PM 0.3 m	5:00 PM 0.2 m	6:00 PM 0.2 m	7:00 PM 0.2 m	8:00 PM 0.2 m	9:00 PM 0.2 m	10:00 PM 0.3 m	11:00 PM 0.3 m
5/28/2015	12:00 AM 0.3 m	1:00 AM 0.3 m	2:00 AM 0.3 m	3:00 AM 0.2 m	4:00 AM 0.1 m	5:00 AM 0.0 m	6:00 AM 0.0 m	7:00 AM 0.0 m	8:00 AM 0.0 m	9:00 AM 0.1 m	10:00 AM 0.2 m	11:00 AM 0.3 m	12:00 PM 0.4 m	1:00 PM 0.5 m	2:00 PM 0.5 m	3:00 PM 0.4 m	4:00 PM 0.4 m	5:00 PM 0.3 m	6:00 PM 0.2 m	7:00 PM 0.2 m	8:00 PM 0.1 m	9:00 PM 0.2 m		
5/29/2015	12:00 AM 0.3 m	1:00 AM 0.3 m	2:00 AM 0.3 m	3:00 AM 0.2 m	4:00 AM 0.1 m	5:00 AM 0.0 m	6:00 AM 0.0 m	7:00 AM -0.1 m	8:00 AM 0.0 m	9:00 AM 0.0 m	10:00 AM 0.2 m	11:00 AM 0.3 m	12:00 PM 0.4 m	1:00 PM 0.5 m	2:00 PM 0.5 m	3:00 PM 0.5 m	4:00 PM 0.4 m	5:00 PM 0.3 m	6:00 PM 0.3 m	7:00 PM 0.2 m	8:00 PM 0.1 m	9:00 PM 0.1 m	10:00 PM 0.1 m	11:00 PM 0.2 m
5/30/2015	12:00 AM 0.2 m	1:00 AM 0.3 m	2:00 AM 0.3 m	3:00 AM 0.2 m	4:00 AM 0.2 m	5:00 AM 0.1 m	6:00 AM 0.0 m	7:00 AM -0.1 m	8:00 AM -0.1 m	9:00 AM 0.0 m	10:00 AM 0.1 m	11:00 AM 0.2 m	12:00 PM 0.4 m	1:00 PM 0.5 m	2:00 PM 0.6 m	3:00 PM 0.6 m	4:00 PM 0.5 m	5:00 PM 0.4 m	6:00 PM 0.3 m					
5/31/2015	12:00 AM 0.2 m	1:00 AM 0.2 m	2:00 AM 0.3 m	3:00 AM 0.2 m	4:00 AM 0.2 m	5:00 AM 0.1 m	6:00 AM 0.0 m	7:00 AM -0.1 m	8:00 AM -0.1 m	9:00 AM -0.1 m	10:00 AM 0.0 m	11:00 AM 0.2 m	12:00 PM 0.3 m	1:00 PM 0.5 m	2:00 PM 0.6 m	3:00 PM 0.6 m	4:00 PM 0.6 m	5:00 PM 0.5 m	6:00 PM 0.4 m	7:00 PM 0.3 m	8:00 PM 0.2 m	9:00 PM 0.1 m	10:00 PM 0.1 m	11:00 PM 0.1 m
6/1/2015	12:00 AM 0.1 m	1:00 AM 0.2 m	2:00 AM 0.2 m	3:00 AM 0.2 m	4:00 AM 0.2 m	5:00 AM 0.1 m	6:00 AM 0.1 m	7:00 AM 0.0 m	8:00 AM -0.1 m	9:00 AM -0.1 m	10:00 AM 0.0 m	11:00 AM 0.1 m	12:00 PM 0.2 m	1:00 PM 0.4 m	2:00 PM 0.5 m	3:00 PM 0.6 m								
6/2/2015	12:00 AM 0.1 m	1:00 AM 0.1 m	2:00 AM 0.2 m	3:00 AM 0.2 m	4:00 AM 0.2 m	5:00 AM 0.2 m	6:00 AM 0.1 m	7:00 AM 0.0 m	8:00 AM -0.1 m	9:00 AM -0.1 m	10:00 AM -0.1 m	11:00 AM 0.0 m	12:00 PM 0.1 m	1:00 PM 0.3 m	2:00 PM 0.5 m	3:00 PM 0.6 m	4:00 PM 0.7 m	5:00 PM 0.7 m	6:00 PM 0.6 m	7:00 PM 0.5 m	8:00 PM 0.3 m	9:00 PM 0.2 m	10:00 PM 0.1 m	11:00 PM 0.0 m



0700 Set Sea, Anchor detail  
E/R Manned & ready  
0707 Bow Manned & Ready, Anchors  
Ready to Let Go, Stern Manned & Ready  
0710 PILOT ABOARD.  
0713 TIGER 4 MADE FAST FWD TIGER  
5 MADE FAST & AFT.  
0716 STANDBY FULCRUM  
0730 LAST LINE TOOK DEPARTURE  
BELOW VINGE 4-15.  
\* 0716 MASTER PILOT EXCHANGE COMPLETE  
0747 MASTER ASSUMES COMM.  
0808 BOTH TUGS CAST OFF  
0814 PILOT AWAY  
0822 STERN SECURED FOR SEA  
0837 PASSED COLLEGE DEMARCATION LINE  
0837 STBD ANCHOR SECURED FOR SEA  
0838 SECURED SEA, ANCHOR AND  
MANEUVERING DETAILS

(b)(6)



0838 SECURE SEA DETAIL

(b)(6)



# USNS MERCY (T-AH 19)

## PILOT BOARDING CARD


MMSI 367816000

CALL SIGN: NMER

YEAR BUILT: 1986

Date: 27 MAY 2015

Port: PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII



PROPULSION: GEARED STEAM TURBINE

SHAFT HP: 24,500

SINGLE RIGHT HAND SCREW FIXED PITCH

STEERING: SINGLE RUDDER W/ 2 HYDRAULIC STEERING MOTORS

MAX RUDDER ANGLE: 35 ° RUDDER RATE: 2.1" per sec

BOW/STERN THRUSTER: NONE

PORT ANCHOR: 12 SHOTS

STBD ANCHOR: 12.5 SHOTS

BOWER ANCHORS 30,000lbs EA

ENGINE ORDER	RPM	SPEED (KTS)
FULL SEA SPEED	80	17.0
FULL AHEAD	60	12.7
HALF AHEAD	40	8.1
SLOW AHEAD	20	5.0
DEAD SLOW AHEAD	10	3.0
DEAD SLOW ASTERN	10	--
SLOW ASTERN	20	2.0
HALF ASTERN	35	4.0
FULL ASTERN	55	6.0

US: GROSS TONNAGE: 54,367 LT

INTL: GROSS TONNAGE: 63,527 LT

FULL LOAD DISPLACEMENT: 69,522 LT

US NET TONNAGE: 35,958 LT

INT NET TONNAGE: 19,058 LT

DISPLACEMENT: 29,109 LT

MANEUVERING CONCERNS: \_\_\_\_\_

CAPTAIN GIUDICE: \_\_\_\_\_

27 May 2015

PILOT: \_\_\_\_\_

27 May 2015

MASTER/PILOT EXCHANGE COMPLETED IAW 33 CFR 157.455(b)

ENCLOSURE (34)




18 Jun 2015

Subj: USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) SIMPLIFIED VOYAGE DATA RECORDER (S-VDR) TRANSCRIPT

1. The following is an edited transcript of audio recording from USNS MERCY's S-VDR from 27 May 2015. A number of communications were inaudible; these inaudible communications were edited out of the transcript. The transcript starts at 0730W, when MERCY got underway from Hotel 2 pier in Pearl Harbor, HI, through her allusion with the USS ARIZONA Memorial landing dock at approximately 0748W.
2. Information was transcribed on 18 June 2015 by (b)(6) N3/5 directorate, with the technical assistance of (b)(6) Marine Service Engineer, Mackay Marine.
3. Rudder order and engine order information was not available during S-VDR playback.
4. Transcript (all times are Whiskey (GMT -10) time zone):


0730:16 – "Last line" (Winds 240° T at 3 knots)  
0730:20 – "Last line, shift colors"  
0731:33 – "Slow astern"  
0731:36 – "Slow astern, aye"  
0731:45 – "Engine Room, Bridge, slow astern"  
0735:48 – "We're letting the Pilot off at Hospital Point"  
0736:40 – "We're gonna spin around when we're clear"  
0738:29 – "All stop"  
0738:31 – "All stop, aye"  
0738:37 – "Engine Room, Bridge, all stop"  
0741:50 – "Swinging the stern"  
0741:59 – "Bridge, Bow, you have plenty of room to starboard"  
0742:35 – "Slow ahead"  
0742:37 – "Slow ahead, aye"  
0742:40 – "Engine Room, Bridge, slow ahead"  
0743:00 – "Stern, Bridge, how's your swing?"  
0743:07 – "Estimate 250 yards to the ARIZONA memorial"  
0743:58 – "Hard right rudder"  
0744:00 – "Hard right rudder, aye"  
0744:15 – "Rudder is hard right"  
0744:29 – "All stop"  
0744:30 – "All stop, aye"  
0744:35 – "Engine Room, Bridge, all stop"  
0745:08 – "Slow ahead"  
0745:10 – "Slow ahead, aye"  
0745:15 – "Engine Room, Bridge, slow ahead"  
0746:20 – "Half ahead"  
0746:22 – "Half ahead, aye"  
0746:27 – "Engine Room, Bridge, half ahead"  
0747:05 – "Full ahead" (Winds 140° T at 5 knots)







# THROTTLE TREND



Local time ~ 0727:18 05/27/2015 10:28:18 AM +10 MIN +20 MIN 10:58:18.848 AM +40 MIN +50 MIN 05/27/2015 11:28:18 AM

This computer is roughly 60 to 90 seconds ahead of ships time

Line ID	Current Value	Slider Value	Slider Value Time	
P STM FLOW	30.6	14	10:34:11.958322	Port Boiler Steam Flow %
S STM FLOW	29.1	14.1	10:34:12.558356	Stbd Boiler Steam Flow %
RPM	64.02	-21.2	10:34:11.378289	Actual Shaft RPM from mag pickup
AHD_SENSORS_COMB	24.4	0	10:32:25.150213	Ahead throttle position from LVDT
ASTERN_SENSORS_COMB	1.79	37.9	10:34:07.055042	Astern throttle position % from LVDT
ER DMD	64.13	-19	10:34:00.086643	Engine room demand RPM ie. throttle RPM position
AHD PID CV	28.98	8.6	10:32:15.965688	
AST PID CV	0	56.5	10:34:10.716251	
MN LO TEMP.	113.5	***	***	

05/27/2015 10:34:08 AM


RESET ZOOM

MERCY THROTTLE TREND FROM MAY 27 2015

Throttle Control	Throttle Alarm	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard
100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard	100% Outboard



# TOUGH



Line ID	Current Value	Slider Value	Slider Value Time
BP STM FLOW	30.6	14	10:34:11.958322
BS STM FLOW	29.1	14.1	10:34:12.558358
BRPM	64.02	-21.2	10:34:11.378289
BAHD SENSORS_COMB	24.4	0	10:32:25.158213
BASERN SENSORS_COMB	1.79	37.9	10:34:07.055042
BBER DARD	64.13	-19	10:34:00.086643
BAHD PID CV	28.98	8.6	10:32:15.965888
BAST PID CV	0	56.5	10:34:10.716251
BMN LO TEMP	-113.5	...	...

BP STM FLOW	BS STM FLOW	BRPM	BAHD SENSORS_COMB	BASERN SENSORS_COMB	BBER DARD	BAHD PID CV	BAST PID CV	BMN LO TEMP
30.6	29.1	64.02	24.4	1.79	64.13	28.98	0	-113.5

05/27/2015 10:34:08 AM



# THROTTLE TREND

Zoomed

71.07 65.53  
55.09  
39.12 65.57  
23.14  
7.17  
-8.81  
-24.78  
-40.75  
-56.73  
-72.7  
-88.88

SHAFT RPM AND DEMAND  
10:41:31 AM  
0740:31  
2.16 min 2 min log

05/27/2015  
10:54:29 AM

0742:41  
10:40:00.353 AM

0749:11  
10:42:50.835000

0751:20  
10:42:50.835000


0753:27  
10:42:50.835000

Line ID	Current Value	Slider Value	Slider Value Time
01P STM FLOW	31.7	10.6	10:40:51.640183
02S STM FLOW	30.1	10.6	10:41:49.843512
03RPM	65.32	-6.7	10:42:37.883260
04AHD_SENSORS_COMB	26.07	0.5	10:42:50.835000
05ASTERN_SENSORS_COMB	1.95	1.7	10:42:50.835000
06ER OMD	65.16	0	10:39:25.564259
07AHD PID CV	30.07	9	10:39:27.769385
08AST PID CV	0	0.8	10:42:50.170062
09MN LO TEMP.	113.5	...	...

05/27/2015 10:42:49 AM



# THROTTLE TREND



Line ID	Current Value	Slider Value	Slider Value Time
REP STM FLOW	33.5	12.7	10:47:27.474823
SS STM FLOW	31.9	13	10:47:24.474651
SRPM	65.83	26.4	10:47:27.540827
SHAND_SENSORS_COMB	26.43	11.5	10:47:27.540827
EASTERN_SENSORS_COMB	1.5	1.7	10:47:27.540827
SHAND DMD	65.89	29.4	10:47:27.540827
SHAND PID CV	31.16	19.3	10:47:26.885789
EAST PID CV	1.14	0.5	10:47:26.885789
MIN LO TEMP	113.5	...	...
05/27/2015	10:47:27 AM		



Investigating Officer Statement  
Concerning  
ECDIS Print Enclosure

During the course of my investigation, I gathered 26 time-sequenced ECDIS prints of the MERCY's transit based on minute intervals. The ECDIS time is based on GPS with the time located in the top left corner. Additionally, most of the prints have speed over ground (SOG) and sternway labeled in the top right had corner. These were calculated using the MERCY's ECDIS speed vector angle to the keel and the SOG of the ship. Sternway speed was added to the top right corner of the prints. Speeds were used to reconstruct the sternway of the ship throughout the event and used to support the timeline in the findings of fact section of the report. Calculations were simply the COSINE of the angle multiplied by the magnitude of the speed vector or SOG.

(b)(6)




7/10/2015

Date






































SOG - 2.6 kts  
Sternway - 2.6 kts





SOG – 2.9 kts  
 Sternway – 2.6 kts





Time: 0744

Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in


Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in

SOG – 3.0 kts

Sternway – 2.4 kts

→ Distance astern

→ Distance to nearest hazard



ENCLOSURE (37)



Time: 0745

Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in


Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in

SOG – 2.7 kts

Sternway – 2.0 kts

→ Distance astern

→ Distance to nearest hazard



12

ENCLOSURE (3)




Time: 0746

Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in

Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in


SOG – 2.5 kts

Sternway – 1.7 kts



Distance astern

Distance to nearest hazard






Time: 0747

Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in

Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in


SOG – 2.2 kts

Sternway – 1.3 kts



Distance astern

Distance to nearest hazard



14

ENCLOSURE (37)



Time: 0748

Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in


Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in

SOG – 1.3 kts

Sternway – 0.2 kts

→ Distance astern

→ Distance to nearest hazard



15

ENCLOSURE (57)



Time: 0749

Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in


Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in

SOG – 1.9 kts

Headway – 1.6 kts



Distance to nearest hazard



46

ENR 51



Time: 0750


Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in

Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in

SOG – 1.9 kts

Headway – 1.8 kts

→ Distance to nearest hazard





Time: 0751


Fwd draft – 23 ft 7 in

Aft draft – 29 ft 5 in


SOG – 1.9 kts

Headway – 1.9 kts


→ Distance to nearest hazard












ENCLOSURE (37)


































Investigating Officer Statement  
Concerning Photograph Enclosure

During the course of my investigation, I used photographs which were taken with time stamps by an MSC employee who was a bystander to the event. These photos recorded what happened. This enclosure consists of 21 photos of these photos with several close-ups at specific times to show the position of the tugs in relation to MERCY. Time labels in the upper right hand corner are consistent with the original time stamps. The photo numbering, comments, and arrows were added to show the "take away" from the slide for the investigation and were added to provide clarity.

(b)(6)

Date



Photo #1 – Prior to Underway

5/27/15 - 0722





Photo #2 -- Underway, Tiger 5 lifting stern off pier

5/27/15 - 0732





Photo #3 – Tiger 4 made up to Dutch bollard lifting bow of pier

5/27/15 - 0739






Photo #4

5/27/15 - 0740






Photo #5 – Tiger 4 repositions to port bow

5/27/15 - 0741





Photo #6 – Tiger 4 pushes ahead full

5/27/15 - 0742





Photo #7

5/27/15 - 0743





Photo #8

5/27/15 - 0743





Photo #9

5/27/15 - 0744





Photo #10 – Tiger 4 appears to be 90 degrees to keel

5/27/15 - 0744





Photo #111 – Tiger 4 appears to be contributing to sternway

5/27/15 - 0745






Photo #12

5/27/15 - 0746







Photo #12a

5/27/15 - 0746

Tiger 4 is contributing to MERCY sternway based on:

- Tiger 4's wash
- Tiger 4's stern aspect
- MERCY's Port bow aspect





Figur 5 potentially contributing to MERCY sternway based on:

- Tiger 5's wash
- Tiger 5's port quarter aspect
- MERCY's beam aspect





Photo #13

5/27/15 - 0746







Photo #13a

Tiger 4 is contributing to MERCY sternway based on:

- Tiger 4's wash
- Tiger 4's stern/starboard quarter aspect
- MERCY's beam aspect


MER bridge face



Bow tug pushing



Tug wash





Tiger 5 potentially contributing to MERCY sternway based on:

- Tiger 5's wash
- Tiger 5's port quarter aspect
- MERCY's beam aspect






Photo #14

5/27/15 - 0746





Photo #14a

5/27/15 - 0746

Tiger 4 is contributing to MERCY sternway based on:

- Tiger 4's wash
- Tiger 4's starboard quarter aspect
- MERCY's beam aspect

MER bridge face

Tug wash

Bow tug pushing



Photo #114b

5/27/15 - 0746

Figure 5 hull extends perpendicular to MERCY keel

— not contributing to sternway





Photo #15

5/27/15 - 0747





Photo #15a

5/27/15 - 0747

Tiger 4 is contributing to MERCY sternway based on:

- Tiger 4's wash
- Tiger 4's starboard quarter aspect
- MERCY's beam aspect

MER bridge face



Tug wash



Bow tug pushing





5/27/15 - 0747

Photo #15b

Tiger's bow stern perpendicular to MERCY keel

— not contributing to sternway





5/27/15 - 0748

Photo #16






5/27/15 - 0747

Photo #16a

Tiger 4 is at "stop" - no wash





5/27/15 - 0747

Photo #16b

Tug Schallastern

Positioned to contribute to MERCY headway





Photo #17

5/27/15 - 0748






Photo #18

5/27/15 - 1349





Photo #19

5/27/15 - 0749





Photo #20

5/27/15 - 0749





Photo #21

5/27/15 - 0750





07 JUN 2015

Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6) declare that the following is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am a temporary third watch assistant engineer aboard the USNS MERCY (T-AH 19), a position I have held for six months. I have been a civil service mariner with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) for three years. I have been involved in numerous maneuvering details while assigned to MERCY.

On Wednesday, 27 May 2015, the ship was in port, Pearl Harbor, preparing to depart. I was assigned as the 0800-1200 third engineering watch. Prior to assuming the watch, I made a preliminary round of the Auxiliary Machinery Room (AMR) and Engine Room (ER) from top to bottom. All conditions were satisfactory. During a watch turnover, no abnormal plant conditions were reported. Turnover was conducted at 0730.

I was in the Engine Room Control (ERC) from turnover of the watch until the allision. There were no boiler flame-outs, loss of fires, or any other abnormal plant operation during this period. I did not witness any engine department personnel with a diminished capacity to focus on assigned duties. When word of pending allision from the deck radio was received, the maneuvering detail's response to a rapid succession of bell orders was routine but conducted with extra attentiveness to plant operation. Situational awareness was maintained at all times by the maneuvering team. Immediately after the allision, I was directed by the Chief Engineer to make a round of the ER and check sea strainers.

I did not observe any significant engineering issues during transits from San Diego, CA, to Pearl Harbor, HI, nor from Pearl Harbor to Suva, Fiji. All systems and equipment operated normally.

End of Statement

(b)(6)

Signature

Date

Attachments:

1. Signed Privacy Act Statement



This credential has been issued under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended;

The lawful holder of this Credential as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code to serve in the capacity or capacities specified, subject to any limitations indicated.

The Government of the United States of America certifies that

(b)(6)

has been duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of regulation(s)

III/1; III/4; VI/1; VI/2; VI/3; VI/4

Of the above Convention, as amended, and has been found competent to perform the following functions, at the levels specified, subject to any limitation indicated until 18-JUN-2016.

Ref Num 2841403 Serial Num 000109166

4

CAPACITY	LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)
Officer in charge of an engineering watch (Third Assistant Engineer)	

Ref Num 2841403 Serial Num 000109166

5



<p>The lawful holder of this credential  <b>(b)(6)</b>  as endorsed below, is entitled under Title 46 (Shipping) U.S. Code  to serve in the capacity or capacities specified (Domestic Only),  subject to any limitations indicated.</p>	
<p><b>CAPACITY</b></p> <p>Third Assistant  Engineer  Any Unlic Engine  Rtg  Lifeboatman  Ordinary Seaman  Stewards Dept (FH)  First Aid Provider</p>	<p><b>LIMITATIONS APPLYING (IF ANY)</b></p> <p>Of Steam, Motor, or Gas Turbine Vessels Of Any  Horsepower.</p>
<p>Ref Num 2841403</p>	<p>Serial Num 000109166</p>

<p><b>(b)(6)</b>  <b>(b)(6)</b> CAPT, USCG</p>	
<p>Ref Num 2841403</p>	<p>Serial Num 000109166</p>



is a seafarers' identity document  
seafarers' Identity Document  
of the International Labour

(b)(6)

This document is a seafarers' identity document for the purpose of the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003, of the International Labor Organization.

(b)(6)

SIGNATURE OF BEARER

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-1-ASK-NMC

Issued By: The United States Coast Guard National Maritime Center  
Website: <http://www.uscg.mil/nmc> Phone: 1-888-1-ASK-NMC

Reference Number  
2841403

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Place of Birth

Expiration Date  
18-JUN-2016

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<  
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<2



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. § 802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

Date

6/7/15



08 JUN 2015

Statement of (b)(6)

I, (b)(6), declare that the following statement is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. Prior to giving this statement, I was provided with a Privacy Act statement and told the purpose(s) for which my statement could be used.

I am Supply Utilityman (SU) with Military Sealift Command (MSC). I reported aboard USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) in April 2015, but have been with MSC for two years and 10 months. Prior to affiliating with MSC, I was a chef on a cruise ship that operated out of San Diego, CA, for about two years.

On 27 May 2015, I stepped outside to get some fresh air and take video of the ship's departure. I saw CRET (b)(6) outside. While outside, I took an initial video [reference video 20150527\_074516] using my cell phone. Then, I noticed that we seemed to be a little closer than normal and started filming again [reference video 20150527\_074634].

MSC has my permission to use the videos I took on my personal cell phone.

(b)(6)  
Signature


6/8/15

Date

Attachment

1. Privacy Act Statement







**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
COMMAND INVESTIGATION**

1. **AUTHORITY:** 44 U.S.C. § 3101; 5 U.S.C. § 301. Other statutory authority listed below that is peculiarly applicable to the matter under investigation, include the following: Admiralty claims. 10 U.S.C. § 7622-7623; Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680; Forfeiture of pay for time lost due to incapacitation caused by alcohol or drug use. 37 U.S.C. §802; Public Vessels Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 and the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752.
2. **PRINCIPLE PURPOSE(S):** The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purpose(s): Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties; Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action; Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration; Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy and Public information releases.
3. **ROUTINE USES:** In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; and to the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, including the United States Coast Guard, State or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.
4. **MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:** Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I understand the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as related to me through the foregoing statement.

Full name: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date

6/8/15



**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. Coast Guard  
REPORT OF MARINE CASUALTY**

OMB No. 1625-0001  
Expires: 01/31/2016

**SECTION I. GENERAL INFORMATION**

1. Name of Vessel or Facility <b>USNS MERCY</b>		2. Official No. <b>570876</b>		3. Nationality <b>USA</b>		4. Call Sign <b>NMER</b>		5. USCG Certificate of Inspection Issued at: <b>Portland</b>	
6. Type (Towing, Freight, Fish, Drill, etc.) <b>HOSPITAL</b>		7. Length <b>861' 8"</b>		8. Gross Tons <b>54,367</b>		9. Year Built <b>12JUN1974</b>		10. Propulsion (Steam, diesel, gas, turbine...) <b>Steam Turbine</b>	
11. Hull Material (Steel, Wood...) <b>STEEL</b>		12. Draft (FL - in.) <b>FWD 29 AFT. 32-10</b>		13. If Vessel Classed, By Whom: (ABS, LLOYDS, DNV, BV, etc.) <b>ABS</b>		14. Date (of occurrence) <b>27 May 2015</b>		15. TIME (Local) <b>0748</b>	
16. Location (See Instruction No. 10A) <b>Navy Base Pearl Harbor</b>						17. Estimated Loss of Damage TO:			
18. Name, Address & Telephone No. of Operating Co. <b>Military Sealift Command 471 East C Street Norfolk Va (757) 443-2701</b>						<b>VESSEL 0</b> <b>CARGO 0</b> <b>OTHER UNK</b>			

19. Name of Master or Person in Charge <b>Captain Thomas Giudice</b>		USCG License <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		20. Name of Pilot <b>(b)(6)</b>		USCG License <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		State License <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
19a. Home or Work Street Address (City, State, Zip Code) <b>USNS Mercy FPO AP 96672</b>		19b. Home or Work Telephone No. <b>(b)(6)</b>		20a. Home or Work Street Address (City, State, Zip Code) <b>Pearl Harbor, HI</b>		20b. Home or Work Telephone No. <b>(b)(6)</b>			

21. Casualty Elements (Check as many as needed and explain in Block 44.)

<input type="checkbox"/> NO. OF PERSONS ON BOARD _____ <input type="checkbox"/> DEATH - HOW MANY? _____ <input type="checkbox"/> MISSING - HOW MANY? _____ <input type="checkbox"/> INJURED - HOW MANY? _____ <input type="checkbox"/> HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASED OR INVOLVED _____ <i>(Identify Substance and amount in Block 44.)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> OIL SPILL - ESTIMATE AMOUNT: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> CARGO CONTAINER LOST/DAMAGED _____ <input type="checkbox"/> COLLISION _____ <i>(Identify other vessel or object in Block 44.)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> GROUNDING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WAKE DAMAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> FLOODING; SWAMPING WITHOUT SINKING <input type="checkbox"/> CAPSIZING (with or without sinking) <input type="checkbox"/> FOUNDERING OR SINKING <input type="checkbox"/> HEAVY WEATHER DAMAGE <input type="checkbox"/> FIRE <input type="checkbox"/> EXPLOSION <input type="checkbox"/> COMMERCIAL DIVING CASUALTY <input type="checkbox"/> ICE DAMAGE <input type="checkbox"/> DAMAGE TO AIDS TO NAVIGATION <input type="checkbox"/> STEERING FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> MACHINERY OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> ELECTRICAL FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> STRUCTURAL FAILURE	<input type="checkbox"/> FIREFIGHTING OR EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT FAILED OR INADEQUATE (Describe in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> BLOW OUT (Petroleum exploration/production) <input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.) <input type="checkbox"/> DRUG INVOLVEMENT (Describe in Block 44.) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) <b>Allision to Arizona Boat Landing</b>
--	--	--

22. Conditions

A. Sea or River Conditions (wave height, river stage, etc.) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLEAR <input type="checkbox"/> RAIN <input type="checkbox"/> SNOW <input type="checkbox"/> FOG <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) _____	B. WEATHER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLEAR <input type="checkbox"/> RAIN <input type="checkbox"/> SNOW <input type="checkbox"/> FOG <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) _____	C. TIME <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DAYLIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> TWILIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT	D. VISIBILITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GOOD <input type="checkbox"/> FAIR <input type="checkbox"/> POOR	E. DISTANCE (miles of visibility) <b>10</b> F. AIR TEMPERATURE (F) <b>67</b> G. WIND SPEED & DIRECTION <b>215 5</b> H. CURRENT SPEED & DIRECTION <b>Flood N/A</b>
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23. Navigation Information


<input type="checkbox"/> MOORED, DOCKED OR FIXED <input type="checkbox"/> ANCHORED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNDERWAY OR DRIFTING	SPEED <b>0.5</b> AND COURSE _____	24. Last Port <b>SAN DIEGO</b> Where Bound _____	24a. Time and Date of Departure <b>05/17/15 09:00</b>
--	---	---	--

25. FOR TOWING ONLY	25a. NUMBER OF VESSELS TOWED			25b. TOTAL H.P. OF TOWING UNITS	25c. MAXIMUM SIZE OF TOW WITH TOW-BOAT(S)	Length	Width	25d. (Describe in Block 44.)
	Empty	Loaded	Total					
								<input type="checkbox"/> PUSHING AHEAD <input type="checkbox"/> TOWING ASTERN <input type="checkbox"/> TOWING ALONGSIDE <input type="checkbox"/> MORE THAN ONE TOW-BOAT ON TOW

**SECTION II. BARGE INFORMATION**

26. Name		26a. Official Number		26b. Type	26c. Length	26d. Gross Tons	26e. USCG Certificate of Inspection Issued at:
26f. Year Built	26g. <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE SKIN <input type="checkbox"/> DOUBLE	26h. Draft FWD	AFT	26i. Operating Company			
26j. Damage Amount BARGE _____ CARGO _____ OTHER _____				26k. Describe Damage to Barge			



SECTION III. PERSONNEL ACCIDENT INFORMATION				
27. Person Involved <input type="checkbox"/> MALE/or <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE <input type="checkbox"/> DEAD <input type="checkbox"/> INJURED <input type="checkbox"/> MISSING		27a. Name (Last, First, Middle Name) 27b. Address (City, State, Zip Code)		27c. Status <input type="checkbox"/> Crew <input type="checkbox"/> Passenger <input type="checkbox"/> Other
28. Birth Date	29. Telephone No.	30. Job Position		31. (Check here if off duty) <input type="checkbox"/>
32. Employer - (If different from Block 18, fill in Name, Address, Telephone No.)				
33. Person's Time  A. IN THIS INDUSTRY - _____ B. WITH THIS COMPANY - _____ C. IN PRESENT JOB OR POSITION - _____ D. ON PRESENT VESSEL/FACILITY - _____ E. HOURS ON DUTY WHEN ACCIDENT OCCURRED - _____			34. Industry of Employer (Towing, Fishing, Shipping, Crew Supply, Drilling, etc.)  35. Was the Injured Person Incapacitated 72 Hours or More?  36. Date of Death	
37. Activity of Person at Time of Accident				
38. Specific Location of Accident on Vessel/Facility				
39. Type of Accident (Fall, Caught between, etc.)		40. Resulting Injury (Cut, Bruise, Fracture, Burn, etc.)		
41. Part of Body Injured		42. Equipment Involved in Accident		
43. Specific Object, Part of the Equipment in block 42., or Substance (Chemical, Solvent, etc.) that directly produced the Injury.				
SECTION IV. DESCRIPTION OF CASUALTY				
44. Describe how accident occurred, damage, information on alcohol/drug involvement and recommendations for corrective safety measures. (See instructions and attach additional sheets if necessary).				
<p>USNS Mercy U/W at 0730 form H2 Pearl Harbor. Master Tom Giudice in Command, Pilot (b)(6) at Conn with Tiger 5 Aft and Tiger 4 Fwd. Pilot ordered a backing bell and ship cleared the pier. Ship commenced swing with a slow ahead bell to check sternway for departure line up. Mate on Stern and Tiger 5 indicated swing was well clear of all obstructions. As ship's stern passed USS Missouri, swing was reported as closing, half ahead was ordered. As stern approached Arizona Memorial approximately 0747, Tiger 5 reported ship was 25 ft away from landing dock and closing.</p> <p>Master assumed CONN and ordered ahead full. Tug reported ship's rudder rubbed against Arizona Memorial Boat Landing fender and prop wash from full bell caused significant motion to landing dock causing most of the damage.</p> <p>Chief Engineer conducted after steering gear inspection and rudder swing test and reported no damage.</p>				
45. Witness to Casualty (Name, Address, Telephone No.) Chief Mate, (b)(6)				
46. Witness to Casualty (Name, Address, Telephone No.) 3/O (b)(6)				
SECTION V. PERSON MAKING THIS REPORT				47c. Title MASTER
47. Name (PRINT) (Last, First, Middle) GIUDICE, THOMAS, John		47b. Address (City, State, Zip Code) (b)(6)		47d. Telephone No. (b)(6)
47a. Signature 		47e. Date 27 May 2015		
FOR COAST GUARD USE ONLY			REPORTING OFFICE:	
MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Data Entry: <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> PRELIMINARY <input type="checkbox"/> DATA COLLECTION			MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number (if applicable) <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMAL <input type="checkbox"/> FORMAL	
Serious Marine Incident <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	INVESTIGATOR (Name)	DATE	APPROVED BY (Name)	DATE
Major Marine Casualty <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No				



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-2692B (04-06)	<b>REPORT OF REQUIRED CHEMICAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING FOLLOWING A SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT</b> <i>(See Instructions on reverse)</i>	APPROVED OMB NO. 1626-0001 Expiration Date: 08/31/2008 USCG MISLE ACTIVITY NUMBER																																																							
<b>SECTION I—VESSEL INFORMATION</b>																																																									
1. Name of vessel USNS MERCY (T-AH 19)	2. Official Number 570876	3. Call Sign NMER																																																							
5. Vessel Type (Freight, Towing, Fishing, MODU, etc.) HOSPITAL	6. Length 861'8"	7. Gross Tons 54,367																																																							
9. Operating Company  Name: MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND  Address: 471 EAST C STREET NORFOLK, VA  Telephone Number: 757-443-2701	10. Master or Person in Charge  Name: THOMAS GIUDICE  Address: USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) FPO AP 96672  Telephone Number: 619-533-7232																																																								
<b>SECTION II—INCIDENT INFORMATION</b>																																																									
11. Type of Serious Marine Incident (Check Appropriate Box(es)). (See Instructions on Reverse)																																																									
<input type="checkbox"/> a. Death (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> b. Injury requiring medical treatment (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> c. Property damage in excess of \$100,000 (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> d. Loss of inspected vessel (Append to Form CG-2692)	<input type="checkbox"/> e. Loss of uninspected, self-propelled vessel of over 100 gross tons (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> f. Discharge of oil of 10,000 gallons or more into U.S. waters  <input type="checkbox"/> g. Discharge of a reportable quantity of hazardous substance into U.S. waters  <input type="checkbox"/> h. Release of a reportable quantity of hazardous substance into U.S. environment																																																								
12. Date of Incident 27 MAY 2015	13. Time (local) of Incident 0748	14. Location of Incident (Latitude and Longitude or River and Milepost) NAVY BASE PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII																																																							
<b>SECTION III—PERSONNEL / TESTING INFORMATION</b>																																																									
15. Personnel Directly Involved In Serious Marine Incident		16. Drug and Alcohol Testing (See Instructions on reverse)																																																							
15a. Name (Last, First, Middle Initial)  THOMAS GIUDICE	15b. Licensing/Certification (Check Appropriate Box(es)) USCG License    USCG MMD    Neither <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="2">16a. Drug Test Urine Specimen provided within 32 hours?</th> <th colspan="2">16b. Alcohol Test Specimen provided within 2 hours?</th> <th colspan="3">Alcohol Test Specimen Source</th> <th rowspan="2">Alcohol Test Results</th> </tr> <tr> <th>YES</th> <th>NO</th> <th>YES</th> <th>NO</th> <th>Saliva</th> <th>Blood</th> <th>Breath</th> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>0.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	16a. Drug Test Urine Specimen provided within 32 hours?		16b. Alcohol Test Specimen provided within 2 hours?		Alcohol Test Specimen Source			Alcohol Test Results	YES	NO	YES	NO	Saliva	Blood	Breath	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
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17. SAMHSA Accredited Laboratory Conducting Chemical Drug Tests  Name: UNIVERSITY SERVICES  Address: 10551 DECATUR ROAD, STE 200 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19154  Telephone Number: 215-637-6800		18. Laboratory conducting blood alcohol test(s) or individual conducting saliva or breath alcohol test(s)  Name: (b)(6)  Address: (b)(6)  Telephone Number: (b)(6)																																																							
19. Person Making This Report (Please Print)  Name: (b)(6)  Address: (b)(6)  Telephone Number: (b)(6)		20. Signature  (b)(6)  Title: 1st Officer																																																							
21. Date  5-27-2015																																																									
22. Remarks (See Instructions on Reverse) 11. Unknown Property Damage 16b. An Alcohol Test Specimen was provided at 1037 local. 2hr 49min delay due to navigation details and making initial voice reports. Alcohol Test Results 0.00																																																									

SN 7530-01-GF3-2380

ENCLOSURE (44)



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-2692B (04-06)	<b>REPORT OF REQUIRED CHEMICAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING FOLLOWING A SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT</b> <i>(See Instructions on reverse)</i>	APPROVED OMB NO. 1625-0001 Expiration Date 08/31/2008 USCG MISLE ACTIVITY NUMBER
<b>SECTION I—VESSEL INFORMATION</b>		
1. Name of vessel USNS MERCY (T-AH 19)	2. Official Number 570876	3. Call Sign NMR
5. Vessel Type (Freight, Towing, Fishing, MODU, etc.) HOSPITAL	6. Length 861'8"	7. Gross Tons 54,367
9. Operating Company  Name: MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND  Address: 471 EAST C STREET NORFOLK, VA  Telephone Number: 757-443-2701	10. Master or Person in Charge  Name: THOMAS GIUDICE  Address: USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) FPO AP 96672  Telephone Number: 619-533-7232	
<b>SECTION II—INCIDENT INFORMATION</b>		
11. Type of Serious Marine Incident (Check Appropriate Box(es). (See Instructions on Reverse))		
<input type="checkbox"/> a. Death (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> b. Injury requiring medical treatment (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> c. Property damage in excess of \$100,000 (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> d. Loss of inspected vessel (Append to Form CG-2692)	<input type="checkbox"/> e. Loss of uninspected, self-propelled vessel of over 100 gross tons (Append to Form CG-2692)  <input type="checkbox"/> f. Discharge of oil of 10,000 gallons or more into U.S. waters  <input type="checkbox"/> g. Discharge of a reportable quantity of hazardous substance into U.S. waters  <input type="checkbox"/> h. Release of a reportable quantity of hazardous substance into U.S. environment	
12. Date of Incident 27 MAY 2015	13. Time (local) of Incident 0748	14. Location of Incident (Latitude and Longitude or River and Milepost) NAVY BASE PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII
<b>SECTION III—PERSONNEL / TESTING INFORMATION</b>		
15. Personnel Directly Involved In Serious Marine Incident		16. Drug and Alcohol Testing (See Instructions on reverse)
15a. Name (Last, First, Middle Initial)	15b. Licensing/Certification  (Check Appropriate Box(es)) USCG License    USCG MMD    Neither	16a. Drug Test Urine Specimen provided within 32 hours? YES    NO
16b. Alcohol Test Specimen provided within 2 hours? YES    NO	Alcohol Test Specimen Source Saliva    Blood    Breath	
16c. Alcohol Test Results	17. SAMHSA Accredited Laboratory Conducting Chemical Drug Tests  Name: UNIVERSITY SERVICES  Address: 10551 DECATUR ROAD, STE 200 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19154  Telephone Number: 215-637-6800	
18. Laboratory conducting blood alcohol test(s) or individual conducting saliva or breath alcohol test(s)  Name: (b)(6)  Address: (b)(6)  Telephone Number: 619-744-4594	19. Person Making This Report (Please Print)  Name: (b)(6)  Address: (b)(6)  Telephone Number: (b)(6)	
20. Signature  (b)(6)	21. Date  5-28-2015	
22. Remarks (See Instructions on Reverse) 11. Unknown Property Damage		

SN 7530-01-GF3-2380



## INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM CG-2692B REPORT OF REQUIRED CHEMICAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING FOLLOWING A SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT

**NOTE:** When this form is being submitted along with a REPORT OF MARINE ACCIDENT, INJURY OR DEATH (Form CG-2692), Blocks 3-10 and Blocks 12-14 on Form CG-2692B need not be completed.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. The Coast Guard estimates that the average burden for this report is .5 hours. You may submit any comments concerning the accuracy of this burden estimate or any suggestions for reducing the burden to: Commandant (G-PCA-1), U.S. Coast Guard, 2100 2<sup>nd</sup> St, SW, Washington D.C. 20593-0001 or Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (1625-0001), Washington, DC 20503.

### WHEN TO USE THIS FORM

1. This form satisfies the requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations for written reports of chemical drug and alcohol testing of individuals directly involved in serious marine incidents. Alcohol tests are to be conducted not later than 2 hours (unless there are casualty directly related safety concerns) and drug test specimens collected not later than 32 hours after a Serious Marine Incident. Public vessels and recreational vessels are excepted from these reporting requirements.

### SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENTS

2. The term "serious marine incident" includes the following events involving a vessel in commercial service:

- A. Any marine casualty or accident that occurs upon the navigable waters of the U.S., its territories or possessions, or that involves a U.S. vessel anywhere, and that results in any of the following:
  - 1. One or more deaths;
  - 2. Any injury to a crewmember, passenger, or other person which requires professional medical treatment beyond first aid; and, in the case of a person employed on board a vessel in commercial service, which renders the individual unfit to perform routine vessel duties;
  - 3. Damage to property, as defined in 46 CFR 4.05-1(f), in excess of \$100,000;
  - 4. Actual or constructive total loss of any vessel subject to inspection under 46 U.S.C. 3301; or
  - 5. Actual or constructive total loss of any self-propelled vessel, not subject to inspection under 46 U.S.C. 3301, of 100 gross tons or more.
- B. A discharge of oil of 10,000 gallons or more into the navigable waters of the United States, as defined in 33 U.S.C. 1321, whether or not resulting from a marine casualty.
- C. A discharge of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance into the navigable waters of the United States, whether or not resulting from a marine casualty.
- D. A release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance into the environment of the United States, whether or not resulting from a marine casualty.

### INDIVIDUAL DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN A SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT

3. Term "individual directly involved in a serious marine incident" is an individual whose order, action or failure to act is determined to be, or cannot be ruled out as, a causative factor in the events leading to or causing a serious marine incident.

### COMPLETION OF THIS FORM

4. This form should be filled out as completely and accurately as possible. Please type or print clearly. Fill in all blanks that apply to the kind of incident that has occurred. If a question is not applicable, the abbreviation "NA" should be entered in that space. If an answer is unknown and cannot be obtained, the abbreviation "UNK" should be entered in that space. If "NONE" is the correct response, then enter it in that space.

5. When this form has been completed, deliver or mail it as soon as practicable to the Coast Guard Marine Safety or Marine Inspection Office nearest to the location of the incident or, if at sea, nearest to the port of first arrival.

6. Upon receipt of a report of chemical test results, the marine employer shall submit a copy of the test results for each person listed in block 15(a) of this form to the Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection where the CG-2692B was submitted. (Ref. 46 CFR 4.06-60(d)).

7. Amplifying information for completing the form:

- A. Block 11—"TYPE OF SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT"  
Check each appropriate box. If box a, b, c, d, or e is checked, or append this form to the required form CG-2692, "REPORT OF MARINE ACCIDENT, INJURY OR DEATH", and submit both forms as indicated in 5. above.
- B. Block 16c—"ALCOHOL TEST BREATH SPECIMEN PROVIDED?" When breath test results are available alcohol concentration shall be expressed numerically in percent by weight (i.e., .04, .10 etc...).
- C. Block 22—"REMARKS" Describe the duties of each individual listed in 15a, at the time of incident (i.e., master, pilot, chief engineer...). If an individual refuses to provide the required specimens, if specimens are not timely obtained, or not obtained, describe the circumstances completely.

**NOTICE:** The information collected on this form is routinely available for public inspection. It is needed by the Coast Guard to carry out its responsibility to investigate marine casualties, to identify hazardous conditions or situations and to conduct statistical analysis. The information is used to determine whether new or revised safety initiatives are necessary for the protection of life or property in the marine environment.

22. REMARKS (Continued)



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-2692B (04-06)	<b>REPORT OF REQUIRED CHEMICAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING FOLLOWING A SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT</b> <i>(See Instructions on reverse)</i>	APPROVED OMB NO. 1625-0001 Expiration Date: 08/31/2008 USCG MISLE ACTIVITY NUMBER																																																							
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SN 7530-01-GF3-2380



# INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM CG-2692B REPORT OF REQUIRED CHEMICAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING FOLLOWING A SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT

**NOTE:** When this form is being submitted along with a REPORT OF MARINE ACCIDENT, INJURY OR DEATH (Form CG-2692), Blocks 3-10 and Blocks 12-14 on Form CG-2692B need not be completed.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. The Coast Guard estimates that the average burden for this report is .5 hours. You may submit any comments concerning the accuracy of this burden estimate or any suggestions for reducing the burden to: Commandant (G-PCA-1), U.S. Coast Guard, 2100 2<sup>nd</sup> St, SW, Washington D.C. 20593-0001 or Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (1625-0001), Washington, DC 20503.

## WHEN TO USE THIS FORM

1. This form satisfies the requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations for written reports of chemical drug and alcohol testing of individuals directly involved in serious marine incidents. Alcohol tests are to be conducted not later than 2 hours (unless there are casualty directly related safety concerns) and drug test specimens collected not later than 32 hours after a Serious Marine Incident. Public vessels and recreational vessels are excepted from these reporting requirements.

## SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENTS

2. The term "serious marine incident" includes the following events involving a vessel in commercial service:

- A. Any marine casualty or accident that occurs upon the navigable waters of the U.S., its territories or possessions, or that involves a U.S. vessel anywhere, and that results in any of the following:
  - 1. One or more deaths;
  - 2. Any injury to a crewmember, passenger, or other person which requires professional medical treatment beyond first aid, and, in the case of a person employed on board a vessel in commercial service, which renders the individual unfit to perform routine vessel duties;
  - 3. Damage to property, as defined in 46 CFR 4.05-1(f), in excess of \$100,000;
  - 4. Actual or constructive total loss of any vessel subject to inspection under 46 U.S.C. 3301; or
  - 5. Actual or constructive total loss of any self-propelled vessel, not subject to inspection under 46 U.S.C. 3301, of 100 gross tons or more.
- B. A discharge of oil of 10,000 gallons or more into the navigable waters of the United States, as defined in 33 U.S.C. 1321, whether or not resulting from a marine casualty.
- C. A discharge of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance into the navigable waters of the United States, whether or not resulting from a marine casualty.
- D. A release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance into the environment of the United States, whether or not resulting from a marine casualty.

## INDIVIDUAL DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN A SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT

3. Term "individual directly involved in a serious marine incident" is an individual whose order, action or failure to act is determined to be, or cannot be ruled out as, a causative factor in the events leading to or causing a serious marine incident.

## COMPLETION OF THIS FORM

4. This form should be filled out as completely and accurately as possible. Please type or print clearly. Fill in all blanks that apply to the kind of incident that has occurred. If a question is not applicable, the abbreviation "NA" should be entered in that space. If an answer is unknown and cannot be obtained, the abbreviation "UNK" should be entered in that space. If "NONE" is the correct response, then enter it in that space.

5. When this form has been completed, deliver or mail it as soon as practicable to the Coast Guard Marine Safety or Marine Inspection Office nearest to the location of the incident or, if at sea, nearest to the port of first arrival.

6. Upon receipt of a report of chemical test results, the marine employer shall submit a copy of the test results for each person listed in block 15(a) of this form to the Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection where the CG-2692B was submitted. (Ref. 46 CFR 4.06-60(d)).


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- A. Block 11—"TYPE OF SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT"  
Check each appropriate box. If box a, b, c, d, or e is checked, or append this form to the required form CG-2692, "REPORT OF MARINE ACCIDENT, INJURY OR DEATH", and submit both forms as indicated in 5. above.
- B. Block 16c—"ALCOHOL TEST BREATH SPECIMEN PROVIDED?" When breath test results are available alcohol concentration shall be expressed numerically in percent by weight (i.e., .04, .10 etc...).
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22. REMARKS (Continued)





## FEDERAL DRUG TESTING CUSTODY AND CONTROL FORM

Building 2490, Wilson Street  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755  
Phone: (301) 677-7085 • Fax: (301) 677-6237

M 0266296

SPECIMEN ID NO.

## STEP 1: COMPLETED BY COLLECTOR OR EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVE

ACCESSION NO.

A. Employer Name, Address, I.D. No. Department of Navy- UIC 32813 ATTN: (b)(6) 517 Russell Ave Bldg 1 2nd flr Pearl Harbor, HI 95660 USA P: 808-471-4420 F: 808-471-0685		B. MRO Name, Address, Phone No. and Fax No. Medical Review Office ATTN: (b)(6) 2307 N. Parham Rd Richmond, VA 23229 PHONE-804-348-1010 FAX-804-588-5326	
C. Donor SSN or Employee I.D. No. <u>711 346 346</u>			
D. Specify Testing Authority: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HHS <input type="checkbox"/> NRC <input type="checkbox"/> DOT - Specify DOT Agency: <input type="checkbox"/> FMCSA <input type="checkbox"/> FAA <input type="checkbox"/> FRA <input type="checkbox"/> FTA <input type="checkbox"/> PHMSA <input type="checkbox"/> USCG			
E. Reason for Test: <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-employment <input type="checkbox"/> Random <input type="checkbox"/> Reasonable Suspicion/Cause <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Post Accident <input type="checkbox"/> Return to Duty <input type="checkbox"/> Follow-up <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____			
F. Drug Tests to be Performed: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> THC, COC, PCP, OPI, AMP <input type="checkbox"/> THC & COC Only <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____			
G. Collection Site Address: <u>711 346 346</u>			
		Collector Phone No. _____	
		Collector Fax No. _____	

## STEP 2: COMPLETED BY COLLECTOR (make remarks when appropriate) Collector reads specimen temperature within 4 minutes.

Temperature between 90° and 100° F? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No, Enter Remark _____	Collection: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Split <input type="checkbox"/> Single <input type="checkbox"/> None Provided, Enter Remark _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Observed, Enter Remark _____
REMARKS		

## STEP 3: Collector affixes bottle seal(s) to bottle(s). Collector dates seal(s). Donor initials seal(s). Donor completes STEP 5 on Copy 2 (MRO Copy)

## STEP 4: CHAIN OF CUSTODY - INITIATED BY COLLECTOR AND COMPLETED BY TEST FACILITY

I certify that the specimen given to me by the donor identified in the certification section on Copy 2 of this form was collected, labeled, sealed and released to the Delivery Service noted in accordance with applicable Federal requirements.

SPECIMEN BOTTLE(S) RELEASED TO:

X <u>(b)(6)</u> (PRINT) Collector's Name (First, MI, Last)	<u>05.21.15</u> Date (Mo/Day/Yr)	<u>1:42</u> Time of Collection	<u>AM</u> Name of Delivery Service
---	-------------------------------------	-----------------------------------	---------------------------------------

## STEP 5: COMPLETED BY DONOR

I certify that I provided my urine specimen to the collector; that I have not adulterated it in any manner; each specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in my presence; and that the information provided on this form and on the label affixed to each specimen bottle is correct.

X <u>(b)(6)</u> Signature of Donor	<u>(b)(6)</u> (PRINT) Donor's Name (First, MI, Last)	<u>05.21.15</u> Date (Mo/Day/Yr)
Daytime Phone No. <u>(b)(6)</u>	Evening Phone No. <u>(b)(6)</u>	Date of Birth <u>(b)(6)</u> (Mo/Day/Yr)

After the Medical Review Officer receives the test results for the specimen identified by this form, he/she may contact you to ask about prescriptions and over-the-counter medications you may have taken. Therefore, you may want to make a list of those medications for your own records. THIS LIST IS NOT NECESSARY. If you choose to make a list, do so either on a separate piece of paper or on the back of your copy (Copy 5). - DO NOT PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION ON THE BACK OF ANY OTHER COPY OF THE FORM. TAKE COPY 5 WITH YOU.

## STEP 6: COMPLETED BY MEDICAL REVIEW OFFICER - PRIMARY SPECIMEN

In accordance with applicable Federal requirements, my verification is:

<input type="checkbox"/> NEGATIVE <input type="checkbox"/> POSITIVE for: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> DILUTE	<input type="checkbox"/> TEST CANCELLED
<input type="checkbox"/> REFUSAL TO TEST because - check reason(s) below: <input type="checkbox"/> ADULTERATED (adulterant/reason): _____ <input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTITUTED <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER: _____	

REMARKS: _____		
X _____ Signature of Medical Review Officer	_____ (PRINT) Medical Review Officer's Name (First, MI, Last)	_____ Date (Mo/Day/Yr)

## STEP 7: COMPLETED BY MEDICAL REVIEW OFFICER - SPLIT SPECIMEN

In accordance with applicable Federal requirements, my verification for the split specimen (if tested) is:

<input type="checkbox"/> RECONFIRMED for: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> TEST CANCELLED
<input type="checkbox"/> FAILED TO RECONFIRM for: _____	

REMARKS: _____		
X _____ Signature of Medical Review Officer	_____ (PRINT) Medical Review Officer's Name (First, MI, Last)	_____ Date (Mo/Day/Yr)



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

7

ENCLOSURE (44



(b)(6)





## AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING CLASS SURVEY REPORT

Vessel Name	USNS MERCY	Class Number	7600548
Attending Office	San Diego, CA	Report Number	SC2915981
First Visit Date	01-Jun-2015	Last Visit Date	01-Jun-2015

Report	Survey Description	Status	Outstanding
SC2915981-A	Damage Survey (Class)	Completed	Yes

### Closing Paragraph

It is recommended that this vessel be retained as classed with this Bureau.

### Surveyor(s) to The American Bureau of Shipping Attending Surveyors

(b)(6)

Electronically Signed on 02-Jun-2015

### Reviewed By

(b)(6)

Electronically Signed on 02-Jun-2015, San Diego Port

NOTE: This report evidences that the survey reported herein was carried out in compliance with one or more of the Rules, guides, standards or other criteria of the American Bureau of Shipping and is issued solely for the use of the Bureau, its committees, its clients or other authorized entities. This Report is a representation only that the vessel, structure, item or material equipment, machinery or any other item covered by this Report has been examined for compliance with, or has met one or more of the Rules, guides, standards or other criteria of American Bureau of Shipping. The validity, applicability and interpretation of this report is governed by the Rules and standards of American Bureau of Shipping who shall remain the sole judge thereof. Nothing contained in this Report or in any notation made in the contemplation of this Report shall be deemed to relieve any designer, builder, owner, manufacturer, seller, supplier, repairer, operator or other entity of any warranty express or implied.

A B Report A

Page 1 of 2

ENCLOSURE (45)





# AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING CLASS SURVEY REPORT

Vessel Name	USNS MERCY	Class Number	7600548
Attending Office	San Diego, CA	Report Number	SC2915981
First Visit Date	01-Jun-2015	Last Visit Date	01-Jun-2015

## Outstanding Recommendations

It is recommended that the following outstanding recommendations be dealt with to the satisfaction of the attending Surveyor as follows:

Number	Due by Survey	Due by Date
641	Annual Hull Survey 4	31-Mar-2016

## Damage Survey (Class) - Contact / Striking Damage

Contact between vessel rudder and Arizona Memorial.

### 641 Bottom Plating

Opened In Report	SC2915981-A - Damage Survey (Class)	01-Jun-2015	San Diego, CA
Due By	Annual Hull Survey 4, 31-Mar-2016	Recommendation	Outstanding
Found	Location : Rudder		

As per email confirmation from the Military Sealift Command Supervisory Program Engineer, dated 30 May, 2015, it has been reported that the vessel's rudder has come into contact with the landing platform, dock, or fendering at the Arizona Memorial boat landing in accordance with ABS Rule 1.1.2/7.5.

At this time the vessel Chief Engineer has confirmed that the steering gear is fully operational until the next port of call.

Reference is made to the USCG Form 2692 further detailing the allision.

**Recommendation** At the next port of call, a survey of the vessel's bottom plating, rudder, propeller, steering gear, and shell plating is to be performed to the satisfaction of the attending surveyor to determine the extent of the damage.

**Rectification**





## AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING CLASS SURVEY REPORT

Vessel Name	USNS MERCY	Class Number	7600548
Attending Office	San Diego, CA	Report Number	SC2915982
First Visit Date	04-Jun-2015	Last Visit Date	08-Jun-2015

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the undersigned surveyor(s) to this Bureau, did at the request of the Owners representative attend the Hospital Vessel USNS MERCY, of Port San Diego, CA, United States of America, Class Number 7600548, IMO Number 7390454, on 04-Jun-2015 as the vessel lay afloat, in order to carry out the survey(s) noted below:

Survey Location: Suva, Fiji

Report	Survey Description	Status	Outstanding
SC2915982-A	Survey for Compliance - Class - Underwater survey of rudder relative to reported contact with pier in Honolulu, HI	Completed	No

### Safety Management System Section (IACS PR 17)

No deficiencies were observed during this survey relating to possible Safety Management System failures.

### Closing Paragraph

It is recommended that this vessel be retained as classed with this Bureau.

### Surveyor(s) to The American Bureau of Shipping Attending Surveyors

(b)(6)

Reviewed By

NOTE: This report evidences that the survey reported herein was carried out in compliance with one or more of the Rules, guides, standards or other criteria of the American Bureau of Shipping and is issued solely for the use of the Bureau, its committees, its clients or other authorized entities. This Report is a representation only that the vessel, structure, item or material equipment, machinery or any other item covered by this Report has been examined for compliance with, or has met one or more of the Rules, guides, standards or other criteria of American Bureau of Shipping. The validity, applicability and interpretation of this report is governed by the Rules and standards of American Bureau of Shipping who shall remain the sole judge thereof. Nothing contained in this Report or in any notation made in the contemplation of this Report shall be deemed to relieve any designer, builder, owner, manufacturer, seller, supplier, repairer, operator or other entity of any warranty express or implied.

A B Report A - Preliminary

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ENCLOSURE (46)





## AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING CLASS SURVEY REPORT

Vessel Name	USNS MERCY	Class Number	7600548
Attending Office	San Diego, CA	Report Number	SC2915982
First Visit Date	04-Jun-2015	Last Visit Date	08-Jun-2015

### SC2915982-A : Survey for Compliance - Class

#### 641 Bottom Plating

Opened In Report	SC2915981-A - Damage Survey (Class)	01-Jun-2015	San Diego, CA
Closed In Report	SC2915982-A - Survey for Compliance - Class	08-Jun-2015	San Diego, CA
Due By	Annual Hull Survey 4, 31-Mar-2016	Recommendation	Closed
Found	Location : Rudder		

As per email confirmation from the Military Sealift Command Supervisory Program Engineer, dated 30 May, 2015, it has been reported that the vessel's rudder has come into contact with the landing platform, dock, or fendering at the Arizona Memorial boat landing in accordance with ABS Rule 1.1.2/7.5.

At this time the vessel Chief Engineer has confirmed that the steering gear is fully operational until the next port of call.

Reference is made to the USCG Form 2692 further detailing the allision.

**Recommendation** At the next port of call, a survey of the vessel's bottom plating, rudder, propeller, steering gear, and shell plating is to be performed to the satisfaction of the attending surveyor to determine the extent of the damage.

**Rectification (Full )** This is to certify that the undersigned Surveyor to this Bureau did, at the request of the Owner's representative, attend the US-flagged Hospital Vessel "USNS MERCY" of ABS ID No. 7600548 and 54,367 gross tons as it lay berthed at King's Wharf in Suva, Fiji on 07 June 2015 in order to report upon alleged damage from an allision which occurred in Honolulu, Hawaii on 27 May 2015. It was reported to Class that the rudder contacted the pier at the USS Arizona Memorial as the vessel was maneuvering out of the harbor under tug assist. The undersigned reports as follows:

By way of background, Class was requested to attend the vessel in Suva, Fiji to report upon the condition of the vessel following an allision in Hawaii with the USS Arizona Memorial. At the time of the notification, the vessel was enroute to Fiji. ABS San Diego wrote a non-attendance Outstanding Recommendation in Report No. SC2915981 dated 01 June 2015 for the vessel to be examined at the next port of call relative to the potential damage. US Coast Guard Form 2692 "Report of Marine Casualty" was provided to ABS and reviewed relative to the contact in Honolulu and uploaded into this work order for reference information.

#### In-Water Survey

Divers from Pro Marine Technology were utilized for the in-water survey portion of the examination in Suva, Fiji. Certificate of Service Recognition No. GM2378805-002.R1 dated 26 June 2013 and valid until 25 June 2016 was reviewed for Pro Marine Technology and considered satisfactory as an ABS-approved external specialist for In-Water Surveys. The vessel's stern section bottom plating, propeller, rudder and transom were examined using certified diver video recording equipment. The visibility of the water was approximately 5 ft. The out-of-water portion of the rudder's trailing edge was found with scrape marks, but no visible structural damage. The underwater portion of the rudder's trailing edge beginning from the bottom of the rudder





## AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING CLASS SURVEY REPORT

Vessel Name	USNS MERCY	Class Number	7600548
Attending Office	San Diego, CA	Report Number	SC2915982
First Visit Date	04-Jun-2015	Last Visit Date	08-Jun-2015

extending upwards to a point approximately halfway the full height was found with scrape marks, but no structural damage. The scrape marks wrapped from the trailing edge to the port side of the rudder extending forward for approximately 6 inches. The scrape marks continued to the bottom aft portion of the rudder. Further scrape marks were found on the bottom of the rudder. A close-up examination revealed only removal of the paint and no structural damage to the plating or welds.

### Out of Water Survey

The external portions of the vessel in way of the rudder, stern section, sideshell and transom were visually examined, no deformations or damage noted and considered satisfactory.

### Engine Room / Steering Gear Survey

A general visual examination was conducted of the engine room, sea chests, bilges, propulsion shafting in way of the stern tube and steering gear room. The steering gear was operated off the main distribution board and the rudder exercised from hard over port to hard over starboard in 27 seconds. The steering gear was proven to operate from the navigation bridge deck and locally from the steering gear flat. The rudder actuator and associated attachments to include the tiller and upper rudder stock bolting arrangements were visually examined during the exercising of the gear, no unusual vibrations noted and considered satisfactory. The engineering department commented that there were no abnormalities with the operation of the steering gear during the transit from Honolulu to Fiji.

Based on the above-noted visual examinations and operational tests as well as documentation made available for review and discussions with pertinent shipboard personnel, the Outstanding Recommendation (OSR) noted in San Diego ABS Report No. SC2915981 dated 01 June 2015 is considered permanently dealt with at this time and cleared. A copy of the diver video was made available to Class for inclusion in the local San Diego office files. Reference is made to attachments within this work order relative to snapshots of pertinent diver video and a sketch of the port side trailing edge of the rudder.



From: Captain (b)(6), Military Sealift Command N3/5; and Port Captain (b)(6)

To: Commander Military Sealift Command

Encl: (1) Operational Navigation Assessment from Port Captain (b)(6)

(2) USNS MERCY (T-AH-19) Engineering Assessment from Chief Engineer (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

(3) Navigation Material Assessment from Captain (b)(6)

Subj: USNS MERCY NAVIGATION ASSESSMENT

1. Background. On 27 May, 2015 USNS Mercy allided with the ARIZONA memorial docking pier. A combination of the rudder sliding along the edge of the pier and the wash associated with an ordered full ahead bell resulted in displacement and damage to the pier. A team of subject matter experts were used to assess the navigation capability of the USNS MERCY from both a material and watchstanding aspect. The assessment team members included:

- a. Captain (b)(6) (post MSCLANT Commodore, two USS command tours)
- b. Port Captain (b)(6) (licensed mariner for 20 year, Master licensed for eleven years, retired USN Commander)
- c. Chief Engineer (b)(6) (licensed steam Chief Engineer for 25 years)
- d. Captain (b)(6) (International Safety Management (SMS) auditor, 22 years as licensed mariner with eight years as a licensed Master).

2. Methodology. The navigation assessment was conducted over a six day period (three days underway) and included observation of three navigation briefs and details, observation of two loss of steering drills during both maneuvering lineup and independent steaming, completion of applicable navigation portion of the SMS internal audit, completion of single hull tanker navigation checklist. Observations were conducted on the bridge as well as the engineering plant.

3. Summary of findings.

- a. Navigation observation findings from enclosure (1). The navigation team onboard USNS MERCY has demonstrated safe navigation. The following recommendations are provided to enhance Bridge Resource Management (BRM) and support mission success:

(b)(6)

(2) MSC Afloat Training Team (ATT) provide a Tailored Training Team (TTT) to USNS MERCY focusing on BRM to include deck drills (Loss of Steering, etc.) based on SMS procedures.



(3) Conduct shipboard contracted BRM team training in the future to focus on navigation detail situations (tugs, controlling lines, etc) as a follow up to this assessment teams actions.

(4) Ship Management Team (SMT) address BRM support electronics and equipment deficiencies along with validating SMS Loss of Steering 8.13-001-AH procedure for accuracy via the submission of SMS Finding reports.

b. Engineering findings from enclosure (2). There were no deficiencies in the functioning of the engineering plant or deficiencies with plant operation by USNS MERCY engineers identified in the period leading up to, and during, the 27 May allision with the USS ARIZONA memorial dock. With the new Program Logic Control (PLC) throttle, ordered bells were answered within 30 seconds and at a faster rate than may be accomplished with a conventional steam propulsion plant without PLC. The Engine maneuvering details into Suva, the transit to Savu Savu, and the arrival into Savu Savu, Fiji were routine and uneventful. The automation performed flawlessly. The Engineering spaces are in outstanding condition overall. The Engineers are enthusiastic and motivated for mission success.

c. Navigation material findings from enclosure (3). A Navigation System Assessment and Safety Management System (SMS) Internal Audit were conducted. The bridge team was determined to be knowledgeable with regards to safe navigation practices and voyage planning. All bridge equipment was in good working order. There were findings identified during the course of the assessment which are consistent with previous findings on other vessels, but none created a concern for the crew to safely operate the vessel. The findings include; training on the ECDIS system version onboard not completed, weekly test calls on the GMDSS DSC (Digital Selective Calling) not performed, and "Rate of Turn" indicator on the bridge not installed as required.

4. Summary. The engineering plant material condition and engineering watchstanding are above average. Although minor findings were identified with the navigation equipment and training, none directly contribute or impact the safe navigation of the ship. Some Bridge Resource Management shortfalls were identified during the first observed navigation detail and debriefed to the senior deck officers (Master, Chief Mate, and Second Officers). These shortfalls were corrected and demonstrated during the underway detail leaving Suva, Fiji and anchoring evolution at Savu Savu, Fiji. (b)(6)

Very Respectfully

(b)(6)

Very Respectfully

(b)(6)



11 Jun 2015

From: Captain (b)(6), Port Captain - West, Military Sealift Command  
To: Captain (b)(6), Military Sealift Command

Subj: USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) OPERATIONAL NAVIGATION ASSESSMENT

Ref: (a) Safety Management System (SMS) Procedures

1. Operational Navigation Assessment Team observed three separate navigation briefs and details to include execution of pre-evolution SMS Checklists, independent steaming transit, and at sea Bridge Resource Management (BRM) drills.
2. Observations.

a. Arrival Suva, Fiji:

- Navigation brief and Master Pilot Exchange were effective.
- Communication from Chief Mate, Navigator, and bow (Cargo Mate) and stern (Third Officer) to the Master showed room for improvement.

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(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

- Captain (b)(6) and myself held a post arrival navigation detail debrief with the senior Deck Officer's and Master. The Chief Engineer was also in attendance. The above mentioned items were discussed as well as methods for improvement.

b. Departure Suva, Fiji:

- All the above observations with recommended corrective actions were implemented. Bridge Resource Management (BRM) improved.
  - o The Navigation Officer improvement in his position reports.
  - o Although improved, communication with respect to status of mooring and tug lines from the bridge and the bow show room for some improvement.
  - o The Chief Mate followed our recommendation and conned the vessel for departure from port.



- This action allowed the Master to maintain the “big picture” with respect to ship movement, team communications and overall situational awareness.
- c. Post Suva, Fiji underway BRM focused drills:
  - Steering Gear Casualty Response while in a Maneuvering and UNREP condition.
    - Bridge: SMS procedures were followed by the Helmsman and Captain who had the conn.
    - After Steering: Navigation assessment team members Chief Engineer (b)(6) and SMS Safety Manager Captain (b)(6) verified that the bridge and after steering gyro repeaters were compared and read properly during the pre-underway checks. However during the drill, the after-steering gyro repeater showed a 45° discrepancy from what the bridge repeater showed.
  - Steering Gear Casualty Response while in an Independent Steering condition.
    - Bridge: SMS procedures were followed by the Helmsman, Watch Officer, and Captain.
    - After Steering: SMS procedures were followed by the Helmsman, Watch Officer, and Captain.
    - After Steering: Chief Engineer (b)(6) and SMS Safety Manager Captain (b)(6) found there it to be difficult to hear commands from the bridge in after-steering. Recommend procuring amplified head phones for use in the space.
  - Although the Chief Mate would normally be involved with any deck training evolution, he was not involved with the Loss of Steering drills.
- d. Arrival Savu Savu, Fiji:
  - SMS Pre-Arrival Checks completed satisfactory.
  - Pre-Arrival Navigation Brief conducted satisfactorily.
  - Post departure form Suva, Fiji evolutions debrief from assessment team conducted with bridge team.
  - Precession anchorage accomplished with no untoward conditions and SMS procedures adhered to.

### 3. Recommendations.

- Based on close observations, inspections, and interviews, I recommend that the Master and subordinate Deck Officer's with the exception of (b)(6) remain in place onboard USNS MERCY.

- (b)(6)
- (b)(6)
- The Navigator has been receptive and implemented recommendations, resulting in improvement of BRM.



- The Master is very strong, capable, and experienced Captain.
- Relevant training opportunities identified during this navigation assessment which would provide value to all MSC ships include shipboard contracted BRM Team training, and focused BRM training by MSC Afloat Training Team (ATT) to include drills and SMS procedures.
- Ship Management Team (SMT) address BRM support electronics and equipment deficiencies along with validating SMS Loss of Steering 8.13-001-AH procedure for accuracy via the submission of SMS Finding reports.

4. Summary. The team aboard USNS MERCY is operating the ship satisfactorily as required by reference (a). Coordination and a good working relationships between MSC CIVMARS was evident, and effective coordination with US Navy is in place as well. These positive relationships inherently support good BRM practices and cross functional success in shipboard evolutions. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] The rest of the BRM Deck Officer Team should remain in place and additional ship specific BRM training should be arranged through MSC HQ N1 Training Department.

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

Port Captain - West, USMM



11 June 2015

From: Chief Engineer (b)(6)  
To: Captain (b)(6) USN, Military Sealift Command

Subj: USNS MERCY (T-AH-19) ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT

1. Summary. There were no deficiencies in the functioning of the Engineering Plant or deficiencies with Plant operation by USNS MERCY Engineers identified in the period leading up to, and during, the 27 May allision with the USS ARIZONA Memorial dock. With a PLC controlled throttle, ordered bells were answered within 30 seconds and at a faster rate than may be accomplished with a conventional steam propulsion plant. The Engine maneuvering details into Suva, the transit to Savu Savu, and the Arrival into Savu Savu were routine and uneventful. The automation performed flawlessly. The Engineering spaces are in outstanding condition overall. The Engineers are enthusiastic and motivated for mission success.

2. The USNS MERCY T-AH-19 is a single screw, steam turbine propelled, former SAN CLEMENTE class crude oil tanker. MERCY's boilers generate 875 psig 930 degree F. superheated steam to drive the turbines with a full shaft horsepower output of 24,500 and propeller speed in the range of 92-95 rpm. Full sea speed is 80 rpm.

The marine accident on 27 May 2015 involved the following Engine Bells:

SLOW ASTERN	(-20 RPM)	2 KNOTS
SLOW AHEAD	+20 RPM	5 KNOTS
HALF AHEAD	+40 RPM	8 KNOTS
FULL AHEAD	+60 RPM	12.7 KNOTS

3. There is no Engine Room Bell Data logger. Bells are manually recorded in the Engine Bell Book. There is no ship's digital clock system. Engine Control Room (ERC) Engine Order Telegraph Bell Times were obtained from a common plastic battery operated "Industry for the Blind" Wall Clock. It is difficult to obtain a precise time from these clocks that are found in nearly all US Government facilities and aboard many MSC vessels.

4. Upon arriving in the ERC, I reviewed the electronic Automation Alarm Logs for the Voyage. It was notable that there were very few alarms registered for anything other than those generated when securing a piece of equipment. The Engineering Plant was at 100 per cent operational capability in the period leading up to the 27 May allision.

5. The ship's General Electric Fanuc Engine Room's original Automation had been expanded and upgraded. During the ship's recent ROH, and in conjunction with the USCG Five Year COI, the Automation was groomed in April 2015. Work was performed by Technical Marine Service (TMS). On 01-07 May 2015, TMS technical representatives accompanied the ship from the ROH in Portland, Oregon down to the home port of San Diego. The Automation was adjusted and fine tuned during that voyage. The ship departed on her current mission a short time later on 17 May 2015.



6. During my attendance in the ERC for Transit and Arrival into Suva, Fiji, and the overnight transit and maneuvering into Savu Savu, Fiji the plant operation was routine and uneventful. The Engineers demonstrated competence, confidence, and maintained full situational awareness.

7. The current ERC Console Automation provides continuous trending and display of current process values with the majority of Plant monitored processes. Two separate monitor screens enable a combination of these monitored process values to be separately trended from the continuous trends found on their individual monitor displays. These continuously trending displays enhance the ability of MERCY Engineers to readily identify potential problems before they develop into an Engine casualty. The Automation also permits the Engineers to collect historical data. There were no abnormalities found in these trends or recorded alarms in the period leading up to the Time 0747 allision.

8. A review of the trend in Shaft RPM versus Time in the minutes leading up to the 0747 hour Allision shows a relatively rapid response on the Main Engine Throttle by the Second Assistant Engineer to all ordered Bells. An independent shaft magnetic pick-up rpm indicator provides feedback to the PLC that controls ramp speeds of the Main Engine Throttle. It was noted upon review of the trend of the Shaft RPM over Time that the Automation internal computer clock was one minute ahead of the ship's clocks.

9. A review of the Voyage Engine Logs, Lock Out/Tag Out Log, and SAMM Ship's Force Work List did not find any issues that would have affected this Marine Accident or be considered constituting a negative pattern in any way. The general condition of the Engineering spaces was outstanding.

10. I interviewed the following MERCY personnel:

A/B(W)	(b)(6)	(After Steering)
DEMAC	(b)(6)	(After Steering)
CHELECT	(b)(6)	(ERC/Bell Book)
3A/E(W)	(b)(6)	(8-12 Watch Engineer)
2A/E	(b)(6)	(ERC/Throttle)
Chief Engineer	(b)(6)	(ERC/PIC)

11. In conclusion, there were no Engineering factors that contributed to any portion of the chain of events affiliated with the 27 May 2015 allision of the USNS MERCY's rudder with the USS ARIZONA Memorial Floating dock.

(b)(6)

Military Sealift Command



From: Captain (b)(6) – Safety Manager/ ISM Lead Auditor

To: Captain (b)(6) and Port Captain –West (b)(6)

Encl: (1) Navigation System Assessment Report

(2) Safety Management System (SMS) Internal Audit Report

Subj: Navigation Material Assessment

1. Background. A Navigation Material Assessment was completed on USNS MERCY T-AH 19 by USMM Captain, (b)(6), using both the Navigation Systems Assessment (enclosure (1)) and SMS Internal Audit (enclosure (2)) to:

- Verify industry standards for safe navigation are being utilized
- Evaluate Bridge Navigation Officers knowledge of the bridge equipment
- Verify required tests and documentation is being carried out on specified equipment
- Verify required postings & instructions are displayed as required

Summary:

- i. The navigation assessment began on 07 June and concluded on 08 June 2015 in the port of Suva, Fiji. I found the bridge team knowledgeable with regards to safe navigation practices & voyage planning. All bridge equipment was in good working order with the exception of the VDR not being able to record due to card removal for the recent incident. There were findings identified during the course of the assessment which are consistent with previous findings on other vessels, but none created a concern for the crew to safely operate the vessel. Results found on enclosure (1).
- ii. An annual SMS Internal Audit was conducted on June 8<sup>th</sup> & 9<sup>th</sup> 2015. This audit was carried out to assess & verify the vessels compliance with the company's Safety Management System Program. It consists of crew interviews at all levels including the Master & Chief Engineer.
- iii. The following is a summary of "Findings" from enclosures 1 & 2 that are relevant to the safe navigation of the vessel.
  - A. No "Type Specific" familiarization training was held on ships ECDIS with deck officers. **Corrective Action:** Vessel given a checklist by the auditor, with required criteria to cover in this training. Vessel to schedule training for all deck officers assigned and document this training at first opportunity.



- B. Weekly test calls on the GMDSS DSC (Digital Selective Calling) have not been conducted when in range of a Coast Station as required. **Corrective Action:** Primary operator was made aware of the requirement and will commence making test calls weekly and logging in GMDSS Log.
- C. Vessel is over 50,000 GT's and does not have a "Rate of Turn" indicator as required. **Corrective Action:** Vessel should be budgeted and equipped with "Rate of Turn" indicator at next VRR.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)





**(b)(6) CAPT MSCHQ, N3/5**

---

**From:** (b)(6) CIV MSC, N122  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 30, 2015 13:57  
**To:** (b)(6) CAPT MSCHQ, N3/5; (b)(6) MSC, N3/N5  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV MSCHQ, N00L  
**Subject:** RE: C/M (b)(6) Employment History  
**Attachments:** CM (b)(6) ASSIGNMENTS.xlsx  
**Signed By:** (b)(6)

CAPT and LT,

Attached is C/M (b)(6) assignment history with additional notes. (b)(6) has been in the ammo world for five years prior to being assigned to MERCY. (b)(6) last watchstanding assignment ended in April 2010 on board MOUNT WHITNEY.

V/r

**(b)(6)**

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CAPT MSCHQ, N3/5  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 30, 2015 11:59 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV MSC, N122  
**Cc:** (b)(6) MSC, N3/N5; (b)(6) CIV MSCHQ, N00L  
**Subject:** C/M (b)(6) Employment History

**(b)(6)**

We have C/M history, and some of the ship employments. I am having (b)(6) assist with providing a statement that discusses C/M (b)(6) underway bridge time experience. My understanding is (b)(6) has an ammo pipeline.

Please work with (b)(6) to provide access to the appropriate information system to further define the C/Ms experience to support the opinions and recommendations you previously provided. Thanks.

Very Respectfully  
Captain (b)(6)  
MSC Headquarters  
(b)(6)



1/O-D - (b)(6)

Employed with MSC since 21-Sep-2004

Assignment Status	Organization	Actual		Out of Rate Pay	Start Date	End Date
		Sailing Pos.	Perm. Pos.			
OS - On Board Ship	USNS MERCY Deck	103	104	Sailing Position	19-Apr-15	
OS - On Board Ship	USNS LEWIS AND CLARK Deck	103	104	Sailing Position	22-Dec-13	17-Jun-14
OS - On Board Ship	USNS CESAR CHAVEZ Deck	103	104		21-May-12	17-Aug-13
OS - On Board Ship	USNS COMFORT Deck	103	104		27-Apr-12	20-May-12
OS - On Board Ship	USNS FLINT Deck	103	104		26-Feb-12	9-Mar-12
OS - On Board Ship	USNS FLINT Deck	103	104		9-Jun-11	25-Feb-12
OS - On Board Ship	USNS HENRY J KAISER Deck	105	106		16-May-10	27-May-11
OS - On Board Ship	USS MOUNT WHITNEY Deck	106	106		11-Nov-09	9-Apr-10
OS - On Board Ship	USNS SAN JOSE Deck	106	106		4-Jan-09	23-May-09
OS - On Board Ship	USNS RAPPAHANNOCK Deck	108	108		9-Nov-08	3-Jan-09
OS - On Board Ship	USNS RICHARD BYRD Deck	108	108		31-Oct-07	8-Jun-08
OS - On Board Ship	USNS COMFORT Deck	108	108		31-Jul-07	20-Oct-07
OS - On Board Ship	USNS SAN JOSE Deck	106	108		3-Jul-06	12-Feb-07
OS - On Board Ship	USNS FLINT Deck	108	108		26-Jun-05	10-Apr-06
OS - On Board Ship	USNS FLINT Deck	108	162		7-Nov-04	25-Jun-05

Assignment history is the best gauge of watch standing experience. Most watch standing experience for licensed deck officers (LDOs) is obtained before an employee becomes a Second Officer (78 of 107 Second positions are day vs. watch) or First Officer (58 of 72 First positions are day vs watch). It is not until the LDO becomes a Master that watch standing experience is reinforced.

## KEY

103 1st Officer Day

105 2nd Officer Day

106 2nd Officer Watch

108 3rd Officer Watch

104 1st Officer Watch

162 Able Seaman Maintenance



## Master's Daily Report

USNS Mercy

## Departure Slip

Generated by ShipsLog™

Report Date: Friday, May 29, 2015 00:17

Date and Time: 05/27/2015 07:30

Distance to Pier: 0

Voyage: 4-15

Position:

Latitude: 21°21.9'N

Longitude: 157°56.5'W

Course: 065°PGC 065°T 052°PSC

Weather:

Weather: 11 Nautical Miles Visibility

Wind: 215.0 °T @ Force 1

Sea:

W: 084.0 °T 0 Ft S: 130.0 °T 0 Ft

Barometer: 1019.0

Sea State: 1

Wet Bulb: 64

Dry Bulb: 67

Sea Water: 77

Distance:

	Miles	Days:Hrs:Mins	Knots
Daily Distance, Time, and Average Speed:	0	0:00:00	0
Voyage Distance, Time, and Average Speed	0	0:00:00	0

Remarks:

commence VOY 4-15 Pacific Partnership 2015


Watch Officer: (b)(6)

\*All temperatures are in °F





# CHIEF MATE MANNING FY10 –FY15





(b)(6) CAPT MSCHQ, N3/5

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**Subject:** FW: MERCY Investigation  
**Attachments:** 20 (b)(6) and (b)(6) Work History.xls

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CIV MSC, N122  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 09, 2015 12:07 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CAPT MSCHQ, N3/5  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV MSCHQ, N00L  
**Subject:** RE: MERCY Investigation

CAPT,

HRMS has been down most of yesterday and this morning, so we are having difficulty looking up records. I used the assignment list Placement provided you last month and spoke to the Placement detailer.

2/O (b)(6) most recent assignment to MERCY began 10 Dec 2014. (b)(6) is a permanent 3/O and was temporarily promoted to 2/O effective with the assignment on 10 Dec 2014. On 8 Feb 2015 Placement initiated a change of detailer, so a new entry was made to reflect a new assignment. (b)(6) was assigned as a code 105, which is a 2/O Day. MERCY usually has two 2/O (D), one Cargo and one NAV/OPS (both code 105), and a 2/O Watch (code 106). The present manning report has the 2/O Watch position gapped. (b)(6) served as 2/O Watch in MERCY June - August 2014.

The dates for the MERCY shipyard period for overhaul and dry docking was from 01/01/15 to 03/27/15. In the April and May period prior to deploying on present mission 19 May 2015, based on conversations setting up an ATT visit, the MERCY transited from San Diego to Portland OR and back to San Diego (I don't have access to schedules to see what other underway times were done in that period). So it appears that is the only experience (b)(6) had as Nav/Ops, which was brief.

V/r (b)(6)

CIVMAR Training Manager, N122  
Military Sealift Command  
Norfolk VA  
(b)(6)



2/O-D (OPS A) - (b)(6)  
Employed with MSC since 18-Jan-2011

Assignment Status	Organization	Sailing Pos.	Perm. Pos.	Perm. Coa	Out of Rate Pay	Start Date	End Date
OS - On Board Ship	USNS MERCY Deck	105	108	West	Sailing Position	8-Feb-15	
OS - On Board Ship	USNS MERCY Deck	105	108	West	Sailing Position	10-Dec-14	7-Feb-15
OS - On Board Ship	USNS MERCY Deck	106	108	West	Sailing Position	6-Jun-14	9-Aug-14
OS - On Board Ship	USNS MERCY Deck	107	108	West	Sailing Position	18-May-14	5-Jun-14
OS - On Board Ship	USNS MERCY Deck	108	108	West		4-May-14	17-May-14
OS - On Board Ship	USNS APACHE Deck	108	108	West		14-Mar-14	23-Mar-14
OS - On Board Ship	USNS MERCY Deck	108	108	West		14-Feb-14	9-Mar-14
OS - On Board Ship	USNS WASHINGTON CHAMBERS Deck	108	108	West		15-Sep-13	7-Nov-13
OS - On Board Ship	USNS LEWIS AND CLARK Deck	108	108	West		6-Nov-12	13-May-13
OS - On Board Ship	USNS CARL BRASHEAR Deck	108	108	East		13-Sep-11	26-Jun-12

Key

108	3rd Officer Watch
107	3rd Officer Day
106	2nd Officer Watch
105	2nd Officer Day

2

ENCLOSURE (51)



# USNS MERCY (T-AH 19)

## 12 Month Slider Capture

